1. One historian mistakes Zunyi for a small town. See Rue, John, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 1927–1935 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966), p. 270Google Scholar.

2. Ibid. p. 272. Rue thinks that Mao became the dominant leader of the CCP Politburo at the Conference. Also, see Schram, Stuart, Mao Tse-tung (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1966), p. 181Google Scholar. Schram says that the Conference at last placed Mao in control of the CCP.

3. See “Resolution on some historical problems,” adopted by the CCP Central Committee in 04 1945Google Scholar, in Mao Zedong xuanji (Selected Works of Mao Zedong) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1964), Vol. III, p. 971Google Scholar.

4. Their topics of discussion, in general, focus on specifics, such as the dates of the First CCP Congress, the leaders of the Nanchang Uprising, etc.

5. See the Office for Research on Party History of the CCP Central Committee. Zhonggong dangshi dashi nianbiao (Chronological Listing of Important Events in the History of the CCP) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1981), p. 40Google Scholar; Zhonggong dangshi renwu lu (People and Events in CCP History), collectively comp. (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1983), p. 189Google Scholar.

6. Kuo, Warren (Hualun, Guo), Zhonggong shilun (Analytical History of the Chinese Communist Party) (Taibei: Guoli zhengzhi daxue, 1969), Vol. III, p. 13Google Scholar; Xiaoxian, Cai, Jiangxi suqu hongjun xichuan huiyi (Reminiscence of the Jiangxi Soviet and the Red Army's Western Stampede) (Taipei: Zhonggong yanjiu zazhishe, 1970), p. 281Google Scholar.

7. See, for example, “Gaoju Zunyi huiyi de geming huoju, yanzhuo Mao zhuxi zhiyin de geming daolu fenyong qianjin” (“Holding up the revolutionary torch of the Zunyi Conference, stride forward along the revolutionary road of Chairman Mao”), in Renmin ribao (People's Daily), 11 January 1967.

8. Braun, Otto, A Comintern Agent in China, 1932–1939, trans, by Moore, Jeane (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), p. 95Google Scholar.

9. Ch'en, Jerome, ”Resolutions of the Tsunyi Conference,” The China Quarterly (10–12 1969), p. 18Google Scholar; Wilson, Dick, The Long March (New York: Avon Books, 1971), p. 338Google Scholar.

10. Qiaofei zhanshi (A History of Exterminating Campaigns against the Communist Bandits), compiled by the Military History Bureau of the Ministry of National Defence, Taiwan Government (Taibei: Zhonghua dadian bianyin hui, 1967), Vol. V, p. 872Google Scholar.

11. See Yugao, Hu, Gongfei xichuan ji (A Record of the Red Rebels' Western Flight) (Guiyang: Yugao shudian, 1946), p. 274Google Scholar.

12. See the Investigation Office of Revolutionary and Historical Relics of Guizhou Province.Qianshan hongji (Red Traces Left in the Guizhou Mountains) (Guiyang: Guizhou renmin chubanshe, 1980), p. 233Google Scholar.

13. Ibid. p. 235.

14. Rongzhen, Nie, Nie Rongzhen huiyi lu (Autobiography of Nie Rongzhen) (Beijing: Zhanshi chubanshe, 1983), Vol. I, pp. 244–45Google Scholar.

15. Zhou's telegram can be found in Section 2 of the Memorial Hall of Chairman Mao in Beijing.

16. See Chen Vun, “Zunyi zhangzhiju kuoda huiyi chuanda tigang” (“Notes for communicating the enlarged Politburo Conference at Zunyi”), in Appendix 2 following this text.

17. Yuying, Ni, “Youguan Zunyi huiyi de jige wenti” (“Several questions concerning the Zunyi Conference”), Dangshi ziliao yanjiu (Studies of CCP Historical Materials) (08 1982), pp. 11–12Google Scholar.

18. Ibid.

19. Smedley, Agnes, The Great Road, the Life and Times of Chu Teh (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1956), p. 315Google Scholar.

20. Some sessions of the Conference were held at night. See Xiuquan, Wu, “Wo de licheng” (“My Memoir”), Zhonggong dangshi ziliao (CCP Historical Materials) (02 1982), p. 171Google Scholar; Jiqing, Wu, Zai maozhuxi shenbian de rizili (The Days When I Was With Chairman Mao) (Nanchang: Jiangxi renmin chubanshe, 1983), p. 195Google Scholar.

