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China-India Relations in the Post-Soviet Era: The Continuing Rivalry

  • J. Mohan Malik


In September 1993, China and India signed an agreement “to maintain peace and tranquillity” along their disputed Himalayan border. This agreement between the two Asian giants – which required both sides to respect the Line of Actual Control (LAC), that is to maintain the status quo pending a peaceful, final boundary settlement and to reduce military forces along the border in accordance with the principle of “mutual and equal security” – has been described as a “landmark agreement” and “a significant step forward” in their uneasy relations since the 1950s. It was a logical culmination of a series of developments since the late 1980s, especially the visit of India's Premier to Beijing in 1988 and the reciprocal visit of China's Premier to New Delhi in 1991; the end of the Cold War and the bipolar system following the Soviet collapse; the consequent dramatic changes in the global strategic environment; and the overall improvement in bilateral relations between China and India.

However, the fact that Sino-Indian relations today seem to be better than at any time during the last four decades should not lead one to assume that all the hurdles in the relationship have been overcome. This article examines the factors underlying the current détente, and analyses Indian and Chinese perspectives on their bilateral relations as well as the wider post-Cold War Asian security environment. It concludes that a thaw in Sino-Indian relations notwithstanding, the two sides are poised for rivalry for regional dominance and influence in the multipolar world of the 21st century.



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1. Gupta, Shekhar and Chakravarti, S., “Sino-Indian relations: vital breakthrough,” Today, 30 September 1993, p. 22; “China and India paving way for peace,” Beijing Review, 20–26 September 1993, p. 6; Kaye, Lincoln, “Bordering on Peace,” Far Eastern Economic Review (hereafter FEER), 16 September 1993, p. 13; and “Hands across the Himalayas,” The Economist, 11 September 1993, p. 21.

2. For details, see Malik, J. Mohan, “Hands across the Himalayas,” Pacific Defence Reporter, March 1989, pp. 4345.

3. In August 1993, the United States imposed sanctions against China for allegedly violating international agreements by selling missiles to Pakistan (these sanctions were lifted in October 1994 after China pledged to abide by the missile control regime guidelines), and a year earlier, it pressured Russia to cancel its contract to supply cryogenic rocket engines to India. On the trade front, Japan has also been feeling U.S. pressure. Still, a common front or even co-ordination of policies by the three powers against Washington can be completely ruled out.

4. Kaye, “Bordering on peace”; Mohan Malik, J., “India copes with the Kremlin's fall,” Orbis, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Winter 1993), pp. 6987.

5. FEER, 15 April 1993, pp. 10–11, According to Pentagon's “Defense planning draft, 1994–1999,” Washington proposes to “discourage Indian hegemonic aspirations over the other states in South Asia and on the India Ocean.” See The New York Times, 8 March 1992. Also see Indian Defence Review, April 1992, p. 26.

6. Glaser, B. S., “China's security perceptions: interests and ambitions,” Asian Survey, Vol. XXXID, No. 3 (March 1993); Ya-Chun, Chang, “Peking's Asia-Pacific strategy in the 1990s,” Issues & Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1 (January 1993), p. 85.

7. Ruixiang, Zheng, “Shifting obstacles in Sino-Indian relations,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1993), p. 65.

8. Kaye, “Bordering on peace,” p. 13.

9. Mitra, Nirmal, “Coming closer,” Sunday (Calcutta), 23–29 August 1992, p. 59.

10. Gupta and Chakravarti, “Sino-Indian relations,” pp. 24–25; Indian Defence Review, April 1992, p. 8.

11. Joshi, Manoj, “Shy hands across the Himalayas,” Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter (hereafter A-PDR), April-May 1993, p. 15.

12. The Economist, 11 September 1993, p. 21.

13. BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts: The Far East (hereafter SWB/FE), No. 1789 (9 September 1993), p. G/2; Gupta and Chakravarti, “Sino-Indian relations,” p. 23.

14. “Satisfaction over India border talks,” South China Morning Post (hereafter SCMP), 13 September 1994, p.10. The Defence Minister's visit was preceded by the deputy chief of the general staff of the PLA, General Xu Huize, who visited New Delhi in December 1993. See Ranjan Gupta, “India, China to withdraw troops,” The Australian, 1–2 January 1994, p. 9.

