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Leibniz's Moral Psychology of an Evil Person

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 November 2023

Evelyn Vargas  and
Markku Roinila Open the ORCID record for Markku Roinila [Opens in a new window]
Evelyn Vargas*
Affiliation:
Departamento de filosofía, Universidad Nacional de La Plata, IDHICS (UNLP-CONICET), Argentina
Markku Roinila
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, History and Art studies, University of Helsinki, Finland
*
Corresponding author: Evelyn Vargas; Email: evelyn.vargas@gmail.com
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Abstract

Our focus in this article concerns Leibniz's views on evil. Our goal is to examine which are the consequences of his conception of moral agency for the moral psychology of the genuinely evil person. For Leibniz, moral failure is an epistemic error since it involves some false practical judgement. Moral maxims may be represented in blind or symbolic cognitions, but then moral agents can misrepresent the evil consequences of their behaviour. Finally, we discuss Leibniz's view on habits that may help virtuous persons strive for perfection but also enable evil persons to continue sinning.

Résumé

Résumé

Dans cet article, nous nous concentrons sur les vues de Leibniz à propos du mal. Notre objectif est d'examiner quelles sont les conséquences de sa conception de l'agence morale pour la psychologie morale de la personne véritablement mauvaise. Pour Leibniz, le mal moral est une erreur épistémique puisqu'il implique un faux jugement pratique. Les maximes morales peuvent être représentées par des cognitions aveugles ou symboliques, et par conséquent, un agent moral peut se tromper dans sa représentation des conséquences mauvaises de ses décisions. Enfin, nous discutons de la perspective de Leibniz sur les habitudes qui peuvent aider les personnes vertueuses à rechercher la perfection, mais aussi permettre aux personnes mauvaises de continuer à pécher.

Keywords

Leibnizdeliberationevilmoral failurehabitsweakness of will
Type
Article
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , First View , pp. 1 - 23
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Canadian Philosophical Association / Publié par Cambridge University Press au nom de l’Association canadienne de philosophie.

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