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Efficacité et moralité. Une analyse économique des conventions morales

  • Louis Corriveau (a1)

Abstract

We expound an economic explanation of the nature, causes, and effects of moral conventions. We show, first, that systems of moral rules lead to Pareto-efficiency; second, that the efficiency they induce may be interpreted as the outcome of an exchange of courtesies; third, and finally, that moral exchange takes place whenever the costs of transaction are sufficiently low. We also explain various phenomena, including the diversity of moral rules in time and space. Finally, we give sufficient conditions for universal moral rules to emerge in a sequence of agreements involving two agents only at a time.

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Efficacité et moralité. Une analyse économique des conventions morales

  • Louis Corriveau (a1)

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