¹ Verzijl, J. H. W., International Law in Historical Perspective, vol. 1, at 558 (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1968).Google Scholar

² For conflicting views regarding the status of the principle of self-determination in international law, see, e.g., the deliberations of the Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States, UN Docs. A/6230, at 91-100; A/6799, at 29-37, 80; A/7326, at 52-68; and A/7619, at 48-68. See also the discussion of Emerson, Rupert, “Self-Determination,” 65 Am. J. Int’l L., 459–62 (1971)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; the debate between Emerson and Bowett in 1966 Proceedings, American Society of International Law, 129-41; and Feinberg, Nathan. The Arab-Israel Conflict in International Law, 44–51 (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1970).Google Scholar

³ Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

⁴ This resolution deals with the principles which should guide UN members in determining whether or not they are obliged to transmit information under Article 73(e) of the Charter.

⁵ In the case of Western Samoa (a trust territory), Samoan leaders initially wished to have the 1961 plebiscite conducted by the traditional “matai” system; but the UN successfully urged the use of universal adult suffrage in the plebiscite. See Report of the 1959 UN Visiting Mission to Western Samoa, UN Doc. T/1449, paras. 162-64; GA Resolution 1569 (XV), December 18, 1960.

⁶ The 1946 consultations are to be distinguished from the plebiscite which South Africa wished to conduct in the territory jointly with the International Court in 1971 in the course of the proceedings in the Namibia case. The latter plebiscite, presumably, would have been based on a “one man, one vote” system, but its purpose was to be solely evidentiary. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 2 Pleadings 668-69 (I.C.J.); [1971] I.C.J. Rep. 57-58.

⁷ The most notable exception is Bahrain, in respect of which the two disputant states, Britain and Iran, agreed to request the despatch of a personal repre-sentative by the Secretary-General to “ascertain the wishes of the people,” the results of his findings to be transmitted to the Security Council “for its consideration and endorsement.” See UN Docs. S/97S6, March 28, 1970; S/9772, April 30, 1970; and S/PV. 1536, May 11, 1971. In the case of Malaysia, the three disputant states (Indonesia, Malaya, and the Philippines) requested the Secretary-General to confirm “by a fresh approach” (and by reference to Principle IX of the Annex to Resolution 1541) the previously expressed desires of Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak to join the proposed Malaysian federation. The Secretary-General acted in this case in a personal and quasi-arbitral capacity, no other UN organ being asked to confirm the results. See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1963, at 41-44; and Rovine, Arthur W., The First Fifty Years: The Secretary-General in World Politics, 1920-1970, 377–81 (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1970)Google Scholar. Mention might also be made of the referendum carried out by the United Kingdom in Gibraltar in 1967, which was discussed by the UN Special Committee of Twenty Four and the General Assembly: [1967] United Nations Yearbook 668-76. For a discussion of plebiscites conducted by the UN up to 1961, see Merle, M., “Les Plébiscites Organisés par les Nations Unies,” 7 Annuaire Francais de Droit International 425–45 (1961).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁸ No positive alternative was offered in either case. In the South West Africa consultations, the choice was between incorporation and non-incorporation with South Africa; in West Irian it was between remaining with Indonesia and severing ties with it. Independence (eventual or immediate) was more implicit in the case of West Irian.

⁹ Prior to the consultations neither government possessed such sovereignty. Under the terms of the Mandate for South West Africa, South Africa possessed only “full power of administration and legislation … as an integral portion” of its own territory. The New York Agreement of 1962 transferred “full administrative responsibility” for West Irian to Indonesia in 1963, the transfer of sovereignty being implicitly contingent upon the “act of free choice” (to be held before the end of 1969). Legally, South Africa’s right to administer was apparently more restricted than that of Indonesia, since it was subject, by the terms of the Mandate, to international supervision (a requirement which the International Court was to hold in its 1950 advisory opinion, continued in force after the demise of the League). The New York Agreement did not provide for any UN supervisory role in West Irian after 1963 — except with regard to the preparations for and conduct of the “act of free choice.” As for the applicability of Article 73 of the Charter to both territories, see the following footnote.

