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Le quasi-réalisme et l’argument de la coïncidence

  • DAVID ROCHELEAU-HOULE (a1)

Abstract

In this paper, I reply to Sharon Street’s objection against quasi-realism, according to which this theory is subject to a problem of unexplained coincidence between the normative truths and our evaluative attitudes. I argue that this problem cannot be applied to quasi-realism because the necessary element for it to be applied is missing in this theory: an ontological commitment towards robust normative entities. This lack of commitment allows quasi-realists to argue for a minimalist conception of normative truths, and to escape the scope of the problem of unexplained coincidence.

Dans cet article, je réponds à la critique de Sharon Street contre le quasi-réalisme, selon laquelle les quasi-réalistes doivent accepter qu’il existe une coïncidence inexpliquée entre les vérités normatives et nos attitudes évaluatives. Je soutiens que ce problème ne peut être appliqué au quasi-réalisme, car l’élément essentiel pour qu’il puisse s’appliquer — un engagement ontologique envers des entités normatives robustes — ne se retrouve pas dans cette théorie. C’est ce qui permet aux quasi-réalistes de défendre une conception minimaliste des vérités normatives et ainsi d’échapper à l’argument de la coïncidence.

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Le quasi-réalisme et l’argument de la coïncidence

  • DAVID ROCHELEAU-HOULE (a1)

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