21. Dehuai, Peng, Peng dehuai zishu (Autobiography of Peng Dehuai) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1981), p. 195Google Scholar. In fact, the KMT troops attacking Daobashui on 17 January 1935 were not Wu Qiwei's Central Army but Bo Huizhang's local army. Wu followed the same route to attack Zunyi two months later. Since Wu was a more well-known general than Bo, Peng only remembered his name. See Yue, Xue, Qiaofei jishi (A True Account of Rebel Suppression) (n.p. 1937), Pt 3, pp. 7–8, 28–29Google Scholar.

22. See. e.g., the CCP History Institute of the Senior Party School, Zhonggong dangshi cankao ziliao (Reference Materials of CCP History) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1979), Vol. III, p. 9Google Scholar.

23. Ch'en, Jerome, “Resolutions,” pp. 18–19Google Scholar.

24. See Kenichi, Hanato, Chūgoku kyōsantō shi (A History of the Chinese Communist Party) (Tokyo: Jiji tsushin sha, 1961), Vol. IV, pp. 260–61Google Scholar. The other missing Politburo members are Kang Sheng and Gu Zuolin, whereas the incorrect members on Hanato's list are at least Liang Botai, Liu Shaoqi and Wu Liangping. The list seems to have no idea of the alternate members of the Politburo. Furthermore, Hanato's account of the Secretariat and the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee in 1934 is both misled and misleading. Even at that time, Ch'en should have referred to the more reliable works of Warren Kuo, not only for this point but for many others such as Liang Botai's being left at the Jiangxi base and Hua Fu being the alias of Otto Braun.

25. Braun, , A Comintern Agent, p. 95Google Scholar. Braun claims that 35–40 people participated in the Conference.

26. Tien-wei, Wu, Mao Tse-tung and the Tsunyi Conference (Washington, D.C.: Association of Research Libraries, 1974), pp. 49–50Google Scholar.

27. Kuo, , Analytical History (Chinese edition), Vol. III, p. 13Google Scholar.

28. Lin was not yet an alternate Central Committee member, and Deng Fa was already an alternate Politburo member. See Jianying, Wang, Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao huibian (A Compilation of Materials on CCP Organizational History) (Beijing: Hongqi chubanshe, 1981), pp. 145–46Google Scholar, 190.

29. Aiguo, Zou, “Xinfaxian de Zunyi huiyi shiliao” (“Newly discovered historical materials about the Zunyi Conference”), Liaowang zoukan (The Prospect Weekly) (5 03 1984), p. 41Google Scholar.

30. Kuo, , Analytical History, Vol. III. pp. 4–5Google Scholar; Jianying, Wang, CCP Organizational History, pp. 228–30Google Scholar.

31. Dong left the KMT and joined the CCP in 1931, and Luo in 1929.

32. Being the editor of Hongxing (The Red Star), the official newspaper of the Military Council, Deng might have been allowed to attend the Conference as a recordkeeper but he could hardly have been selected as a participant.

From fn. 14 in the first edition of the “Investigation report on some circumstances of the enlarged Politburo conference at Zunyi,” we can see that the basic evidence supporting Deng's participation at the Conference was an article by Wu Xiuquan published in early 1982. In that article, Wu stated cautiously, “Comrade Deng Xiaoping attended the Conference first as the editor of Hongxing. Then he was elected director of the General Office (mishuzhang) of the Central Committee and formally participated in the Conference. Li De (Otto Braun) attended the Conference only as an observer, so did I the interpreter.“ Without any further examination, the “Investigation report”accepted this version of events. What is more, it put Deng directly into the participant list notwithstanding Wu's own reservation. When the second edition of the “Investigation report” appeared later, the whole footnote had been deleted, thus making Deng's participation an even more unchallengeable official version.

Nie Rongzhen incorporated this version into his own memoir in 1983. In the abridged version of his article included in Zunyi Conference Materials (in 1985), Wu Xiuquan put it as follows. “Comrade Deng Xiaoping participated in the Conference as the director of the General Office of the Central Committee. Li De only participated in the Conference and I the interpreter attended the Conference as an observer.”