¹⁰ The Charter basis is provided primarily by Article 73 relating to non-self-governing territories. South Africa at least initially acknowledged the applic-ability of this article to South West Africa, even while denying the continuance of the international supervision requirement of the mandate. See, e.g., GAOR (I/2), 4th Ctte., 19th Mtg., November 13, 1946, at 102. And see, on this question, the Spender-Fitzmaurice joint dissent, [1962] I.C.J. Rep. 541-45; the views of Judge Fitzmaurice, [1971] I.C.J. Rep. 248-49, 296; and Slonim, Solomon, South West Africa and the United Nations: An International Mandate in Dispute, 93, 101 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1973)Google Scholar. Indonesia, on the other hand, did not consider West Irian in the 1963-69 period to be a non-self-governing territory concerning which information had to be transmitted to the UN, and the UN did nothing to challenge this view. On the legal untenability of the Indonesian stance, see the discussions of the West Irian case, below, and especially the concluding section of this article.

¹¹ On the necessity for UN consent to any modification of the international status of South West Africa, see the 1950 advisory opinion of the International Court, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 141-43.

¹² On the ambiguous nature of the UN role under the terms of the Agreement, see the section on the framework and implementation of the “act of free choice” in West Irian, infra.

¹³ See the reservation entered by South Africa at the San Francisco Conference in 1945; the South African statement during the first part of the first General Assembly session in January, 1946; and the South African statement during the last League Assembly session in April, 1946. GAOR (I/2), 4th Ctte., Annex 13, at 200; ibid. (I/1), Plenary, 12th Mtg., January 7, 1946, at 185-86; ibid., 4th Ctte., 3rd Mtg., January 22, 1946, at 10; League of Nations, Official Journal, Spec. Supp., No. 194, at 32-33.

¹⁴ GAOR (I/2), 4th Ctte., Annex 13a, at 240.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid., 4th Ctte., 14th Mtg., November 4, 1946, at 64.

¹⁷ Ibid., Annex 13, at 232-34.

¹⁸ See Slonim, op. cit., supra note 10, at 78,n. 11. The British government subsequenting cited Lord Hailey’s report as grounds for supporting South Africa’s request for incorporation: GAOR (I/2), 4th Ctte., 19th Mtg., November 13, 1946, at 100.

¹⁹ Ibid., Annexes 13 and 13a, at 199-244.

²⁰ Ibid., 4th Ctte., 14th Mtg., November 4, 1946, at 65.

²¹ Ibid., 15th Mtg., November 5, 1946, at 70. As noted above, the population was offered no positive alternative to incorporation.

²² Ibid., 20th Mtg., November 14, 1946, at 110.

²³ Ibid., 16th Mtg., November 7, 1946, at 78.

²⁴ Ibid., 19th Mtg., November 13, 1946, at 98. See also the Cuban draft resolution, ibid., Annex 21 (A/C.4/68), at 288.

²⁵ See, e.g., the views of Poland, ibid., 19th Mtg., November 13, 1946, at 105; Mexico and Syria, ibid., 20th Mtg., November 14, 1946, at 108 and 113.

²⁸ See the remarks of the Mexican representative, ibid., 20th Mtg., November 14, 1946, at 108.

²⁷ See, e.g., the remarks of the Chinese representative, ibid., 16th Mtg., November 7, 1946, at 78; the Czechoslovak representative, ibid., 17th Mtg., November 8, 1946, at 87; and the Danish representative, ibid., 20th Mtg., November 14, 1946, at 109.

²⁸ See, e.g., the comments of India, ibid., 15th Mtg., November 5, 1946, at 70; and the Ukrainian S.S.R., ibid., 19th Mtg., November 13, 1946, at 103.

²⁹ Yugoslavia, ibid., 19th Mtg., November 13, 1946, at 99.

³⁰ See, e.g., the views of Mexico, ibid., 20th Mtg., November 14, 1946, at 108; Bolivia, ibid., 114; and the United States, ibid., 21st Mtg., December 8, 1946, at 122. The assumption that independence was the only legitimate outcome of the mandate tutelage was not entirely borne out historically. See Slonim, op. cit., supra note 10, Chap. I. South Africa’s own arguments in 1946 regarding the goals of the mandates system were not free of inconsistencies: see ibid., 79-80.

³¹ See, e.g., the Indian draft resolution, GAOR (I/2), 4th Ctte., Annex 13c, at 245; and the Soviet draft resolution, ibid., Annex 21, at 287.

