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Beyond Dispute: International Judicial Institutions as Lawmakers

  • Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke

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The increasing number of international judicial institutions, producing an ever-growing stream of decisions, has been one of the dominant features of the international legal order of the past two decades. The shift in quantity has gone hand in hand with a transformation in quality. Today, it is no longer convincing to only think of international courts in their role of settling disputes. While this function is as relevant as ever, many international judicial institutions have developed a further role in what is often called global governance. Their decisions have effects beyond individual disputes. They exceed the confines of concrete cases and bear on the general legal structures. The practice of international adjudication creates and shifts actors' normative expectations and as such develops legal normativity. Many actors use international judicial decisions in similar ways as they do formal sources of international law. To us, this role of international adjudication beyond the individual dispute is beyond dispute.

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References

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1 Note that we follow a broad understanding of the term “court”. It covers arbitral tribunals as well as other institutions fulfilling a court-like function such as the WTO panels and Appellate Body even if they change in composition and do not formally decide a case. See also Project on International Courts and Tribunals, available at: http://www.pict-pcti.org, (adopting an equally broad understanding of “court”); cf. Cesare Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 NYU Journal of International Law & Politics 709 (1999).

2 The creation and stabilization of normative expectations is considered by many, otherwise diverging, contemporary theories as the core function of law, see Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms 427 (1997); Luhmann, Niklas, Das Recht der Gesellschaft 151 (1995).

3 Note that Art. 38 ICJ-Statute refers to judicial decisions as “subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law”, we discuss this qualification infra section II.C, notes 62-64.

4 Cf. Shany, Yuval, No Longer a Weak Department of Power? Reflections on the Emergence of a New International Judiciary, 20 EJIL 73 (2009).

5 It follows the study on “The Exercise of Public Authority by International Organizations”, Special Issue, 9 German Law Journal (2008); The Exercise of Public Authority by International Institutions: Advancing International Institutional law (Armin von Bogdandy, Rüdiger Wolfrum, Jochen von Bernstorff, Philipp Dann & Matthias Goldmann eds, 2010). See further Ingo Venzke, On Words and Deeds. How the Practice of Interpretation Develops International Norms (unpublished doctoral thesis, 2010).

6 See respectively the contributions in this issue by Stephan Schill, System-Building in Investment Treaty Arbitration and Lawmaking; Ingo Venzke, Making General Exceptions: The Spell of Precedents in Developing Article XX GATT into Standards for Domestic Regulatory Policy; Michael Ioannidis, A Procedural Approach to the Legitimacy of International Adjudication: Developing Standards of Participation in WTO Law; Thomas Kleinlein, Judicial Lawmaking by Judicial Restraint? The Potential of Balancing in International Economic Law; Christina Binder, The Prohibition of Amnesties by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights; Milan Kuhli & Klaus Günther, Judicial Lawmaking, Discourse Theory, and the ICTY on Belligerent Reprisals; Karin Oellers-Frahm, Expanding the Competence to Issue Provisional Measures – Strengthening the International Judicial Function; Markus Fyrnys, Expanding Competences by Judicial Lawmaking: The Pilot Judgment Procedure of the European Court of Human Rights; Marc Jacob, Precedents: Lawmaking Through International Adjudication.

7 Casini, Lorenzo, The Making of a Lex Sportiva by the Court of Arbitration for Sport, in this issue.

8 Schill, Stephan, Fair and Equitable Treatment, the Rule of Law, and Comparative Public Law, in: International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law, 151 (Stephan Schill ed., 2010).

9 Dolzer, Rudolf & Schreuer, Christoph, Principles of International Investment Law 18 (2008).

10 Hirsch, Moshe, Conflicting Obligations in International Investment Law: Investment Tribunals’ Perspective, in: The Shifting Allocation of Authority in International Law, 323, 344 (Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany eds, 2008).

11 See, e.g., Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law 1010 (2008); Daillier, Patrick, Alain Pellet, Mathias Forteau & Nguyen Quoc Dinh, Droit international public 923 (2009).

12 Habermas, Jürgen, The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays (2001); Leibfried, Stephan & Zürn, Michael, Von der nationalen zur post-nationalen Konstellation, in: Transformationen des Staates?, 19 (Stephan Leibfried & Michael Zürn eds, 2006); Bogdandy, Armin von, Globalization and Europe: How to Square Democracy, Globalization, and International Law, 15 EJIL 885 (2004); Venzke (note 5).

