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The Perniciousness of Higher-Order Evidence on Aesthetic Appreciation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 2023

David Sackris Open the ORCID record for David Sackris [Opens in a new window]  and
Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen
David Sackris*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Arapahoe Community College, Littleton, CO, USA
Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen
Affiliation:
Department of Forensic Psychology, University of Toronto Mississauga, Mississauga, ON, Canada
*
Corresponding author. Email: david.sackris@gmail.com
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Abstract

We demonstrate that many philosophers accept the following claim: When an aesthetic object is apprehended correctly, taking pleasure in said object is a reliable sign that the object is aesthetically successful. We undermine this position by showing that what grounds our pleasurable experience is opaque: In many cases, the experienced pleasure is attributable to factors that have little to do with the aesthetic object. The evidence appealed to is a form of Higher-Order Evidence (HOE) and we consider attempts to overcome said evidence. We argue they are unsuccessful. We conclude by considering what this means for our practice of making aesthetic judgements.

Résumé

Résumé

Nous démontrons que de nombreux philosophes acceptent l'affirmation suivante : lorsqu'un objet esthétique est appréhendé correctement, prendre plaisir à cet objet est un signe fiable que l'objet est esthétiquement réussi. Nous minons cette position en montrant que les bases sur lesquelles repose notre expérience de plaisir sont opaques : dans de nombreux cas, le plaisir éprouvé est attribuable à des facteurs qui n'ont que peu à voir avec l'objet esthétique. La preuve invoquée est une forme de preuve d'ordre supérieur et nous considérons les tentatives de surmonter ladite preuve. Nous soutenons que ces tentatives sont infructueuses. Nous concluons en examinant ce que cela signifie pour notre pratique du jugement esthétique.

Keywords

aesthetic appreciationaesthetic judgementhigher-order evidencescepticismtaste
Type
Article
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 62 , Issue 2 , August 2023 , pp. 303 - 322
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Canadian Philosophical Association / Publié par Cambridge University Press au nom de l’Association canadienne de philosophie.

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