³² See, especially, India’s reference to South Africa’s racial policies, ibid., 4th Ctte., 20th Mtg., November 14, 1946, at 110.

³³ Ibid., 108.

³⁴ Ibid., 17th Mtg., November 8, 1946, at 86-87.

³⁵ Ibid., 19th Mtg., November 13, 1946, at 100.

³⁶ The vote was 37 to o, with 8 abstentions. Ibid., Plenary, 64th Mtg., December 14, 1946, at 1327.

³⁷ Following the General Assembly’s rejection of the incorporation proposal, South Africa never formally annexed South West Africa, although it continued to administer it while denying the UN a supervisory role. In 1966, the Assembly “terminated” South Africa’s mandate, but South Africa has refused to recognize the validity of this act. For a history of the UN’s treatment of the South West Africa question, see Slonim, op. cit., supra note 10; and Dugard, John (ed.), The South West Africa/Namibia Dispute (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973).Google Scholar

³⁸ For an appreciation of the background to the 1962 Agreement, see Lijphart, Arend, The Trauma of Decolonization: The Dutch and West New Guinea (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966)Google Scholar; and van der Kroef, Justus M., “The West New Guinea Settlement: Its Origins and Implications,” 7 Orbis 120–49 (1963)Google Scholar. The text of the Agreement may be found in 437 UNTS (1962), No. 6311; UN Doc. A/5170, annex; and ILM, 1962, at 231.

³⁹ For a summary of the Dutch and Indonesian arguments on the question, see Lijphart, op. cit., 22-35. The 1949 agreement had left the future political status of West New Guinea to be determined “within a year from the date of transfer of sovereignty” to Indonesia of the Dutch East Indies. The issue remained in dispute until 1962. Dutch offers to have the ICJ adjudicate the dispute were rejected by Indonesia.

⁴⁰ See UN Docs. A/4915 and A/L.354; GAOR (XVI), Plenary, 1049th Mtg., November 8, 1961, at 587-89. The Dutch draft resolution was not put to the vote, and two counter-proposals failed to receive the required two-thirds majority. The first, a nine-power draft (A/L.367/Rev.i, sponsored by India et al.) made no reference to the right of self-determination, and would have simply called for renewal of bilateral negotiations under the aegis of the President of the Assembly. The second, a compromise thirteen-power proposal sponsored by the Brazzaville group of states (A/L.368) also called for the renewal of negotiations, but envisaged, in the event of failure to resolve the dispute by a certain date, the despatch of a UN fact-finding commission to investigate conditions in the territory and to examine the possibilities for establishing a period of international administration. This draft referred specifically to Resolution 1514 and to the need to base a solution of the dispute on the principle of self-determination. While both proposals were defeated, the second attained considerably more support. (The vote on the Brazzaville group’s draft resolution was 53 for, 41 against, with 9 abstentions; on the nine-power draft, 41 for, 40 against, with 21 abstentions. In a separate vote on the preambular paragraph in the Brazzaville draft referring to self-determination, 53 votes were cast in favour, 36 against, with 14 abstentions.) GAOR (XVI), Plenary, 1o66th Mtg., November 27, 1961, at 873, 875-76. See, in general, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1961, at 51-55 and 57; and, for earlier discussions of the West New Guinea problem, see ibid., 1954, at 56-60; 1955, at 61-63; 1956, at 125-27; and 1957, at 76-80.

⁴¹ Cf. too the Dutch assertion in 1961 that any formula for staging an act of self-determination some years after Indonesian administration would “make a mockery of the principle of free choice.” GAOR (XVI), Plenary, 1055th Mtg., November 15, 1961, at 665.

⁴² This ambiguity was highlighted by the conflicting statements made by the two disputants immediately after signing the New York Agreement. Indonesia emphasized that the agreement represented the completion of the “independence struggle of the Indonesian revolution”; the Netherlands attached primary importance, inter alia, to the “genuine” exercise of free choice by the Papuans “under the active supervision of the United Nations.” Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, August 25 - September 1, 1962, at 18939.

⁴³ For a critical discussion of UNTEA’s role in this respect, see van der Veur, Paul W., “The United Nations in West Irian: A Critique,” 18 Int’l Organ. 53–73 (1964).Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Due primarily to Indonesia’s “withdrawal of cooperation” with the UN in 1965, this part of the Agreement remained a dead letter. See the report of Ortiz Sanz, the Secretary-General’s Representative in West Irian, UN Doc. A/7783, November 6, 1969, Annex I (hereinafter cited as Ortiz Sanz Report), para. 11.