15. Garver, John W., “Chinese-Indian rivalry in Indochina,” Asian Survey, Vol. XXVII, No. 11 (November 1987), pp. 1216–17.

16. Thakur, Ramesh, “Normalizing Sino-Indian relations,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1991), p. 15.

17. China's forays into Burma since 1991 seem to have bridged the gap in thinking lately.

18. Bhaskar, C. Uday, “Role of China in the emerging world order,” Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), Vol. XVI, No. 1 (April 1993), pp. 319.

19. Discussion here is based on private conversations with India's China experts and defence analysts, 1992–93.

20. Ibid. Also see Singh, Jasjit, “Post-Cold War security situation in Southern Asia,” Strategic Analysis, Vol. XVII, No. 1 (April 1994), p. 18.

21. See Gupta, Ranjan, “U.S. sees India and Pakistan in a new light,” The Australian, 15 April 1994, p. 16. As part of growing military co-operation between the two countries, U.S. and Indian Marine commandos conducted joint Special Operation exercises along the west Indian coast recently. The first Indian and U.S. joint naval exercise was conducted in May 1992. “Navies team up for coastal operations,” SCMP, 12 September 1994, p. 12.

22. Sawhney, Pravin, “Hastening slowly: developing Indo-U.S. relations,” Indian Defence Review, April 1993, pp. 5763; and “Developing Indo-U.S. defence cooperation,” Indian Defence Review, April 1992, pp. 17–38.

23. Khajuria, Lt Gen K. S. (Retd), “Security in South West Asia Region post-Cold War and India's defence concerns,” Indian Defence Review, July 1993, p. 44. Conversations with India's Japan experts, 1992.

24. Bhaskar, “Role of China in the emerging world order,” p. 8; “Vietnam's Spratly dispute with China and China's claims over the Japanese controlled Senkaku islands may be another realignment in which Japan and Vietnam could find common strategic interests,” writes Naidu, G.V.C., “Japan and Southeast Asia,” Strategic Analysis, Vol. XVII, No. 1 (April 1994), p. 120.

25. Gordon, Sandy, “Sino-Indian relations after the Cold War,” SDSC Newsletter (Canberra), March 1993, pp. 1, 4.

26. Jane's Defence Weekly (hereafter JDW), 6 November 1993, p. 56. Minister of State for External Affairs, R. L. Bhatia, told the Parliament on 6 August 1992 that the Indian government was fully aware of the apprehensions of defence analysts and editorial writers about the potential threat to India's security arising from Chinese military expansion plans. Cited in Chengappa, B. M., “India-China Relations: issues and implications,” Strategic Analysis, Vol. XVI, No. 1 (April 1993), p. 39.

27. See Brahma Chellaney, “The challenge of nuclear arms control in South Asia,” Survival, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Autumn 1993), pp. 121–136.

28. Chengappa, “India-China Relations,” p. 45.

29. Editorial, “China's non-interference,” The Hindustan Times, 18 November 1989.

30. Chengappa, “India-China relations,” p. 41.

31. Bhaskar, “Role of China in the emerging world order,” p. 9.

32. “Like most Asians, Indians fret about the security implications of a rich and powerful China in the next century,” The Economist, 11 September 1993, p. 21. China's neighbours voice this concern despite repeated assurances by Chinese leaders that their country will not behave like superpowers. For example, see Qichen, Qian, “China never seeks hegemony,” Beijing Review, 2–8 August 1993, pp. 911. Apparently this is so because of the gap between Beijing's words and deeds; while the political leadership has adopted a conciliatory approach in dealing with its neighbours, China's grab for Spratly islands coupled with the military leadership's belligerent rhetoric has not gone unnoticed in the region. “It is impossible to discern whether it is part of Chinese diplomacy, or an expression of existing reality in the [domestic] power politics of China,” writes Naidu, “Japan and Southeast Asia,” p. 113.

33. Gupta and Chakravarti, “Sino-Indian relations,” p. 26.

34. Indian Defence Review, April 1992, p. 14.

35. Roy, Denny, “Consequences of China's economic.growth for Asia-Pacific security,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 24, No. 2 (June 1993), p. 184. Also see his “Hegemon on the horizon?” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), p. 156, wherein he argues that “China's domestic characteristics make it comparatively likely to use force to achieve its political goals.”

