The battle for dominance of the global aviation marketplace after 1945 was largely an Anglo-American competition, yet to date historians have overlooked the important role diplomacy played in shaping its outcome. Divisions over the proper regulation of strategically vital aircraft and aviation technology seriously impeded aircraft manufacturers, British producers especially. This article traces the impact of Anglo-American diplomacy upon British aviation manufacturers during the first half of the Cold War, from 1946 until the Sino-American rapprochement of the early 1970s. It explores three periods in particular: the initial postwar years, highlighted by disputed British jet engine sales to the Soviet Union; the early 1950s, when British jetliner exports seemed a genuine strategic threat in Washington; and the early 1960s, when Whitehall authorized covert transfers of American-licensed aviation equipment to complete the first British aircraft sales to the People’s Republic of China. These examples demonstrate not only the effect of strategic balancing by governments on the marketplace, but also diplomacy’s impact on business.

The precise nature of the relationship between the American business community and the New Deal has been a lively topic of debate in recent years. This article looks at an important figure and firm in that relationship (Thomas J. Watson of IBM) to increase our understanding of it. This article focuses chronologically on the period from the early 1930s through the mid-1950s, when New-Deal-era public policy innovations were most influential. The overall picture that emerges from this study of the U.S. business-government relationship during those years is one of business accommodation of major changes in social conditions and public policies rather than a view of business as the primary leader of change.

The literature suggests that cotton textiles should be unattractive for foreign direct investment (FDI). The product is largely undifferentiated; sellers need an intimate knowledge of local markets; and textiles use process technology, which multinational firms cannot monopolize. Indeed, since the 1970s, cotton textiles has been one of the few industries in Brazil in which local capital dominates, joint ventures prevail, and American firms are almost completely absent. Yet, between 1955 and the mid-1970s, Brazil saw significant foreign direct investment in textiles from Japanese firms. There were two successive waves of Japanese investment in the Brazilian cotton textile industry. The first ran from the mid-1950s to the early 1960s. The second took place from the late 1960s to the mid-1970s. Four Japanese textile firms participated in the first wave—Kanebo, Toyobo, Tsuzuki, and Unitika. Four more—Daiwa, Kurabo, Nisshinbo, and Omi—participated in the second wave.

This article explores the business and managerial strategies of Palmer and Company, a Calcutta agency house, as it strove to develop its global business in an era of limited communications technology. The article considers the reasons for the eventual demise of the firm and the consequences for business in India. It examines the principles that governed the operations of the business and considers the extent to which these contributed to the demise of the firm. More generally, it considers the factors that contributed not only to the failure of Palmer and Company but also to the collapse of all the agency houses by 1833.