Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home
Hostname: page-component-5c569c448b-q9r9l Total loading time: 0.308 Render date: 2022-07-04T00:03:01.439Z Has data issue: true Feature Flags: { "shouldUseShareProductTool": true, "shouldUseHypothesis": true, "isUnsiloEnabled": true, "useRatesEcommerce": false, "useNewApi": true } hasContentIssue true

Article contents

DOXASTICISM: BELIEF AND THE INFORMATION-RESPONSIVENESS OF MIND

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2019

Abstract

This paper concerns a problem that has received insufficient analysis in the philosophical literature so far: the conditions under which an information-bearing state – say a perception or recollection – yields belief. The paper distinguishes between belief and a psychological property easily conflated with belief, illustrates the tendency of philosophers to overlook this distinction, and offers a positive conception of the mind's information-responsiveness that requires far less belief-formation – and far less formation of other propositional attitudes – than has been commonly supposed to be produced by perception and other experiences. This conception is clarified by a partial sketch of the natural economy of mind. The paper then considers two important questions the conception raises. Does it force us to abandon the venerable belief-desire conception of intentional action, and does it require expanding the domain of intellectual responsibility and thereby our conception of epistemic virtue?

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 17 , Issue 4 , December 2020 , pp. 542 - 562
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Aiken, S. 2010. Epistemology and the Regress Problem. London: Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Armstrong, D. M. 1973. Belief, Truth and Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Audi, R. 1982. ‘Believing and Affirming.’ Mind, 91: 115–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Audi, R. 1986. ‘Acting for Reasons.’ Philosophical Review, 95(4): 511–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Audi, R. 1994. ‘Dispositional Beliefs and Dispositions to Believe.’ Noûs, 28(4): 419–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Audi, R. 2006. Practical Reasoning and Ethical Decision. London: Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Audi, R. 2007. ‘Justifying Grounds, Justified Beliefs, and Rational Acceptance.’ In Timmons, M., Greco, J. and Mele, A. R. (eds), Rationality and the Good: Critical Essays on the Ethics and Epistemology of Robert Audi. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Audi, R. 2010. Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. London: Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Audi, R. 2015. ‘Intuition and its Place in Ethics.’ Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 1(1): 5777.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Broome, J. 2001. ‘Are Intentions Reasons? And How Should We Cope with Incommensurable Values?’ In Morris, C. and Ripstein, A. (eds), Practical Rationality and Preference: Essays for David Gauthier. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Byrne, A. 2010. ‘Knowing What I See.’ In Smithies, D. and Stoljar, D. (eds), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Dormandy, K. 2018. ‘Resolving Religious Disagreements: Evidence and Bias.Faith and Philosophy, 35(1): 5683.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fricker, M. 2007. Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Green, M. 2010. ‘Perceiving Emotions.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 84: 4561.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grice, H. P. 1957. ‘Meaning.’ Philosophical Review, 66(3): 377–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Heil, J. 1982. ‘Seeing is Believing.’ American Philosophical Quarterly, 19(3): 229–39.Google Scholar
Holton, R. 2009. Willing, Wanting, Waiting. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Klein, P. D. 2011. ‘Infinitism.’ In Bernecker, S. and Pritchard, D. (eds), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, pp. 245–56. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Maddy, P. 1980. ‘Perception and Mathematical Intuition.’ Philosophical Review, 84(2): 163–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nottelmann, N. (ed.) 2013. New Essays on Belief: Structure, Constitution and Content. London: Palgrave-Macmillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Orlandi, N. 2013. ‘Embedded Seeing: Vision in the Natural World.’ Noûs, 67(4): 727–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pelser, A. 2010. ‘Belief in Reid's Theory of Perception.’ History of Philosophy Quarterly, 27(4): 359–78.Google Scholar
Pitcher, G. 1971. A Theory of Perception. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Reid, T. 1983. An Inquiry into the Human Mind: On the Principles of Common Sense. Excerpted in Beanblossom, R. E. and Lehrer, K. (eds), Thomas Reid: Inquiry and Essays. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.Google Scholar
Rosenberg, J. F. and Travis, C. 1971. Readings in the Philosophy of Language, p. 441. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.Google Scholar
Ryan, S. 1996. ‘The Epistemic Virtues of Consistency.’ Synthese, 109(2): 121–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schwitzgebel, E. 2011. ‘Belief.’ In Bernecker, S. and Pritchard, D. (eds), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology, pp. 1424. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
Searle, J. 1983. Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Siegel, S. 2016. The Rationality of Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Steup, M. Forthcoming. ‘Benign Infinity.’ In Fitelson, B. et al. (eds), Themes from Klein. Synthese Library, vol. 404.Google Scholar
van Cleve, J. 2015. Problems from Reid. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Williamson, T. 2000. Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Williamson, T. 2007. ‘On Being Justified in One's Head.’ In Timmons, M., Greco, J. and Mele, A. R. (eds), Rationality and the Good: Critical Essays on the Ethics and Epistemology of Robert Audi. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

Save article to Kindle

To save this article to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

DOXASTICISM: BELIEF AND THE INFORMATION-RESPONSIVENESS OF MIND
Available formats
×

Save article to Dropbox

To save this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you used this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your Dropbox account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

DOXASTICISM: BELIEF AND THE INFORMATION-RESPONSIVENESS OF MIND
Available formats
×

Save article to Google Drive

To save this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you used this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your Google Drive account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

DOXASTICISM: BELIEF AND THE INFORMATION-RESPONSIVENESS OF MIND
Available formats
×
×

Reply to: Submit a response

Please enter your response.

Your details

Please enter a valid email address.

Conflicting interests

Do you have any conflicting interests? *