36. A section of China-watchers feels that “India has stooped too low to please the Chinese” in recent years. A former ambassador to China and ex-Foreign Secretary, A. P. Venkateswaran, complains: “The Chinese haven't resiled on anything, while we keep talking of achievements.” See Mitra, “Coming closer,” p. 59.

37. Manchanda, Rita, “Unequal exchange,” FEER, 26 December 1991, pp. 1011. Critics argue there is no need to support China's position on human rights. Asks Sujit Dutta: “How can we declare commonality on human rights with China, a socialist state that does not believe in democracy?” see Sunday, 23–29 August 1992, p. 59.

38. Kaye, Lincoln, “Bordering on peace,” FEER, 16 September 1993, p. 13.

39. The Hindustan Times, 13 January 1993, p. 14; Conversation with Sujit Dutta, IDSA, January 1993.

40. Mansingh, Surjit, “An overview of India-China relations: from when to where?” Indian Defence Review, April 1993, p. 76; Gupta, Ranjan, “India walks a tightrope in pursuit of Security Council role,” The Australian, 8 October 1993.

41. Subramaniam Swamy, “Are we heading for a war with China?” Sunday, 1–7 February 1987, p. 33. According to another China expert, Surjit Mansingh, “normalization does not imply that divergences in strategic perspective between India and China have suddenly converged, or that conflicts of interest and differences of opinion on a range of issues have disappeared, or that trade and other economic transactions between China and India are blossoming… between hostility at one extreme and collaboration at the other, there is space enough for India and China to cultivate ‘normal’ state-to-state relations in response to their respective perceptions of national interest….” Mansingh, Surjit, “India-China relations in the post-Cold War era,” Asian Survey, Vol. XXXIV, No. 3 (March 1994), pp. 285–86.

42. Dezhi, Yanget al., Guofang fazhan zhanlüe sikao (Thinking on National Defence Strategies) (Beijing: PLA Press, 1987), p. 23.Segal, Gerald, “As China grows strong,” International Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 2 (Spring 1988).

43. Xin, Xu, “Changing Chinese security perceptions,” North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue Working Paper No. 27, April 1993 (York University, Ontario, Canada), p. 12.

44. Ibid. Emphasis added.

45. Betts, Richard K., “Wealth, power, and instability,” International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/1994), p. 54.

46. Mansingh, “An overview of India-China relations,” p. 76; Ruixiang, “Shifting obstacles in Sino-Indian relations,” p. 67.

47. India Today, 30 September 1993, pp. 22–37; Xia, Lin, “Indo-Russian relations enter a new era,” Beijing Review, 15–21 February 1993, pp. 1112.

48. Zhengjia, Ye, “India's foreign policy in the restructuring international relations,” Guoji wentiyanjiu (International Studies), Vol. 3 (1992). The banned book Can the Chinese Military Win the Next War? sees the U.S., India, Vietnam and Taiwan as potential military enemies. The Weekend Australian, 20–21 November 1993, p. 16.

49. Tai Ming Cheung, “Smoke signals,” FEER, 12 November 1992, pp. 29–30.

50. Ye Zhengjia, “India's foreign policy,” p. 13.

51. “China's plan to build up navy,” The Hindustan Times, 13 January 1993, p. 14. Also see Time, 10 May 1993, p. 39.

52. “No change in complexion of Sino-Pak relations,” Asian Defence Journal, February 1994, p. 122.

53. India Today, 30 September 1993, p. 26.

54. Conversations with Chinese analysts Liu Jinkun, IIS (Beijing) and Hua Di (Stanford), May 1991.

55. Klintworth, Gary, “Chinese perspectives on India as a great power,” in Ross, Babbage and Sandy, Gordon (eds.), India's Strategic Future: Regional State or Global Power? (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992), p. 96.

56. Singh, Jasjit, “Indian security: A framework for national strategy,” Strategic Analysis, November 1987, p. 898.

57. For example, China's nuclear and missile assistance to Pakistan has the double advantage for China of gaining a military counterweight on India's left flank while keeping in close contact with the Islamic world.

