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12. Nevertheless, the crisis could never have occurred without free capital mobility. As noted by Dieter, H., Seabrooke, L.and Tsingou, E. (2009) The Global Credit Crisis and the Politics of Financial Reform. GARNET Policy Brief No. 8. ‘A key aspect of the current crisis is that the US was able to draw on the savings of Asia and continental Europe, drowning itself in a sea of foreign liquidity. Restrictions on capital flows would have prevented the US crisis and subsequent global contagion as the US would have had to finance its spending exuberance from domestic savings – since that would not have been possible, the bubble would not have inflated as much as it has. In their various formats (restrictions, taxes, reserve requirements) capital controls might therefore have been a legitimate tool of economic policy.’
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19. Although China (eventually supported by the other BRICs) has criticised the inefficiencies associated with the global dollar standard and is increasingly trying to promote the international use of its currency, financial liberalisation will be a necessary condition for its currency to acquire global currency status (Eichengreen, B. (2009) The dollar dilemma. Foreign Affairs, 88). In this way, China’s contestation of one of the main pillars of US hegemony may lead it to embrace one of the main pillars of neoliberal hegemony – free capital mobility.
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