No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
Taking Reflective Equilibrium Seriously
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 May 2010
Extract
In the essay “Justice and Rights” of his book Taking Rights Seriously Ronald Dworkin puts forward an account of reflective equilibrium which has become an orthodoxy in interpreting John Rawls' theory of justice. My purpose here is to challenge this account, on the grounds that it presupposes an untenable view of the relation between belief and choice.
- Type
- Articles
- Information
- Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 20 , Issue 3 , September 1981 , pp. 548 - 555
- Copyright
- Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 1981
References
NOTES
1 In what follows I assume that the reader has read Rawls', A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Belknap Press, 1971).Google Scholar
2 Rawls, J., “The Independence of Moral Theory”, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 1974–1975, volume XLVIII, pp. 5–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
3 Dworkin, R., Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 160.Google Scholar
4 TRS, p. 165.
5 TRS, p. 162.
6 TJ, p. 50.
7 TJ, p. 20.
8 TJ, p. 20.
9 TJ, p. 49.
10 Nagel, T., “Rawls on Justice”, in Reading Rawls, ed. Daniels, Norman (New York: Basic Books), p. 2.Google Scholar
11 Nozick, R., Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), especially pp. 204–213.Google Scholar
12 Hare, R., “Rawls' Theory of Justice”, in Reading Rawls, ed. Daniels, N. (New York: Basic Books).Google Scholar