58. Mitra, Nirmal, “Coming closer,” Sunday, 23–29 August 1992, p. 59.

59. Mansingh, “An overview of India-China relations,” p. 76.

60. Joshi, “Shy hands across the Himalayas,” p. 16. On the growing Tibetan resistance to Chinese rule, see Bowers, Stephen, “The Tibetan resistance movement,” Jane's Intelligence Review, June 1994, pp. 283–85; “Tibetans risk all to flee” and “Police swoop on nuns in rural Tibet,” SCMP, 30 June 1994 and 25 August 1994, p.9. “Independence ‘last resort for Tibet',” SCMP, 15 September 1994, p. 12.

61. On Sino-Pakistan military ties, see Hussain, Mushahid, “Pakistan-China defense co-operation,” International Defense Review, February 1993, pp. 108111. “No change in complexion of Sino-Pak relations,” Asian Defence Journal, February 1994, p. 122.

62. Ibid. Also see Gupta and Chakravarti, “Sino-Indian relations,” p. 26. The figure on arms sales to Pakistan is from The Asian Wall Street Journal, 28–29 January 1994, p. 6.

63. Joshi, “Shy hands across the Himalayas”; Mansingh, “An overview of India-China relations.”

64. SWB/FE, No. 1789 (9 September 1993), p. G/2; FEER, 16 September 1993, p. 13; “India complains over Pakistan-China links,” The Australian, 16 December 1991, p. 7. Recently, U.S. military intelligence is reported to have uncovered hard evidence of a lucrative deal between China and Pakistan on the sale of missiles banned under the missile control regime. Quoting Pentagon sources, the Washington Post news report said that Chinese experts had arrived in Pakistan to train forces in the deployment of the M-l 1 missiles. ”New ‘evidence’ of Pakistan arms sales,” SCMP, 8 September 1994, p. 16.

65. Jacobs, G., “Chinese waves in South China Sea causing ripples in far-off New Delhi,” Armed Forces Journal International, October 1990, pp. 4041.

66. “India tipped off,” FEER, 9 August 1990, p. 5; Editorial, “China's non-interference,” The Hindustan Times, 18 November 1989.

67. Mansingh, “An overview of India-China relations,” p. 75. Conversations with India's China-watchers.

68. Stobdan, P., “China's forays into Burma: implications for India,” Strategic Analysis, Vol. XVI, No. 1 (April 1993), p. 35.Lintner, Bertil, “Burma: arms for eyes,” FEER, 16 December 1993, p. 26. The purchase of naval craft from China appears to reflect a more “legitimate” concern with protecting Burma's offshore assets, rather than being used to repress the population. Thai and Malaysian fishing boats are regularly attracted to Burmese fisheries, and EEZ also includes proven natural gas reserves.

69. FEER, November 28, 1991.

70. Selth, Andrew, “Burma: ‘hidden paradise’ or ‘paradise lost',” Current Affairs Bulletin (Sydney), November 1991, p. 7.

71. Jane's Defence Weekly reported recently that “about 70 Chinese personnel have been attached to the Burmese Navy as instructors and technicians. China is helping to build a new naval base at Hainggyi Island and to upgrade facilities at Sittwe (Akyab), Mergui and Great Cocos Island.” See JDW, 27 November 1993, p. 11.

72. Tai Ming Cheung, “Smoke signals,” pp. 29–30; Ashton, William, “Chinese naval base: many rumors, few facts,” A-PDR, June-July 1993, p. 25. Satellite images indicate that a 45-metre antenna for monitoring radio traffic has been installed on Cocos Island. See “Snooping Around,” FEER, 4 August 1994, p. 12.

73. Mitra, Nirmal, “Coming closer,” Sunday, 23–29 August 1992, p. 59.

74. Mansingh, “An overview of India-China relations,” p. 75.

75. McDonald, Hamish, “Mutual benefits,” FEER, 3 February 1994, p. 14.

76. Stobdan, “China's forays into Burma,” pp. 37–38.

77. As is their wont, the Chinese vehemently denied that “they're up to anything” when Indian Defence Minister S. Pawar and Prime Minister N. Rao raised the topic of Chinese arms flows into Burma and the build-up of naval facilities there during their visits to China in 1992 and 1993. See Sunday, 23–29 August 1992, pp. 58–59; and FEER, 16 September 1993, p. 13.