Obviously, Wu. Nie and the “Investigation report” writer are concerned to exalt Deng's role. At least two factors, however, appear to cast doubt on their conclusions. First, if Politburo membership and central or army corps leadership were the basic qualifications for the participants, as official historians all agree, why and how could Deng have participated in the Conference as the editor of Hongxing (or the director of the General Office)? Secondly, while Chen Yun's manuscript included all the participants at the Conference, there was no sign of Deng's name. More fundamentally, because the participants of the Zunyi Conference were still decided by the Bo Gu Party Centre and because Deng was well-known as a dissident disliked by those incumbent CCP leaders, his being exceptionally accepted at the Conference as a participant would have been not only unlikely, but also embarrassing rather than glorious for him – not all official Chinese historians seem to have realized this.

See the two editions of the “Guanyu Zunyi zhengzhiju kuoda huiyi ruogan qingkuang de diaocha” (“Investigation report on some circumstances of the enlarged Politburo conference at Zunyi”), in CCP Historical Materials, February 1982, pp. 21, 32, and Zunyi Conference Materials, p. 127; the two versions of Wu Xiuquan's article, “Shengsi youguan de lishi zhuanzhe” (“A turning point of life and death in history”), in Xinghuo liaoyuan (A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire), No. 1 (1982). p. 24Google Scholar, and Zunyi Conference Materials, p. 115; Rongzhen, Nie, Autobiography, Vol. I, p. 247Google Scholar; and Chen Yun, Appendix 2.

33. Wilson, , The Long March, p. 135Google Scholar; Rue, , Mao Tse-tung, pp. 271–72Google Scholar.

34. Mao could not have attacked the Politburo's political line. See Ch'en, Jerome, the “Resolutions,” p. 1Google Scholar.

35. Wilson, loc. cit.

36. Guotao, Zhang, Wo de huiyi (My Memoir) (Hong Kong: Mingbao yuekan chubanshe, 1973), Vol. III, pp. 1123–127Google Scholar; Braun, , A Comintern Agent, pp. 59–60Google Scholar.

37. Wilson, , The Long March, pp. 135–36Google Scholar. We cannot say that Ye was Zhou's follower simply because both had been at the Whampoa Academy in 1924–26, and that Bo Gu and Zhang Wentian stood together at Zunyi because both had been students at Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow in the late 1920s. As far as the Zunyi Conference was concerned, at least, the definitions of Whampoa cadets and International faction were fairly out of date. Ye Jianying lost his position as chief of general staff to Liu Bocheng at the Ningdu Conference in October 1932, at the same time when Mao lost his position as political commissar to Zhou Enlai. Ye's position had not changed at the Zunyi Conference, nor had that of Deng Fa. Wang Jiaxiang had never been political commissar. He did become a full member of the Politburo after the Conference, but that was due to his stand against, not for, Bo Gu.

38. Xiuquan, Wu, “My memoir” pp. 171–74Google Scholar; Rongzhen, Nie, Autobiography, Vol. I, pp. 246–48Google Scholar; Braun, , A Comintern Agent, pp. 98–99Google Scholar. From the unanimous descriptions of the three Conference participants, the order of the first three speakers should be clear.

39. Braun, , A Comintern Agent, pp. 99–104Google Scholar.

40. The “Resolutions” were drafted by Zhang Wentian, Mao's essay was written two years later, and there should be much difference between them and Mao's original speech at the Zunyi conference. Nevertheless, the basic arguments must be the same.

41. Wu Xiuquan, loc. cit.; Nie Rongzen, loc. cit. It is interesting to notice that, according to Wu and Nie, two students who had returned from Russia held the strongest opposing stands, one for Mao and another against Mao. Wang Jiaxiang was remembered as having said to Mao even before the Conference, “Call a conference and bombard them (Bo Gu and Otto Braun)!” and Kai Feng was remembered as having yelled back at Mao, “What the hell do you guys know about Marxism-Leninism?”

42. Rongzhen, Nie, Autobiography, Vol. I, p. 248Google Scholar; Braun, , A Comintern Agent, p. 103Google Scholar; Yuying, Ni, “Several questions,” p. 11Google Scholar. Li Zhuoran Recalled, “I arrived late.… When I came in, many were criticizing Bo Gu. I knew little of the Party Centre's affairs and only spoke a few sentences.“ Li was a returned student and rose to a senior rank after 1931; Lin Biao had published a well-known article praising Braun's military strategy.

43. Peng's resentment against Otto Braun came from their quarrelling over the failure of the Guangchang battle. Braun labelled Peng a “feudalist,” and Peng labelled Braun “a prodigal son joyfully selling his father's land” – it meant that Braun would lose all the Soviet base established by Peng. See Dehuai, Peng, Autobiography, pp. 190–92Google Scholar.

