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Consciousness, Supervenience, and Identity: Marras and Kim on the Efficacy of Conscious Experience

  • LIAM P. DEMPSEY (a1)

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that while supervenience accounts of mental causation in general have difficulty avoiding epiphenomenalism, the situation is particularly bad in the case of conscious experiences since the function-realizer relation, arguably present in the case of intentional properties, does not obtain, and thus, the metaphysical link between supervenient and subvenient properties is absent. I contend, however, that the identification of experiential types with their neural correlates dispels the spectre epiphenomenalism, squares nicely both with the phenomenology of embodiment and the subjectivity of experience, and does not conflict with the supposed multiple realizability of consciousness.

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Consciousness, Supervenience, and Identity: Marras and Kim on the Efficacy of Conscious Experience

  • LIAM P. DEMPSEY (a1)

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