78. Stobdan, “China's forays into Burma,” p. 34; Ashton, “Chinese naval base: many rumors, few facts,” p. 25. China has already undertaken the large-scale development of towns and infrastructure near the Myanmar border to cater to its burgeoning cross-border trade, now valued at over $1.5 billion.

79. See Chu et al., “China's national security in the year 2000,” cited in Wortzel, Larry M., “China pursues traditional great-power status,” Orbis, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Spring 1994), p. 164. Gen. Li Jiulong, commander of China's Chengdu military region, which is the command headquarters and major supply base for Chinese troops in Tibet, visited Burma's naval facilities in July 1994 and reportedly pressured Rangoon to allow greater Chinese access to three islands off the Burmese coast for signals intelligence - Ramree Island south of Sittwe in Western Arakan state, Cocos Island in the Indian Ocean, and Zadetkyi Kyun or St Matthew's Island off the Tenasserim coast in the south-east, which is close to the northern entrance to the Straits of Malacca. See “Snooping around,” FEER, 4 August 1994, p. 12.

80. “Beijing expands its navy,” Inside China Mainland (Taiwan), April 1993, p. 67. At a seminar at the Australian National University in May 1991, one Chinese strategist, Hua Di, said that China cannot claim to be a truly global superpower unless it has the capability to dominate two oceans, the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. He argued that the cases of the Soviet Union and the United States show that to claim to be a superpower, an essential prerequisite is the ability to dominate at least two oceans, the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans.

81. Singh, Jasjit, “Future of Sino-Indian relations,” Strategic Analysis, Vol. XVI, No. 2 (March 1994), p. 12.

82. Dasgupta, Sunil, “The Indian Navy: in troubled waters,” India Today, 30 April 1994, pp. 7071.

83. Lintner, Bertil, “The Indo-Burmese frontier – a legacy of violence,” Jane's Intelligence Review, January 1994, pp. 3843.

84. FEER, 3 February 1994, p. 14. “Indo-Myanmar relations: coming slowly closer,” India Today, 31 January 1994, p. 40. During his February 1993 visit to Rangoon, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen had reportedly promised increased military and economic aid to the Burmese military regime in exchange for access to the Indian Ocean through naval bases in Burmese waters. See Thailand and Burma, Country Report, No, 1,1993 (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, March 1993), p. 31.

85. Stobdan, “China's forays into Burma,” p. 37. Rita Manchanda, “Reasons of state,” FEER, 6 May 1993, p. 12.

86. Indian Defence Review, April 1993, pp. 8–9. Lintner, “Burma: arms for eyes,” p. 26.

87. A senior Indonesian military official told FEER that Jakarta was “worr[ied] about the i close relationship between Burma and China.” See Vatikiotis, M. and Lintner, B., “Pariah no I more,” FEER, 3 March 1994, p. 27 and 25 November 1993, p. 11.

88. FEER, 22 April 1993, p. 9. For India, the ASEAN could also be a valuable source of investment, technology and trade, and a counterbalance to Greater China's economic Ji influence.

89. Just as the Chinese routinely stress the fact that their military ties with India's South Asian neighbours are not aimed at any third parties, an Indian official also pointed out that Indo-Vietnamese defence pact “is very low-key, and it's not aimed at any third parties (read, China).” See “Liaison agreed over defence,” SCMP, 8 September 1994, p. 18.

90. See Ohashi, M. and Takanosu, J., “Southeast Asians eye western frontier,” Nikkei Weekly, 17 May 1993, p. 24; Gupta, Ranjan, “Singapore buys Indian protection as old friendships cool,” The Australian, 7 February 1994, p. 14.

91. Japanese officials told FEER that “they are particularly concerned over the presence of the Chinese near Mergui, some 400 kilometres north of Penang and the entrance to the Strait of Malacca,” FEER, 16 December 1993, p. 26.