⁴⁵ Emphasis supplied.

⁴⁶ The Secretary-General’s Representative inclined toward the narrow view of the UN’s role, seeing it as non-supervisory. See Ortiz Sanz Report, paras. 8-16. But cf. ibid., para. 29(c).

⁴⁷ Emphasis supplied.

⁴⁸ Emphasis supplied.

⁴⁹ Ortiz Sanz Report, para. 82.

⁵⁰ According to Ortiz Sanz, approximately 80 per cent of the inhabitants lived in the less developed interior, and almost all of the population there were “illiterate and little concerned with political matters.” Ibid., para. 139.

⁵¹ See the December, 1962, statement by Indonesia’s Deputy Foreign Minister, cited in P. van der Veur, supra note 43, at 63.

⁵² See the Indonesian Report to the Secretary-General on the “act of free choice,” UN Doc. A/7723, November 6, 1969, Annex II (hereinafter cited as Indonesian Report), para. 33.

⁵³ Ortiz Sanz Report, para. 88. Indonesia appeared to acknowledge at that point that its proposal departed from the strict letter of the New York Agreement, but it considered this departure justified by the “specific geographical, social, and human realities” in West Irian. Ibid., para. 89.

⁵⁴ Ibid., paras. 93-104.

⁵⁵ On the early sifting-out of political opposition to Indonesia from the councils, and the intimidation of council members, see P. van der Veur, supra note 43, 65-67.

⁵⁶ Ortiz Sanz Report, para. 101.

⁵⁷ Ibid., para. 86.

⁵⁸ Ibid., paras. 87, 113-27.

⁵⁹ Ibid., paras. 128-37, 249. In some instances new elections had been held with UN participation.

⁶⁰ These were “to all intents and purposes appointed by local Indonesian civil and military officials after consultation with Papuan tribal chiefs [and] village headmen.” van der Kroef, Justus M., “Indonesia and West New Guinea: The New Dimensions of Conflict,” 14 Orbis 380–81 (1970).Google Scholar

⁶¹ Indonesian Report, para. 59.

⁶² Ortiz Sanz Report, para. 126.

⁶³ See the remarks of Ghana, GAOR (XXIV), Plenary, 1812th Mtg., November 19, 1969, para. 29.

⁶⁴ This emerges most clearly from Indonesia’s own recounting of the proceedings. See Indonesian Report, paras. 50-64.

⁶⁵ See the subsequent query in the UN debates as to why there was “no opportunity given for anyone to make a contrary harangue to the Consultative Assembly.” GAOR (XXIV), Plenary, 1812th Mtg., November 19, 1969, para. 29.

⁶⁶ Indonesian Report, para. 51; and see, in general, ibid., paras. 50-57.

⁶⁷ Ortiz Sanz Report, paras. 250-51. See also ibid., paras. 49-75, 138-82.

⁶⁸ See, e.g., ibid., paras. 8-16 and 86.

⁶⁹ Ibid., para. 253.

⁷⁰ See, e.g., Harris, Stewart in The Times (London), July 8, 1969 Google Scholar; Shabecoff, Philip, New York Times, July 7, 1969 Google Scholar; and see J. van der Kroef, supra note 60, at 394, and the articles there cited. According to one correspondent, all foreigners in West Irian “were unanimous that if the choice were really free it would go against Indonesia”: cited, ibid., 394.

⁷¹ The issue was discussed at plenary meetings 1810, November 13, 1969; 1812 and 1813, November 19, 1969.

⁷² The Moslem kinship between Indonesia and the North African states should not be overlooked in this connection.

⁷³ Although, as will be seen below, some black African states did vote for the Indonesian-sponsored resolution, none spoke in its favor. The intra third-world split had already surfaced in previous Assembly discussion on the subject of self-determination for West Irian. See the debates and votes in 1961 (especially the thirteen-power Brazzaville-group draft resolution), GAOR (XVI) , Plenary Mtgs. 1016, 1048-50, 1054-61, and 1064-66; and the 1962 exchanges between several black African states and Indonesia, GAOR (XVII) , Plenary, 1130th Mtg., paras. 34-36; 1151st Mtg., paras. 154-57; 1152nd Mtg., paras. 137-39; 1153rd Mtg., paras. 70-73; and 1155th Mtg., paras. 114-22, 197-205.

