Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 January 2017
This paper suggests how the regulation of Solar RadiationManagement (SRM) field research in Europe could be designed to maximise the possibility of securing legitimacy. It argues that legitimacy is maximised when regulatory frameworks are legal, and also responsive, flexible, deliberative and inclusive. By adopting an ‘incorporated’ approach to assessing the risk of Solar Radiation Management (SRM) field research, the EU can import elements of ‘directly deliberative polyarchy’ into its otherwise orthodox constitutional regulatory approach thereby maximising legitimacy. The argument is new in so far as it juxtaposes two conceptions of procedural legitimacy – one institutional and the other functional – in the context of significant scientific uncertainty in the technocratic regulatory paradigm of the EU. The significance of the work is that it draws on these conceptions of legitimacy to advance a pragmatic model of institutional design which comprises procedures that maximise legitimacy with minimal disruption to the EU's institutional balance of powers.
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3 There are now a range of different terms used for geoengineering and its component activities, such as ‘climate engineering’ in Asbjorn Aaheim et al. “The European Transdisciplinary Assessment of Climate Engineering (EuTRACE): Removing Greenhouse Gases from the Atmosphere and Reflecting Sunlight away from Earth.” (2015); ‘Climate Intervention’ in Committee on Geoengineering Climate, Climate Intervention: Reflecting Sunlight to Cool Earth. (National Academies Press, 2015), at p. 2. The debate about the classification of geoengineering techniques is ongoing. See Clare Heyward, “Situating and Abandoning Geoengineering: A Typology of Five Responses to Dangerous Climate Change.” 46.01 Political Science & Politics (2013); Boucher, Olivier et al., “Rethinking Climate Engineering Categorization in the Context of Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation”, 5 Clim Change (2014), pp. 23 et sqq.Google Scholar; Duncan McLaren, “Why We Shouldn't Be in a Hurry To Redefine Climate Engineering”, 15th December 2015, available on the internet at http://dcgeoconsortium.org/2015/12/15/why-we-shouldnt-be-in-a-hurry-to-redefine-climate-engineering-duncan-mclaren/ (last accessed 6th January 2016).
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15 I have replaced the term ‘value’ with subject matter in order to reduce its ambiguity. In the context of this paper, value is associated with my definition of political activity and used contra science.
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18 I use the term ‘significant’ in its ordinary, not statistical, sense. In this paper the meaning of the word significant is differentiated from its use in statistics because it relates to scientific uncertainty rather than statistical uncertainty. Scientific uncertainty may or may not be calculated statistically. So, whilst the phrase significant scientific uncertainty could comprise statistical uncertainty, it does not denote it necessarily.
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22 Examples include: the reduction of sunlight intensity, Ibid, p. 95; changes to precipitation, Ibid; and acidity of snow and rain, Ibid.
23 Ibid, p. 98.
24 Ibid, p. 95.
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37 1 EJRR (2010), pp. 5 et sqq.
38 Emeritus Professor of Public Policy at the European University Institute.
39 Majone, “Foundations of Risk Regulation”, supra note 37, pp. 5.
42 The transboundary-ness of risks may or may not align with technology development vs. process studies. Likewise, research vs. deployment may or may not align with EU vs. unknown regulation.
43 These may be effects that are localised and minimal, such as increased air-moisture levels resulting from small-scale test of crop-leaf albedo.
44 Parker, “Governing Solar Geoengineering Research”, supra note 12.
45 Ibid.; Keith et al, “Field Experiments on Solar Geoengineering”, supra note 34.
49 An example might be the Stratospheric Particle Injection for Climate Engineering (SPICE) project, details found at http://www.spice.ac.uk/.
50 For example, the proposed SCoPex at Committee on Geoengineering Climate, Reflecting Sunlight to Cool Earth, supra note 3, p. 161; John A Dykema et al. “Stratospheric Controlled Perturbation Experiment: a Amall-scale Experiment to Improve Understanding of the Risks of Solar Geoengineering.” 372.2031 Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A: (2014): 20140059.
51 Parker, “Governing Solar Geoengineering Research”, supra note 12.
52 Cafaggi, “New Foundations”, supra note 6.
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57 Majone, “Foundations of Risk Regulation”, supra note 37, p. 6
58 UK House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 2010, The Regulation of Geoengineering, Fifth Report of Session 2009-10 (UK Parliament, HC 221), at pp. 20–21, where the Committee found there to be a “gap in the regulatory framework”.
60 UK House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 2010, supra note 58, pp. 49–52 Conclusions and Recommendations, et sqq. Ev27-31 Evidence of Joan Ruddock, Minister for State of Department of Energy and Climate Change.
61 Such as law schools, geography departments, earth science schools and meteorological centres http://www.iagp.ac.uk/ last accessed on 17th May 2015.
62 UK House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 2010, supra note 58, at Ev. 31 - Evidence of Pidgeon.
63 Scott et al, “The Conceptual and Constitutional Challenge of Transnational Private Regulation”, supra note 53, at p. 3.
65 Cafaggi, “New Foundations”, supra note 6, at p. 21.
66 Ibid., at pp. 20–21.
67 Solar Radiation Management Governance Initiative (SRMGI), Solar Radiation Management: The Governance of Research, (2012) at p. 12.
68 Others have been the Oxford Geoengineering Programme and then Geoengineering Governance Research.
69 SRMGI 2012, supra note 67, at p. 4.
70 Ibid., at p. 4.
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73 Such as the Fund for Innovative Climate and Energy Research (FICER), funded by Bill Gates and managed by the University of Calgary.