13 For a fierce and unconvincing argument on the illegitimacy, or, at best, plain futility of international adjudication, see Eric A. Posner, The Perils of Global Legalism (2009); with regard to the ECJ, see Dietrich Murswiek, Die heimliche Entwicklung des Unionsvertrages zur europäischen Oberverfassung, 28 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 481, 484 (2009).

14 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 22 July 2010, available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15987.pdf; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 9 July 2004, available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1671.pdf. See Karin Oellers-Frahm, Lawmaking through Advisory Opinions?, in this issue. For pointed commentary on the direction of impact of each opinion, see Robert Howse & Ruti Teitel, Delphic Dictum: How Has the ICJ Contributed to the Global Rule of Law by its Ruling on Kosovo?, 11 German Law Journal 841 (2010); Agora: ICJ Advisory Opinion on Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 99 AJIL 1 (2005).

15 Bogdandy, Armin von & Venzke, Ingo, On the Democratic Legitimation of International Judicial Lawmaking, in this issue.

16 Cf. Lege, Joachim, Was Juristen wirklich tun. Jurisprudential Realism, in: Rechtsphilosophie im 21. Jahrhundert, 207, 216 (Winfried Brugger, Ulfried Neumann & Stephan Kirste eds, 2008); Christensen, Ralph & Kudlich, Hans, Theorie richterlichen Begründens 26 (2001).

17 See International Law Commission, Third Report on the Law of Treaties, 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 5, 53 (1964) (assembling testimony for such a view on interpretation). Cf. Andrea Bianchi, Textual Interpretation and (International) Law Reading: The Myth of (In)Determinacy and the Genealogy of Meaning, in: Making Transnational Law Work in the Global Economy, 34 (Pieter H. F. Bekker, Rudolf Dolzer & Michael Waibel eds, 2010).

18 Shklar, Judith N., Legalism 12-13 (1964). Consider the ICJ's emblematic pronouncements in Fisheries Jurisdiction (Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland), 25 July 1974, ICJ Reports 1974, 3, para. 53; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, 226, para. 18.

19 Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason A131-148 (2008 [1781]). Cf. Martti Koskenniemi, Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes about International Law and Globalization, 8 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 9 (2007).

20 Kelsen, Hans, Law and Peace in International Relations 163 (1942); Kelsen, Hans, Reine Rechtslehre. Einleitung in die rechtswissenschaftliche Problematik 82-83 (1934).

21 Id., 74, 95; Hans Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre entwickelt aus der Lehre vom Rechtssatze xii-xvi (1923). In closer detail, András Jakab, Probleme der Stufenbaulehre, 91 Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 333, 334 (2005).

22 See The Linguistic Turn. Essays in Philosophical Method (Richard Rorty ed., 1967) (giving the name to this shift in philosophy); Richard Rorty, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and the Reification of Language, in: 2 Essays on Heidegger and Others, 50 (1991) (offering an accessible overview on what it is about).

23 Brandom argues that “there is nothing more to the concept of the legal concepts being applied that the content they acquire through a tradition of such decisions, that the principles that emerge from this process are appropriately thought of as ‘judge-made law'”. Robert B. Brandom, Some Pragmatist Themes in Hegel's Idealism: Negotiation and Administration in Hegel's Account of the Structure and Content of Conceptual Norms, 7 European Journal of Philosophy 164, 180 (1999). A similar argument has been developed before by Friedrich Müller, Richterrecht – rechtstheoretisch formuliert, in: Richterliche Rechtsfortbildung. Erscheinungsformen, Auftrag und Grenzen, 65, 78 (Hochschullehrer der Juristischen Fakultät der Universität Heidelberg eds, 1986).

24 Brandom (note 23), 181 (“[t]he current judge is held accountable to the tradition she inherits by the judges yet to come.”). Cf. Jasper Liptow, Regel und Interpretation. Eine Untersuchung zur sozialen Struktur sprachlicher Praxis 220-226 (2004).

25 Von Bogdandy & Venzke (note 15).

26 Koch, Hans-Joachim & Helmut Rüßmann, Juristische Begründungslehre 5, 69 (1982). See specifically on the lawmaking dimension of judicial decisions id., 248.

