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Neo-liberalism at a Time of Crisis: the Case of Taxation*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 2011

Dries Lesage  and
Mattias Vermeiren
Dries Lesage*
Affiliation:
Ghent Institute for International Studies, Universiteit Gent, Belgium. E-mail: dries.lesage@ugent.be; matthias.vermeiren@ugent.be
Mattias Vermeiren*
Affiliation:
Ghent Institute for International Studies, Universiteit Gent, Belgium. E-mail: dries.lesage@ugent.be; matthias.vermeiren@ugent.be
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Abstract

This essay explores how the global financial crisis of 2008–2009 has affected the stability of what Stephen Gill has termed the ‘new constitutionalism of disciplinary neo-liberalism’,1 more precisely, in the realm of international tax policy. Rather than providing an in-depth and complete empirical study of the matter, this essay will highlight certain interesting developments and touch upon a series of possibly relevant questions that could form the basis for a future research agenda. In the first section, we will examine the remarkable strength and resilience of the new constitutionalism as the institutional component of neo-liberal hegemony. Then we will proceed to an exploration of the impact of the crisis on this hegemony, also paying attention to deepening geopolitical multipolarity as an additional variable. The final, more empirical section will investigate the case of international taxation in this context, and demonstrate that new constitutionalism remains a crucial supporting pillar of neo-liberal globalisation.

Type
Focus: Globalization
Information
European Review , Volume 19 , Issue 1 , February 2011 , pp. 43 - 56
Copyright
Copyright © Academia Europaea 2011

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