⁷⁴ Belgium, Luxembourg, Malaysia, and Thailand.

⁷⁵ UN Doc. A/L. 574, November 12, 1969. The second paragraph related to the future economic development of West Irian.

⁷⁶ Indonesia spoke, e.g., of the “traditional social structure” (Indonesian Report, para. 27) and the “specific socio-cultural conditions” (ibid., para. 28). Indonesia also referred, in the course of its Report, to the fact that “most of the members [of the Consultative Assemblies] had no proper clothing.” Ibid., para. 48. (Cf. Indonesia’s earlier chiding of Australia and the Netherlands regarding the Papuans’ state of dress, GAOR (XVI), Plenary, 1058th Mtg., November 20, 1961. at 721.)

⁷⁷ Indonesian Report, para. 65.

⁷⁸ These, however, were precisely the standards to which the New York Agreement (which spoke of “international practice”) referred.

⁷⁹ GAOR (XXIV), Plenary, 1810th Mtg., November 13, 1969, para. 10.

⁸⁰ See, especially, Ortiz Sanz Report, para. 89.

⁸¹ Indonesian Report, para. 3; GAOR (XXIV), Plenary, 1810th Mtg., para. 8.

⁸² Ibid., para. 10. This argument is, of course, closely connected with the contention (about which, see immediately below) that the “self” is Indonesia (not West Irian), and that its methods should therefore be determinative. On other occasions, however, Indonesia took pains to show that the concept of musjawarah was native also to West Irian. See J. van der Kroef, supra note 60, at 381. (Van der Kroef, incidentally, notes the irony that within Indonesia parliamentary leaders were then urging discarding the musjawarah system as too much of an authoritarian tool of Sukarno’s “guided democracy”: ibid., 381, n. 45.)

⁸³ See, e.g., Indonesian Report, paras. 65-66; GAOR (XXIV), Plenary, 1810th Mtg., paras. 8 and 16; 1813th Mtg., paras. 103 and 106.

⁸⁴ Indonesian Report, para. 9; and see the remarks of Thailand, GAOR (XXIV), Plenary, 1813th Mtg., para. 75.

⁸⁵ See, e.g., Indonesian Report, paras. 9-11, 19, and 34; GAOR (XXIV), Plenary, 1810th Mtg., paras. 2, 6, and 56-57; 1813th Mtg., paras. 94-97, 105, 107-8.

⁸⁶ See the views of Burma, ibid., 1812th Mtg., para. 70; Algeria, ibid., paras. 75, 79, 82, and 92; Kuwait, ibid., 1813th Mtg., paras. 1, 2, 5, and 8; India, ibid., para. 23; Saudi Arabia, ibid., para. 40; Thailand, ibid., paras. 71, 82, and 85; and Afghanistan, ibid., para. 187. See also the statement of Mexico, ibid., para. 190.

⁸⁷ Ibid., para. 24; and see the views of Algeria, ibid., 1812th Mtg., para. 77, and Indonesia, ibid., 1813th Mtg., paras. 103-4. For African fears of setting a precedent, see text at nn. 97 and 98, below. While several states of the Asian-North African group affirmed their satisfaction with the genuineness of the “act of free choice” (see GAOR [XXIV], Plenary, 1810th Mtg., para. 62, and 1812th Mtg., para. 88), this appeared to be a distinctly secondary consideration.

⁸⁸ See, especially, the remarks of the Saudi Arabian and Malaysian representatives, ibid., paras. 47-50 and 61-64. See also ibid., 1810th Mtg., paras. 62 and 64; 1812th Mtg., para. 88; and 1813th Mtg., paras. 21-22, 71, 74, and 79.

⁸⁹ Remarks of the Dutch Foreign Minister, Mr. Luns, ibid., 1810th Mtg., paras. 28-29. By 1969, Dutch-Indonesian political and economic relations had vastly improved and, presumably, the Netherlands was unwilling to sacrifice its growing interests in Indonesia for the sake of Papuan self-determination. See J. van der Kroef, supra note 60, at 375-76.

⁹⁰ GAOR (XXIV), Plenary, 1810th Mtg., paras. 37-38; 1813th Mtg., para. 143.

