Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-m8qmq Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-23T11:14:24.021Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Conservative Treatment of Evidence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 September 2022

Alireza Fatollahi Open the ORCID record for Alireza Fatollahi [Opens in a new window]
Alireza Fatollahi*
Affiliation:
Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey
*
Email: alireza.fatollahi@gmail.com
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This paper discusses two conservative ways of treating evidence. (I) Closing inquiry involves discounting evidence bearing on one's belief unless it is particularly strong evidence; (II) biased assimilation involves dedicating more investigative resources to scrutinizing disconfirming evidence (than confirming evidence), thereby increasing the chances of finding reasons to dismiss it. It is natural to worry that these practices lead to irrational biases in favor of one's existing beliefs, and that they make one's epistemic condition significantly path-sensitive by giving a bigger role to batches of evidence obtained earlier in the course of inquiry compared with those subsequently acquired. However, I argue that both practices are demanded by considerations of practical rationality. I also argue that, contrary to initial appearances, there is little reason to worry about the effects of these practices on the dynamics of one's beliefs.

Keywords

Biased assimilationclosing inquiryconservatismpractical rationalitybias
Type
Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 20 , Issue 3 , September 2023 , pp. 568 - 583
Check for updates
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Christensen, D. (2010). ‘Higher-Order Evidence.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81, 185–215.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Feldman, R. (2000). ‘The Ethics of Belief.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50, 667–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Feldman, R. (2009). ‘Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement.’ Episteme 6, 294–312.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Foley, R. (1987). The Theory of Epistemic Rationality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Foley, R. (1993). Working Without a Net. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Frankish, K. (2009). ‘Partial Belief and Flat-Out Belief.’ In Huber, F. and Schmidt-Petri, C. (eds), Degrees of Belief, pp. 75–93. New York, NY: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harman, G. (1986). Change In View: Principles of Reasoned Revision. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Howson, C. and Urbach, P. (2006). Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach, 3rd edn. La Salle, IL: Open Court.Google Scholar
Hume, D. (1975). Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, 3rd edn. Oxford: Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hume, D. (1978). A Treatise of Human Nature, 2nd edn. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Joyce, J. (2005). ‘How Probabilities Reflect Evidence.’ Philosophical Perspectives 19, 153–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kelly, T. (2003). ‘Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66(3), 612–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kelly, T. (2008). ‘Disagreement, Dogmatism, and Belief Polarization.’ Journal of Philosophy 105(10, Special Issue), 611–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kelly, T. (2010). ‘Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.’ In Goldman, A. and Whitcomb, D. (eds), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings, pp. 183–217. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Lasonen-Aarnio, M. (2014). ‘Higher-Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88, 314–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Leibniz, G.W. (1989). Philosophical Essays. (R. Ariew and D. Garber, eds and transl.). Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.Google Scholar
Leitgeb, H. (2014). ‘The Stability Theory of Belief.’ Philosophical Review 123(2), 131–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lequeux, J. (2013). Le Verrier-Magnificent and Detestable Astronomer. New York, NY: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lord, C., Ross, L. and Lepper, M. (1979). ‘Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The effect of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence.’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 27, 2098–109.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Newton, I. (1999). Principia: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy. (Cohen, B. and Whitman, A. Miller, eds and transl.). Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Newton, I. (2014). Philosophical Writings. (Janiak, A., ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Shaffer, M.J. (2019). ‘Explaining Evidence Denial as Motivated Pragmatically Rational Epistemic Irrationality.’ Metaphilosophy 50(4), 563–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
White, R. (2005). ‘Epistemic Permissiveness.’ Philosophical Perspectives 19, 445–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar