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CONFIRMATION, CAUSATION, AND SIMPSON'S PARADOX

  • Branden Fitelson

Abstract

In this paper, I review some recent treatments of Simpson's Paradox, and I propose a new rationalizing explanation of its (apparent) paradoxicality.

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References

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