74 For a typology of actors see Cafaggi et al, “Transnational Private Regulation: OECD”, supra at note 54.
75 UK House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 2010, supra note 58, at Ev. 30; http://www.understanding-risk.org last accessed on 14 May 2015.
76 Ibid, p. 25 et sqq., para. 55.
77 Ibid, p. 33 et sqq., para. 84.
78 Asilomar Scientific Organizing Committee, “The Asilomar Conference Recommendations on Principles for Research into Climate Engineering Techniques.” Washington DC, Climate Institute, (2010); Margaret Leinen, “The Asilomar International Conference on Climate Intervention Technologies: Background and Overview.” Stanf J Law Sci Policy IV (2011), pp. et sqq. 1–5; Schäfer and Low, “Asilomar Moments”, supra note 13.
79 Rayner et al, “The Oxford Principles”, supra note 71.
81 Ibid. at pp. 502–503.
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87 Steve Rayner, Julian Savulescu and Tim Kruger.
88 Nick Pidgeon.
89 Catherine Redgwell, University College London, now at All Souls College, University of Oxford.
90 Rayner et al, “The Oxford Principles”, supra note 71, at p. 509.
91 Granger Morgan, Robert Nordhaus and Paul Gottlieb, “Needed: Research Guidelines for Solar Radiation Management”, Issues in Science and Technology (2013) 37–44.
93 Morgan, Nordhaus and Gottlieb 2013, supra note 91, at p. 41; UK House of Commons Science and Technology Committee 2010, supra note 58, at p. 29.
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101 Article 191 TFEU.
102 Article 168 TFEU.
103 Article 114 TFEU.
104 By contrast, the US regulates biotechnology through the existing regulations for specific products, eg biotech crops are regulated under the Plant Protection Act which gives the US department of Agriculture and its agency the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services authority to regulate biotechnology products of plants and plant pests.
105 Details of the relevant legislation can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/gmo/legislation/index_en.htm.
106 Directive 2009/41/EC (Recast)  OPJ L125/75
107 Directive 2001/18/EC 90/220/EEC  OJ L106/1
109 Article 5 TEU.
110 Article 114 TFEU on for the approximation of laws in order to establish the proper functioning of the internal market, is the legislative base of competence of the EU to pass the Deliberate Release Directive, whereas the Contained Use Directive is attributed to article 192 of Title XX on the protection of the environment, rather than exclusively on the functioning of the internal market.
111 Commission Policy Officer Interview.
112 Commission Policy Officer Interview.
113 Regulation 178/2002/EC.
114 The Deliberate Release Regulations were created pursuant to, but also amended, the EPA and repealed the previous 1992 deliberate release regulations, see the Explanatory Note on GMO (Deliberate Release) Regulations 2002/2443.
115 Under section 118 EPA, it is a criminal offence to fail to comply with section 111 EPA.
116 Reg 11 Deliberate Release Regulations.
117 Schedules in the Regulations link with appendics in the directive, in so far as they require the same technical information, although differently numbered.
118 Section 126 EPA.
119 Deliberate Release Regulation 20.
120 Deliberate Release Regulation 21.
121 Part B Deliberative Release Directive.
122 Part C Deliberate Release Directive. For marketing biotech products that are not grown in the EU but imported see article 5(5) Food and Feed Regulation, 1829/2003/EC.
123 Some amendments to Annex II have been proposed as General Guidance by EFSA. A differentiated procedure can be used by member state, in which case it will be the ERA confirmed by that member state as approved by the Commission. See Annex A on legal position on ERA in Annex II.
124 C-9/56, Meroni & Co., Industrie Metallurgiche, Spa v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community [1957–58] ECR 133.
125 Article 4 of the Treaty of Rome, article 7 EC Treaty, now repealed by article 13 TEU listed Community institutions and that they must act ‘within the limits of the powers conferred upon them by this Treaty’.
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130 Ibid. at para. 7.
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138 Working Packages 1 and 3 are laboratory based, but Working Package 2 takes place outdoors.
139 Supra note 55.
140 For example, process studies, scaling tests and climate response tests in Keith et al, “Field Experiments on Solar Geoengineering”, supra note 34.
141 Two other funders are Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) and the Science and Technology Facilities Council (STFC) which all comprise part of group of Research Councils in the UK (RCUK).
142 http://www.epsrc.ac.uk/about/plans/implementingdeliveryplan/transchange/research/stagegating/Pages/stagegating.aspx last accessed on 17th April 2014.
145 IAPG, “The Public and Other Stakeholder Perception of Geoengineering: Facilitating Responsible Innovation” Briefing Note 2, available on the internet at: http://iagp.ac.uk/sites/default/files/IAGP_Briefing_Note_2.pdf (last accessed on 14 May 2015).
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150 Ibid p. 1577.
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161 Von Shomberg, Prospects for Technology Assessment, supra note 147.
162 Sabel and Zeitlin, Learning from Difference 2008, supra note 151, at p. 277.
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167 Ibid, at p. 454.
168 5 U.S.C. § 551.
169 5 U.S.C. § 533.
170 5 U.S.C. § 552b(e)(3).
171 5 U.S.C.
172 Committee on Geoengineering Climate, Reflecting Sunlight to Cool Earth, supra note 3, at p. 190.
173 Keith et al, “Field Experiments on Solar Geoengineering”, supra note 34.
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176 European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 on short-selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps, OJ 2012 L 86.
177 Ibid., at para. 54.
178 Ibid, at para. 53.
179 Ibid, at para. 45.
180 Ibid, at para 35: ESMA's measures “require a high level of technical and economic expertise and information”.
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