27 This is also the central theme in Rorbert B. Brandom, Making it Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment (1998). For a concise introduction into this theme, see Robert B. Brandom, Objectivity and the Normative Fine Structure of Rationality, in: Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism, 186 (2000).

28 Neumann, Ulfried, Theorie der juristischen Argumentation, in: Rechtspilosophie im 21. Jahrhundert, 233, 241 (Winfried Brugger, Ulfried Neumann & Stephan Kirste eds, 2008). Many have argued that the concept of decision, i.e. a choice between at least two alternatives, defies the possibility that it can be found. This is quite a fitting thought, although not all consequences drawn from it are equally compelling. Jacques Derrida, Force of Law. The Mystical Foundation of Authority, 11 Cardozo Law Review 919 (1990); Luhmann (note 2), 308.

29 Dodge, William S., Res Judicata, in: The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2006), available at: http://www.mpepil.com.

30 Kirchner, Christian, Zur konsequentialistischen Interpretationsmethode, in: Internationalisierung des Rechts und seine ökonomische Analyse, 37, 39 (Tomas Eger, Jochen Bigus, Claus Ott & Georg von Wangenheim eds, 2008).

31 Shahabuddeen, Mohamed, Precedent in the World Court 76, 209 (1996); Iain Scobbie, Res Judicata, Precedent, and the International Court: A Preliminary Sketch, 20 Australian Yearbook of International Law 299 (1999); Schill, Stephan W., The Multilateralization of International Investment Law 321 (2009); Höland, Armin, Wie wirkt Rechtsprechung?, 30 Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie 23, 35 (2009). Also see Oellers-Frahm (note 14), 1046 (arguing that advisory opinions do not only clarify the law but also contribute to establishing basic doctrines of international law)

32 Binder (note 6).

33 Oellers-Frahm (note 6).

34 Schill (note 6). Cf. Jacob (note 6) (showing how arguing with precedents is quite natural and appealing in judicial reasoning, not least because it has a legitimating effect).

35 Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court), 14 October 2004, 2 BvR1481/04, 111 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 307, for an English translation, see http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20041014_2bvr148104en.html, margin number 68 (referring to a domestic court's duty to take a decision of the ECHR into account).

36 See Binder (note 6).

37 Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), 13 July 2009, para. 64. Cf. Julian Arato, Subsequent Practice and Evolutive Interpretation: Techniques of Treaty Interpretation over Time and Their Diverse Consequences, 9 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 443 (2010).

38 See Richterliche Rechtsfortbildung. Erscheinungsformen, Auftrag und Grenzen (Hochschullehrer der Juristischen Fakultät der Universität Heidelberg eds, 1986).

39 This distinction is held up in the use of different terms in German-speaking legal science whereas in the world of common law the innovative judge frequently simply figures as lawmaker. South Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Justice Holmes, dissenting); Lord Reid, The Judge as Law Maker, 12 Journal of the Society of Public Teachers of Law 22 (1972).

40 Oellers-Frahm (note 14), section D.III.

41 Lauterpacht, Hersch, The Development of International Law by the International Court 155-223 (1958) (speaking of “judicial legislation”).

42 See Conze, Werner, Demokratie, in: 1 Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, 848 (Otto Brunner, Werner Conze & Reinhart Koselleck eds, 1972).

43 See Mosler, Hermann & Oellers-Frahm, Karin, Article 94, in: The Charter of the United Nations. A Commentary, 1174, 1176 (Bruno Simma ed., 2002).

44 Dahl, Robert A., The Concept of Power, 2 Behavioral Science 201, 202 (1957); Dahrendorf, Ralf, Über den Ursprung der Ungleichheit unter den Menschen 20 (1961).

45 Cf. Barnett, Michael & Duvall, Raymond, Power in Global Governance, in: Power in Global Governance, 1 (Michael Barnett & Raymond Duvall eds, 2005) (offering a nuanced conception of power that suits present purposes).

46 See Venzke, Ingo, International Bureaucracies in a Political Science Perspective—Agency, Authority and International Institutional Law, 9 German Law Journal 1401 (2008).

47 Bogdandy, Armin von, Philipp Dann & Matthias Goldmann, Developing the Publicness of Public International Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities, 9 German Law Journal 1375, 1381 (2008).

48 Reputational costs are relevant even for such weighty and mighty actors as the United States. In a rational choice perspective, see Andrew Guzman, How International Law Works 71 (2008).