44. Liu Bocheng had criticized Mao at the Ningdu Conference, and now he was criticizing Mao's opponent. Actually, Liu's criticisms on both occasions were mainly from a military tactical point of view, not from an intra-Party struggle point of view. Most military leaders might have held a similar atttiude.

45. Xiuquan, Wu, “My memoir,” pp. 173–74Google Scholar. Braun's excuse was that he was only an adviser, and if the war was lost the Chinese comrades should blame themselves.

46. Braun, , A Comintern Agent, p. 104Google Scholar. That does not mean that each participant only spoke once or twice, and Zhu and Zhou waited for two days just to give the last words. It does mean, however, that once Zhu and, particularly, Zhou took their firm stands in favour of Mao the debate was settled.

47. Peng Dehuai and Yang Shangkun left the Conference for the front on 17 January. (They began to receive telegrams from the Military Council beginning at 23:00 hours that day. Yuying, Ni, “Several questions,” p. 12Google Scholar.) Li Zhuoran, Lin Biao and Nie Rongzhen left the Conference the same day but still stayed in the city. The Politburo members held the Conference on the morning of 18 January. (Yuying, Ni, “Several questions,” p. 11Google Scholar, gives the diary of Chen Bojun, who was chief of staff in the Fifth Army Corps and who stayed in a Zunyi hospital for treatment: “ 18 January, cloudy, taking rest. This morning,… Political Commissar Li and Army Corps Commander Lin came to visit. In the afternoon, Chairman Zhu came with two packs of cigarettes.”)

48. See Braun, , A Comintern Agent, p. 104Google Scholar, “In an ensuing session of the Politburo, organizational matters of great importance were treated.”

49. Ch'en, Jerome, “Resolutions,” p. 38Google Scholar. In fact, Peng Dehuai was not a commander in this area, and Bo Yibo was not Mao's favourite from an intra-Party struggle point of view. Jerome Ch'en's attempt to connect the publication of the 1948 version of the “Resolutions” with the disparity between the Party-controlled Shan-Gan-Ning and the army-controlled Jin-Ji-Lu-Yu is also too far-fetched.

50. Kuo, Warren, A Study of the “Resolutions of the Tsunyi Conference” (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, n.d.), pp. 9–10Google Scholar; Tien-wei, Wu, The Zunyi Conference, p. 107Google Scholar.

51. Chen Yun, Appendix 2.

52. I have seen three copies in Zunyi, Chengdu and Beijing.

53. Liuda yilai: dangnei mimi wenjian (Since the Sixth Congress – Collection of Secret Documents of the CCP) (comp. by the Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee in 1941 and republished in Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1980), Vol. I, pp. 667–78Google Scholar.

54. Kuo's informant, Chen Ran, or Kuo himself was an ex-communist working as a middle-level cadre during the Long March, and, therefore, much of what he recalls as documented resolutions of the Zunyi Conference are actually rumours after the Conference. As for his claim that he had read the original version of the Conference resolutions with a subtitle which included Zhou Enlai as a target of criticism, I can only suspect that that was done out of his political bias.

55. Kuo, , Analytical History, Vol. III, p. 18Google Scholar.

56. Since Xiang Zhongfa, the general secretary elected by the Sixth CCP Congress in 1928, was arrested and killed in June 1931, until the Eighth CCP Congress in 1956, no formal title such as general secretary existed in the CCP. Bo Gu's position before the Zunyi Conference was termed “the person with overall responsibility (fit zongde zeren or zong fitzeren)” in the Party Centre. See Yun, Chen, “Dui Zunyi huiyi diaocha baogaozhong jige wenti de dafu” (“Reply to several questions in the investigation report of the Zunyi Conference”), in Zunyi Conference Materials, pp. 73–74Google Scholar; Enlai, Zhou, “Dangde lishi jiaoxun” (“Lessons drawn from Party history”), in Zunyi Conference Materials, p. 68Google Scholar.

57. Zhu De was chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Council, an organization of the government but not of the Party at that time.

58. Aiguo, Zou, “Newly discovered materials,” p. 42Google Scholar.

59. Obviously, non-Party Centre members should not take part in the election of Standing Committee members of the Politburo.

60. My translation of the title here is based on the earliest mimeographed copy of this document shown in the inside front cover of Wenxian yu yanjiu (Documents and Studies), No. 1, 1985Google Scholar. In Since the Sixth Congress, Vol. I, p. 669, and some later collections of CCP historical materials, the document has been entitled “The resolution of the CCP Centre on summing up the campaign against the enemy's fifth ‘encirclement’” (the Zunyi Conference) (adopted by the Politburo Conference on 8 January 1935). The version used by Jerome Ch'en adopts this title. In the compilation Zunyi Conference Materials, the title has changed to “The concluding resolution of the CCP Centre on the campaign against the enemy's fifth ‘encirclement’” (adopted by the Politburo Conference on 17 January 1935) (pp. 3–28). The text of the document, however, remains the same in all the versions except for technical errors. Thus, we may say that there is actually only one version.

61. See Appendix 1, following the main text.

62. Chen Yun, Appendix 2.

63. Heinzig, Dieter, “Otto Braun's memoir and Mao's rise to power,” The China Quarterly (04–06 1971), p. 280Google Scholar.

64. See Tien-wei, Wu, Mao Tse-tung and the Zunyi Conference, p. 23Google Scholar.

65. See Selected Works (Chinese edition), Vol. III, pp. 986–87Google Scholar; Hsiao, Tso-liang, Power Relations Within the Chinese Communist Movement, 1930–1934 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1961), pp. 164–65Google Scholar, 216–17, and others.

66. Selected Works, Vol. I, pp. 66–67.

67. Ibid. pp. 54, 62. Mao ascribes the military failure in August 1928 to Du Xiujing, the representative of the Hunan CCP Committee, and Yang Kaiming, the Party secretary of the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area Committee, both of whom seemed to have been superior to Mao at that time.

68. See Schwartz, Benjamin, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 176–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hsiao, , Power Relations, pp. 104–109Google Scholar. By the way, the Anti-Bolshevik League existed only for a few months before it was dissolved by the collective effort of the CCP and the KMT in 1927. It did not, as Hsiao says, play a considerable role against Communists later.

69. The Ningdu Conference, held in October 1932, is another important subject for historical study. This moment, not the Fifth Plenum of the Sixth CCP Congress in January 1934, marked the critical point in Mao's political fortune.

70. Waller, Derek, The Kiangsi Soviet Republic and the National Congresses of 1931 and 1934 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), pp. 104–105Google Scholar.

71. Rue, , Mao Tse-tung, p. 261Google Scholar.

72. See Ch'en, Jerome, “Resolutions,” p. 1Google Scholar; Chen Yun, Appendix 2.

73. See Shoukong, Li, Guomin geming shi (A History of the Nationalist Revolution) (Taipei: Zhongyang wenwu gongying she, 1965), p. 502Google Scholar. Referring to the military situation in 1930, Chiang Kai-shek said, “Following Li Zongren's rebellion is the uprising of Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan – one after another, up and down, hustle and bustle – the Government has to fight to stop the fighting, and the nation has to sacrifice for peace.”

74. In the Third Encirclement Campaign, the KMT troops had captured most of the big cities, including Guangchang and Ruijin, in the Jiangxi Soviet base. The KMT's withdrawal in September 1931 was partly due to its losses in several battles, but mainly to the large-scale Japanese intrusion in northwestern China. In the fourth encirclement action, Chiang Kai-shek took Zhang Guotao's O-Yu-Wan Soviet to be the main offensive target. After several months' fighting, Zhang was defeated and fled to Sichuan and He Long fled from the Honghu Soviet to western Hunan. Since he had failed, Zhang was scolded by the Party Centre for practising an erroneous military line. See Guotao, Zhang, Memoir, Vol. III, pp. 1072–1074Google Scholar.

75. Even if the Party Centre had accepted Mao's proposal to divide the Red Army and move to fight in the KMT areas, the chance of winning in 1934 would not have been good, as Mao later claimed, but perhaps even worse. See Kuo, , Analvtical History, Vol. III, pp. 481–82Google Scholar.

76. Chen was expelled from the Party in 1929; he then formed another party. He Mengxiong died soon after losing power in 1931; Zhang fled to the KMT side in 1938.

77. Waller, loc. cit.

78. Mao was deprived of alternate membership in the Politburo in 1927. He resumed it in 1931 and became a full Politburo member in 1934. See Jianying, Wang, CCP Organizational History, pp. 190Google Scholar, 234.

79. See Braun, , A Comintern Agent, p. 101Google Scholar; Rongzhen, Nie, Autobiography, Vol. I, pp. 213–14Google Scholar.

80. Chu, Gong, Wo vu hongjun (I and the Red Army) (Hong Kong: Nanfeng chubanshe, 1954), pp. 395–99Google Scholar.

81. Rue, , Mao Tse-tung, p. 263Google Scholar.

82. See Jiqing, Wu, The Days with Mao, pp. 146–67Google Scholar; Changfeng, Chen, On the Long March with Chairman Mao (Beijing: Foreign Language Press. 1972), pp. 21–24Google Scholar. Mao wrote his joyful poem, “Huichang” in that period of time. I would say that Mao's retirement to southern and western Jiangxi, not once just at Yudu, from May to September 1934, was intentional. It seemed just like Yuan Shikai's retirement to Zhangde in 1909–11 and that of Chiang Kai-shek to Fenghua several times, but with one purpose, waiting for the appeal. See Braun, , A Comintern Agent, p. 71Google Scholar, “Mao increasing avoided meetings of the Military Council in order to continue the factional struggle in secret.”

83. Braun, , A Comintern Agent, p. 60Google Scholar.

84. Dehuai, Peng, Autobiography, pp. 190–92Google Scholar.

85. See Yueh, Sheng, Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow and the Chinese Revolution: A Personal Memoir (New York: Paragon Book Gallery, 1971), p. 254Google Scholar; Ruoyun, Yang, Gongchan guoji he zongguo geming guan.xi jishi, 1919–1943 (A Record of the Relations Between the Comintern and the Chinese Revolution) (Beijing: Kexue wenwu chubanshe, 1983), pp. 111–12Google Scholar, 117. The high respect paid by the Comintern towards Mao can be more clearly seen from the letters of the CCP Mission to the Comintern, dated 16 September and 14 November 1934. In the first letter it was said that the Comintern had just published a volume of selected works by Mao, which included Mao's speech at the Second Soviet Congress and some other articles. The second letter regarded that speech by Mao as “a very significant historical document” and “a reflection of Comrade Mao Zedong's rich experiences.”

86. Stein, Gunther, The Challenge of Red China (New York: Da Capo Press, 1975), p. 118Google Scholar.

87. See Zhou Enlai and Zhang Wentian's articles at about the time of the Guangchang Campaign (13–28 April 1934); Zhou's articles in Hongxing (The Red Star), “All worker and peasant red armies and all people in the soviet area, unite to defend Ghuangchang!!!” (22 April), and “Guangchang is now fallen; still we must smash the enemy by all means!” (30 April); and Zhang's articles in Hongse Zhonghua (Red China), “Die or win” (28 April), and “We must win by all means!” (1 May). Even just from the titles of these articles by Zhou and Zhang, one the head of the army and the other the head of the government, we can imagine their desperation caused by the loss of the city.

88. See Chu, Gong, Gong Chu jiangjun huiyi lu (General Gong Chu's Memoir) (Hong Kong: Mingbao yuekan she, 1978), Vol. II, pp. 537–44Google Scholar; Braun, , A Comintern Agent, p. 70Google Scholar. An interesting point is that Braun says that the strategic transfer of Ren Bishi's Sixth Army Corps and Xun Huaizhou's Seventh Army Corps was suggested by himself, according to his plan even before the Guangchang battle.

89. The Three-Man Group was apparently formed in September or October 1934. See Braun, , A Comintern Agent, p. 76Google Scholar; Bo Gu's speech on 13 November 1943, as quoted in Kanru's, Fei article, “Zunyi huiyi houde sanren junshi zhihui xiaozu shibushi dangzhongyong junwei?” (“Was the three-man group after the Zunyi Conference also the Central Military Council of the Party?”), in Jindaishi yanjiu (Studies of Modem History) (01 1984), pp. 293–95Google Scholar.

90. Zhang did not take part in the Fourth Plenum of the Sixth Congress in 1931. As for his divergence from the Bo Gu leadership before the Zunyi Conference, see his articles in Douzheng (Struggle) (1 May 1933, 26 November 1933, and 10 July 1934)and Red China (1 May 1934, 25 May 1934, and 29 September 1934). All these articles had one common purpose, to criticize leftist adventurism.

91. See Braun, , A Comintern Agent, p. 71Google Scholar. Braun recalls that before the start of the Long March, Mao, Zhang and Wang had already formed a “Central Triad” against the Party Centre.

