I. Eth. Nic. III. c. I, § 16.

In spite of what Bernays and others have done to clear up this chapter, many perplexities remain. To some of these I propose later to return, but here I confine myself to one. Among the possible circumstances of an act, ignorance of which is excusable and may excuse, is enumerated τò οὑ ἔνεκα. Nothing but desperation could have led the commentators to suggest that here τò οὑ ἔνεκα means the actual effect or result of the act (Stewart, Burnet). It may be sufficient to quote the notes ad loc. of these two scholars:

1. Stewart: ‘The oὑ ἔνεκα here is not, as usual, the intention of the doer, for he cannot be ignorant of what he intends to do; but the outcome or result of what he actually does, which is the opposite of the intention.’