49 Art. 46 (2) European Convention on Human Rights.

50 Art. 193 et seq. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

51 Art. 22 Dispute Settlement Understanding.

52 Art. 54 ICSID-Convention.

53 On the akin concept of “semantic fights”, see Ralph Christensen & Michael Sokolowski, Recht als Einsatz im semantischen Kampf, in: Semantische Kämpfe. Macht und Sprache in den Wissenschaften, 353 (Ekkehard Felder ed., 2006). For a yet more drastic understanding, see Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale Law Journal 1601 (1986).

54 Boyle, Alan E. & Chinkin, Christine M., The Making of International Law 272-311 (2007). Cf. Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 Hastings Law Journal 814, 838 (1987), (“The judgment represents the quintessential form of authorized, public, official speech which is spoken in the name of and to everyone. These performative utterances … formulated by authorized agents acting on behalf of the collectivity, are magical acts which succeed because they have the power to make themselves universally recognized. They succeed in creating a situation in which no one can refuse or ignore the point of view, the vision, which they impose.”)

55 See, in particular, the contributions by Jacob (note 6); Schill (note 6); Venzke (note 6); Oellers-Frahm, (note 14).

56 Appellate Body Report, JapanTaxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS 8, 10 and 11/AB/R, 4 October 1996, 1415.

57 This is a reference to Art. 11 DSU. See, Appellate Body Report, United States – Final Anti-Dumping Measures on Stainless Steel from Mexico, WT/DS344/AB/R, 30 April 2008, para. 162 (stating that “We are deeply concerned about the Panel's decision to depart from well-established Appellate Body jurisprudence clarifying the interpretation of the same legal issues. The Panel's approach has serious implications for the proper functioning of the WTO dispute settlement system”).

58 See Venzke (note 6).

59 Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of the Meeting held on 6 November 1998, WT/DSB/M/50, 12.

60 On the concept of reputation, see Guzman (note 48), 71.

61 Pellet, Allain, Article 38, in: Statute of the International Court of Justice. A Commentary (Andreas Zimmermann, Christian Tomuschat & Karin Oellers-Frahm eds, 2006), 677, paras 301-319; Godefridus J. H. van Hoof, Rethinking the Sources of International Law 169 (1983).

62 See, e.g., Abi-Saab, Georges, Les sources du droit international: Essai de déconstruction, in: 1 El derecho internacional en un mundo en transformacion, 29 (Manuel Rama-Montaldo ed., 1994); Boyle & Chinkin (note 54), 267.

63 Id., 266-272; more cautious and openly flagging his common law bias, Robert Howse, Moving the WTO Forward—One Case at a Time, 42 Cornell International Law Journal 223 (2009).

64 See already Manley O. Hudson, Progress in International Organization 80 (1981 [1932]); Lauterpacht (note 41), 155 (“judicial law-making is a permanent feature of administration of justice in every society “).

65 See Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Entstehung und Wandel des Rechtsstaatsbegriffs, in: Recht, Staat, Freiheit, 143 (1991); Loughlin, Martin, Public Law and Political Theory 138 (1992).

66 Locke, John, The Second Treatise of Government ch. XII (1690); Vergottini, Giuseppe de, Diritto costituzionale comparato 346 et seq. (1999); for a detailed analysis, see Hansjörg Seiler, Gewaltenteilung: Allgemeine Grundlagen und schweizerische Ausgestaltung (1994); Möllers, Christoph, Gewaltengliederung: Legitimation und Dogmatik im nationalen und internationalen Rechtsvergleich (2005).

67 For an early use of such a conception of positivity, see Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Philosophie des Rechts § 3 (1970).

68 Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Demokratie als Verfassungsprinzip, in: Recht, Staat, Freiheit, 289, 322 (1991). With regard to the situation in a common law context: Patrick Atiyah & Robert Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law 141 (1991).

69 Bogdandy, Armin von, Gubernative Rechtsetzung 35 (2000). We do not think that international courts can draw sufficient legitimacy from the fact that they check the power exercised by other institutions. Such argument is made by Sabino Cassese, When Legal Orders Collide: The Role of Courts 122-124 (2010).

70 Our argumentation only relates to countries with a democratic constitution. For citizens living under authoritarian rule, this problem has to be examined separately. On the role of parliaments, see Armin von Bogdandy, Parlamentarismus in Europa: eine Verfalls- oder Erfolgsgeschichte?, 130 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 445 (2005); Dann, Philipp, Parlamente im Exekutivföderalismus 294 (2004); Hilf, Meinhard & Matthias Reuß, Verfassungsfragen lebensmittelrechtlicher Normierung im europäischen und internationalen Recht, 24 Zeitschrift für das gesamte Lebensmittelrecht 289, 293 (1997); Wolfrum, Rüdiger, Die Kontrolle der auswärtigen Gewalt, 56 Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtler 38 (1997).

71 Klabbers, Jan, On Rationalism in Politics: Interpretation of Treaties and the World Trade Organization, 74 Nordic Journal of International Law 405 (2005); Bartels, Lorand, The Separation of Powers in the WTO: How to Avoid Judicial Activism? 53 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 861 (2004).

72 Abbott, Kenneth & Snidal, Duncan, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 International Organization 421, 429 (2000); Goldstein, Judith, Miles Kahler, Robert Keohane & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Introduction: Legalization and World Politics, 54 International Organization 385 (2000) (understanding this to be a general political strategy).

73 Art. 13(2) Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GAOR III Resolutions, UN-Doc. A/810, 71; Art. 12(2) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNTS, Vol. 999, 171; Art. 2(2) Additional Protocol 4 to the European Convention on Human Rights, ETS No. 46.

74 Note that, referring to the doubtful legitimation of arbitral jurisdiction, Bolivia declared on 1 May 2007, that it would exit the ICSID Convention, see Bolivia Foreign Ministry, Letter Concerning Denunciation of ICSID Convention, 1 May 2007, 46 International Legal Materials 973 (2007). Also see Christian Tietje, Karsten Nowrot & Clemens Wackernagel, Once and Forever? The Legal Effects of a Denunciation of ICSID, in: 74 Beiträge zum Transnationalen Wirtschaftsrecht (Christian Tietje, Gerhard Kraft & Rolf Sethe eds, 2008).

75 See respectively the contributions by Binder (note 6), Venzke (note 6), Schill (note 6), Oellers-Frahm (note 14). Compare this with the ambivalent track record explained by Petersen (note 6).

76 On developments in procedural law that form part of strategies responding to problems in the justification if international judicial lawmaking, see von Bogdandy & Venzke (note 15).

77 Oellers-Frahm (note 6).

78 Fyrnys (note 6).

79 Benvenisti, Eyal & Downs, George, Prospects for the Increased Independence of International Tribunals, in this issue.

80 Lieber, Tobias, Diskursive Vernunft und formelle Gleichheit. Zu Demokratie, Gewaltenteilung und Rechtsanwendung in der Rechtstheorie von Jürgen Habermas 226-229 (2007).

81 We take this point from Jürgen Bast, Das Demokratiedefizit fragmentierter Internationalisierung, in: Demokratie in der Weltgesellschaft. Soziale Welt – Sonderband 18, 177 (Hauke Brunkhorst ed., 2009). Also see Möllers (note 66), 31, 223.

82 Paulus, Andreas L., Subsidiarity, Fragmentation and Democracy: Towards the Demise of General International Law?, in: The Shifting Allocation of Authority in International Law: Considering Sovereignty, Supremacy and Subsidiarity, 193, 210 (Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany eds, 2008).

83 Koskenniemi, Martti & Leino, Päivi, Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties, 15 Leiden Journal of International Law 553 (2002); Treves, Tullio, Fragmentation of International Law, The Judicial Perspective, 23 Comunicazione e studi 821 (2007).

84 To what extent the potential for legitimation, which arises from decision-making processes within the states, is affected by the fragmentation cannot be further examined at this place.

85 Paulus (note 82), 210.

* Armin von Bogdandy is Director at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law (MPIL), Heidelberg, Professor of Law at the Goethe University, Frankfurt, and President of the OECD Nuclear Energy Tribunal. Ingo Venzke is a Hauser Research Scholar at New York University Law School and a Research Fellow at the MPIL; this author's work was supported by the Postdoc-Program of the German Academic Exchange Service. Both authors wish to thank Rudolf Bernhardt, Jochen von Bernstorff, Sabino Cassese, Jochen Frowein, Yuval Shany, Bruno Simma, Rüdiger Wolfrum and all participants of the present collaborative research project for their comments on earlier versions of this contribution.

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  • Armin von Bogdandy and Ingo Venzke

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