92. See Wentian, Zhang, “Cong Fujian shibian dao Zunyi huiyi” (“From the Fujian Incident to the Zunyi Conference”), in Zunyi Conference Materials, pp. 78–79Google Scholar; Liping, Wu, “Zhang Wentian yu Mao Zedong tongzhi zai zhongyong suqu de jiezhu” (“Zhang Wentian's association with Comrade Mao Zedong in the Central Soviet”), in Gemingshi yanjiu (Research on Revolutionary History), No. 11 (1983), pp. 150–51Google Scholar; Zehao, Xu, “Wang Jiaxiang dui Mao Zedong sixiang de renshi he gongxian” (“Wang Jiaxiang's recognition and contribution to Mao Zedong's thoughts”), Dangshi yanjiu (Party History Studies) (03 1984), pp. 40–41Google Scholar.

93. Rongzhen, Nie, Autobiography, Vol. I, pp. 236–38Google Scholar; Braun, , A Comintern Agent, pp. 89–91Google Scholar.

94. Ibid.; also, see “Resolutions of the Politburo on founding a new base at the Sichuan-Guizhou Border, 18 December 1934,” Red Traces, pp. 218–19. The Politburo decided to give up the former plan of joining the Second and Sixth Army Corps in southern Hunan province and march further west to northern Guizhou province.

95. Chen Yun, Appendix 2.

96. Kuo, , Analytical History, Vol. III, p. 22Google Scholar. Also, see Bocheng, Liu et al. Recalling the Long March (Beijing 1978), p. 8Google Scholar.

97. Heinzig, loc. cit.

98. Braun, , A Comintern Agent, pp. 88–89Google Scholar.

99. Even Wang seems more correct when he describes the struggle at the Zunyi Conference as one between the “Mao-Lo bloc” and the Party Centre. See Ming, Wang, Mao's Betrayal, trans, by Schneierson, Vic (Moscow: Progress Publisher, 1975), pp. 35–36Google Scholar.

100. There are various approaches to historical studies. I would rather have general historical analyses following concrete historical facts, and not vice versa.

101. Aiguo, Zou. “Newly discovered materials,” pp. 41–42Google Scholar.

102. Braun, , A Comintern Agent, p. 104Google Scholar. Braun's assertion that so many (35–40) army men supported Mao against him was probably his personal delusion.

103. Wang Ming claimed later that if there had been a formal vote Mao would not have succeeded. Ming, Wang, Mao's Betrayal, pp. 35–36Google Scholar. Incidently, that was just what Zhang Guotao did around the time of the Maoergai Conference: Zhang attempted to seize power immediately and eventually lost power forever.

104. Braun left the Military Council and was sent to Lin Biao's First Army Corps after the Conference. Braun, , A Comintern Agent, p. 103Google Scholar.

105. Chen Yun, Appendix 2.

106. For a short while after the Conference, Bo Gu served as the acting general political director. However, this was not a decision-making position. Jianying, Wang, CCP Organizational History, p. 236Google Scholar.

107. Zhou worked with Li Lisan for several years, but when Li was attacked by Wang Ming andBoGuin 1931, Zhou, rather than being weakened, strengthened his position. A similar situation can be found with Zhou and Liu Shaoqi in 1966. This does not mean, however, that Zhou was merely a two-faced politician. Actually, Zhou's ability and hard work had made him indispensable to all in power, and anyone having a higher rank in the past but subsequently losing power would not begrudge him his promotion.

108. Many participants, Chen Yun and Zhu De for example, did not regard the Zunyi Conference as one of much importance, at least in 1935. See Ming, Wang, Mao's Betrayal, p. 30Google Scholar; Guotao, Zhang, Memoir, Vol. III, p. 1125Google Scholar.

109. Bocheng, Liu, The Long March, pp. 8–9Google Scholar; Peng, , Autobiography, pp. 193–95Google Scholar.

110. Braun, , A Comintern Agent, p. 104Google Scholar.

111. Wang Jiaxiang was promoted to full politburo membership, and Deng Xiaoping was said to have become the director of the General Office of the Party Centre. See the “Investigation report,” in Zunyi Conference Materials, p. 136; Xiuquan, Wu, “A turning point,” p. 24Google Scholar.

112. Most of the military orders were issued in his name, or sometimes along with Zhou and Wang.

113. See Kuo, , Analytical History, Vol. III, p. 20Google Scholar.

114. See Ch'en, Jerome, “Resolutions,” p. 16Google Scholar.

115. Yue, Xue, A True Account, Pt 3, pp. 20–30Google Scholar; Bocheng, Liu, The Long March, pp. 10–11Google Scholar; Dehuai, Peng, Autobiography, p. 196Google Scholar.

