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Complexity and Cultural Sources of Law in the EU Context: From the Multilevel Constitutionalism to the Constitutional Synallagma

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

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In this work I will try to analyse the latest trends of the European integration process in light of the notion of complexity, conceived as a bilaterally active relationship between diversities.

This notion of complexity comes from a comparison among the different meanings of this word as used in several disciplines (law, physics, mathematics, psychology, philosophy) and recovers the etymological sense of this concept (complexity from Latin complexus= interlaced). The effort to find a common linguistic core could cause ambiguity but I would like to take the risk because only a multidisciplinary approach can “catch” the hidden dimension of the European process I argue that the European Union legal order is a “complex” entity that shares some features with complex systems in natural sciences: non-reducibility, unpredictability, non-reversibility and non-determinability.

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Copyright © 2007 by German Law Journal GbR 

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