92. Badgley, John, “Myanmar in 1993,” Asian Survey, Vol. XXXIV, No. 2 (February 1994), p. 158.

93. Lintner, Bertil, “Murmur in the ranks,” FEER, 16 February 1993, p. 20.

94. FEER, 6 May 1993, p. 9. On the slow but systematic Chinese colonization of Northern Burma, see Maung, Mya, “On the road to Mandalay: a case study of the Sinonization of Upper Burma,” Asian Survey, Vol. XXXIV, No. 5 (May 1994), pp. 447459. “Burma's markets are flooded with cheap Chinese consumer goods. Road construction in the north, private investment in north-central towns and cities, and consumer products of every sort all reflect the embrace of the classic big brother-cum-enemy,” writes Badgley, “Myanmar in 1993,” p. 158.

95. There still remain several outstanding problems between India and South-East Asia. India's military build-up, Kashmir and Hindu-Muslim conflicts create misgivings in ASEAN's Islamic-majority countries. Hamish McDonald, ”The wooing game,” FEER, 27 January 1994, p. 28. In mid-1994, the Indian navy invited naval chiefs from countries around the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea – including Bangladesh and Burma as well as the ASEAN states – to a get-together at Port Blair, capital of its Andaman and Nicobar Islands. “The unprecendented gathering [was] part of New Delhi's strategy of using the navy to build closer ties with Southeast Asia and dispel fears of expansionist ‘blue-water’ ambitions. Inclusion of Burma on the list also markfed] a more active approach to countering China's military ties with Rangoon.” FEER, September 1994, p. 12.

96. Ashton, “Chinese naval base: many rumors, few facts”; Gordon, “Sino-Indian relations after the Cold War.”

97. Gordon, “Sino-Indian relations after the Cold War,” p. 1.

98. Roy-Chaudhury, R., “The Indian Navy in the 1990s,” Indian Defence Review, October 1992, p. 64.

99. Ruixiang, “Shifting obstacles in Sino-Indian relations,” p. 65.

100. One commentary in Indian Defence Review called upon the Indian government to “follow an activist policy in this region in order to negate external hostile (read, Sino-Pakistani) influences.” See Indian Defence Review, April 1993, pp. 8–9. For, example, the Pakistanis are dreaming of a strategic Islamic bloc – consisting of Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan and some of the new Central Asian states – that could stand up to U.S. pressure, act as a counterweight to India, support the Kashmiri Muslims’ struggle for self-determination and provide Islamabad the long-sought “strategic depth” in the event of a war with India.

101. Craig Harris, Lillian, “Xinjiang, Central Asia and the implications for China's policy in the Islamic world,” The China Quarterly, No. 133 (March 1993), pp. 111129. Chinese media reports suggest that Beijing is watching with concern the growing pro-independence activities of Uighur and Kazakh separatists living in Kazakhstan and Kyrghyzstan. “Ethnic discord raises fears,” SCMP, 10 September 1994, p. 9.

102. Interestingly, Nazarbayev announced his intention to hang on to nuclear weapons in New Delhi after his talks with Indian leaders in early 1992. One wonders whether India sought to elicit Kazakhstan's support for its own stance on nuclear arms control. See “China to stop Middle East missile sales,” The Australian, 24 February 1992, p. 7.

103. FEER, 28 October 1993, p. 14.

104. Gupta, Ranjan, “Buddhism goes full circle in enlightened India,” The Weekend Australian, 26–27 February 1994, p. 13.

105. Ibid. Interestingly, the head lama of Ladakh has been appointed as the Indian ambassador to Mongolia. According to one observer: “A new awareness of Buddhism is fostering ties between Buddhist societies in Central Asia, particularly those of Mongolia, Bhutan, Tibet, Burma and the Buddhist rim of northern India. There is a chance of spreading the initiative to Southeast Asia.” Ibid.

106. Xinhua, 16 August 1988.

107. FEER, 18 January and 6 September 1990; also cited in Klintworth, “Chinese perspectives on India,” p. 101.

108. Chellaney, “The challenge of nuclear arms control.”

109. Arms Control Today, June 1993, pp. 7, 17–22; Ruixiang, “Shifting obstacles in Sino-Indian relations,” p. 69.

110. Gupta, Shekhar and Sidhu, W. P. S., “Indo-U.S. relations: cautious manoeuvres,” India Today, 30 June 1992, p. 35.

111. For details, see Mohan Malik, J., “China's policy towards nuclear arms control: post-Cold War era,” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 16, No. 2 (August 1995), pp. 135 (forthcoming).