116. Dehuai, Peng, Autobiography, p. 199Google Scholar.

117. See “Investigation report,” in Zunyi Conference Materials, pp. 132–33.

118. See “Order of the Military Council concerning establishment of the front headquarters and appointment of Zhu De as commander and Mao Zedong as political commissar, 18:00 hours, 4 March 1935,” in Documents and Studies, No. 1 (1985), p. 40Google Scholar; “Order from the Front Headquarters, 23:30, 5 March 1935, Yaxi,” Red Traces, p. 280.

119. Zou Aiguo, loc. cit.; Fei Kanru, loc. cit.; “Investigation report,” Zunyi Conference Materials, pp. 134–35.

120. Tien-min, Li, Chou Enlai (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, 1970), p. 190Google Scholar. Zhou and his wife were both ill.

121. Guotao, Zhang, Memoir, Vol. III, p. 1122Google Scholar; Braun, , A Comintern Agent, p. 35Google Scholar; Dehuai, Peng, Autobiography, p. 203Google Scholar; Kuo, , Analytical History, Vol. III, p. 13Google Scholar.

122. Yue, Xue, A True Account, Pt 3, pp. 35–36Google Scholar; Braun, , A Comintern Agent, pp. 112–13Google Scholar.

123. Braun, , A Comintern Agent, pp. 114–16Google Scholar; Rongzhen, Nie, Autobiography, Vol. I, pp. 258–59Google Scholar; Dehuai, Peng, Autobiography, pp. 198–99Google Scholar.

124. Braun, loc. cit.

125. Ming, Wang, Mao's Betrayal, p. 31Google Scholar.

126. Dehuai, Peng, Autobiography, pp. 199–200Google Scholar; Rongzhen, Nie, Autobiography, Vol. I, p. 259Google Scholar. In his memoir, Nie tried a bit too hard to shirk all the blame onto Lin Biao. In fact. Nie also joined the protest against the new leadership of Mao at the end of April 1935. A telegram co-signed by him with Lin and dated 22:00 hours. 25 April, complained that “we have lost all possibility of returning to Guizhou. nor have we been able to open a new prospect in eastern Yunnan” and demanded that “this field army should change its present strategy immediately.” See Documents and Studies, No. 1 (1985). p. 62Google Scholar.

127. Braun, . A Comintern Agent, pp. 116–18Google Scholar.

128. Rongzhen, Nie. Autobiography. Vol. I, p. 261Google Scholar.

129. Guotao, Zhang. Memoir, Vol. III, p. 1123Google Scholar.

130. Ibid. pp. 1146. 1157. 1159, and others; also, see “The resolution of the Party Centre concerning the political situations and tasks after the union of the First and Fourth Front Armies” (the Maoergai Conference) (adopted by the Politburo on 5 August 1935). in Since the Sixth Congress. Vol. I, pp. 684–85. Please notice that these arguments in brackets are not direct quotations of Mao or the above sources. It should be also pointed out that since another Politburo conference was held on 20 August actually in the city of Maoergai and thus named the Maoergai Conference, the earlier Politburo conference, held on 5 August at Shawo close to Maoergai and referred to as the Maoergai Conference here by Zhang Guotao and the above resolution, has now been renamed as the Shawo Conference by Chinese historians.

131. See Braun, , A Comintern Agent, pp. 121–24, 127–30Google Scholar; Guotao, Zhang, Memoir, Vol. III, pp. 1128–34, 1159–64Google Scholar. It should be pointed out that even at that time Mao was not chairman of the Military Council. Also, Chen Changhao was not a member of the Standing Committee. In 1935 the Standing Committee of the Politburo was actually another term for the secretariat of the Party Centre. In Zhang's memoir, many mistakes like these can be found.

132. Mao used the Comintern's approval of the Party's political line to argue against Zhang and incited Kai Feng, his opponent at the Zunyi Conference, to attack Zhang. See Guotao, Zhang, Memoir, Vol. III, pp. 1135, 1163Google Scholar.

133. Dehuai, Peng, Autobiography, pp. 202–203Google Scholar; Braun, , A Comintern Agent, pp. 136–38Google Scholar.

134. See Guotao, Zhang, Memoir, Vol. III, p. 1235Google Scholar.