112. Indian Defence Review, April 1993, pp. 59–60.

113. Klintworth, “Chinese perspectives on India,” p. 101.

114. Ibid. p. 105; Gordon, Sandy, “The new nuclear arms race,” Current Affairs Bulletin, Vol. 69, No. 6 (November 1992), pp. 2889. For regional implications of China's military build-up, see Shambaugh, David, “Growing strong: China's challenge to Asian security,” Survival, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Summer 1994), pp. 5357.

115. However, China's official defence budget figures are highly distorted and under-reported. According to the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, China's 1994 defence budget is Rmb 100 bn or US$21.76 bn whereas the 1994 SIPRI Yearbook estimates that real spending for 1993 (discounted for 20% inflation) could be as high as US$37bn (calculated at 1993 exchange rates). See Shambaugh, “Growing strong,” p. 54.

116. FEER, 4 August 1994, pp. 15–16. China has also urged the Philippines to go slow on its proposal for an arms register within the ASEAN and remains ambivalent on greater transparency in its military doctrine, expenditure and force deployment. Apparently, the very concept of such transparency runs counter to the Chinese strategic culture which places high value on deception and secrecy.

117. Gordon, “Sino-Indian relations after the Cold War,” p. 1. Indian Prime Minister Rao raised the subject of Russian arms supplies to China in his talks with President Yeltsin in June 1994.

118. Bodansky, Yossef, “The PRC's force modernisation efforts finally begin to show results,” Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, 31 March 1993, pp. 89; FEER, 2 September 1993, p. 20.

119. Gordon, Sandy, The Search for Substance: Australia-India Relations into the Nineties and Beyond, Australian Foreign Policy Papers, Australian National University, 1993, pp. 7475.

120. “India has withdrawn its plans to build a large-deck aircraft carrier, because of budget constraints, and will instead construct a smaller carrier capable of carrying only 12 aircraft. The air force wants to acquire aerial-refuelling tankers and airborne radar and electronics warfare aircraft.” See McDonald, Hamish, “Iron rations,” FEER, 2 September 1993, p. 22.

121. India Today, 30 September 1993, p. 29.

122. “Asia Survey: Measuring up the giants,” The Economic, 30 October 1993, pp. 14–15.

123. The Australian Financial Review, 8 July 1993, p. 67. Eric Ellis, “India's Economic Revolution,” The Australian Financial Review, 7 February 1994, p. 14.

124. India Today, 30 September 1993, p. 29.

125. India Today, 15 October 1993, p. 87.

126. “China may have had its day,” The Australian, 15 November 1993, p. 19.

127. Sproull, Richard, “India challenges China investment,” The Australian, 27 July 1993, p. 38. “Asia survey: measuring up the giants,” The Economist, 30 October 1993, pp. 14–15; “India in a hurry,” The Economist, 5 March 1994, p. 13.

128. Zhengxin, Li, “Indian-U.S. relations improved,” Beijing Review, 6–12 June 1994, p. 24.

129. “Rediscovering the East,” India Today, 30 September 1994, pp. 36–37. At present, India has the status of a sectoral partner in ASEAN. India sees Vietnam's entry in 1995 as a full partner in ASEAN as providing it with another lever with which to push for increased Indian participation in the association. Much like other countries, in a quiet diplomatic move, New Delhi has also recently set up an unofficial presence in Taipei in order to lure cash-rich Taiwanese investors to India. FEER, 8 September 1994, p. 12.

130. Besides, the lack of direct banking relations, air links or good transportation facilities have also hampered increase in bilateral trade. The two sides signed an agreement to open up more border trade points. “China and India paving way for peace,” Beijing Review, 20–26 September 1993, p. 6. According to one report, Indian commodities such as iron ore, drugs and engineering goods have a ready market across the Himalayas, while Chinese goods such as raw silkd, precious stones and petroleum products are welcomed by Indian businessmen. See India Today, 30 September 1993, p. 36.

131. “Asia survey: measuring up the giants,” p. 15.

132. Indian Voice (Melbourne), November 1993, p. 4.

133. Taylor, Jay, The Dragon and The Wild Goose: China and India (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987), pp. 232, 250–51.

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  • J. Mohan Malik


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