⁹¹ Ibid., 1812th Mtg., paras. 2-3. See also, e.g., the statements of Togo, 1810th Mtg., paras. 77-78, and 1813th Mtg., para. 26; Ghana, 1810th Mtg., paras. 69-70 and 1812th Mtg., para. 31; and Dahomey, 1813th Mtg., para. 153.

⁹² Ghana, ibid., 1812th Mtg., para. 31; 1810th Mtg., para. 70. See also, on the substantive nature of the UN’s role, ibid., 1812th Mtg., paras. 19-20, and 1813th Mtg., para. 112.

⁹³ This conclusion can be inferred from such statements as those of Togo, ibid., 1810th Mtg., para. 78; Ghana, 1812th Mtg., paras. 30 and 34; and Dahomey, 1813th Mtg., para. 153.

⁹⁴ See the statements of Sierra Leone, ibid., 1812th Mtg., paras. 7-9; Ghana, ibid., paras. 20-25; Togo, 1813th Mtg., para. 30; and Zambia, ibid., para. 62.

⁹⁵ See the specific reference to paragraph 3 of that resolution by Togo, ibid., 1813th Mtg., para. 31.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 1812th Mtg., para. 6. It was noted by Ghana that: 1) the Netherlands had successfully introduced democratic voting procedures — even, to a certain extent, in the less accessible areas; and 2) Australia was successfully using the “one man, one vote” principle in Australian Papua and New Guinea, though that territory was “inhabited by the same so-called undeveloped peoples.” Ibid., para. 21.

⁹⁷ Sierra Leone, ibid., para. 7.

⁹⁸ Ghana, ibid., para. 30. Against this argument, the Asian states and Indonesia contended that, since the issue was not self-determination but territorial integrity—-and, moreover, the territorial integrity of a non-colonial state — no harmful precedent was being established. See supra note 87. The African states, it appears, would have been prepared to endorse the “mixed” method proposed by Mr. Ortiz Sanz (see the comments of Togo, GAOR [XXIV], Plenary, 1813th Mtg., paras. 29-30), though, as noted above, this proposal also accepted the “primitiveness” hypothesis to a considerable extent.

⁹⁹ See, e.g., ibid., 1812th Mtg., paras. 3, 9, 24-29, and 32.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., paras. 36-38 and 40.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., paras. 43-44.

¹⁰² Ibid., 1813th Mtg., paras. 168 and 182. The resolution was numbered 2504 (XXIV).

¹⁰³ Voting in favour were: Barbados, Central African Republic, Dahomey, Gabon, Ghana, Guyana, Israel, Jamaica, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zambia. Seventeen black African states abstained, as did twelve European states (including Romania, from the Eastern bloc), six Latin American states, and Canada. Only four sub-Saharan African states (Congo [Brazzaville], Guinea, Mali, and Nigeria) voted against.

¹⁰⁴ Twenty-four black African states abstained, joined by four black Central American states, Israel, and Venezuela. Only eight sub-Saharan African states voted in favor. Among the latter were Nigeria and Ethiopia, who, with their special separatist problems, were, very likely, particularly susceptible to Indonesia’s “territorial integrity” appeal. (During the summer preceding the Assembly session, the Indonesian Foreign Minister had announced his government’s “unqualified” support for Nigeria in the matter of the Biafran secession. See J. van der Kroef, supra note 60, at 392. See also ibid. for an account of the respective efforts of “Free Papua” and Indonesia to sway Africa in regard to the “act of free choice.”) A sense of “third-world” kinship probably accounts for the supporting votes of the more “radical” black African states, such as Guinea and Mali. (Cf., too, in this connection, Ghana’s stance in 1961, under Nkrumah, with the position of the more “moderate” regime in 1969. See GAOR [XVI], Plenary, 1057th Mtg., November 17, 1961, paras. 51-59.) For appeals to “third-world” solidarity during the debates, see the statements of Algeria, GAOR (XXIV), Plenary, 1812th Mtg., paras. 77, 82, 92-96; Indonesia, 1813th Mtg., para. 101; and Saudi Arabia, ibid., para. 41.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., para. 144.

¹⁰⁶ Similarly, if the standards of the population consulted do not embrace universal adult suffrage they are inadmissible means of self-determination. See the case of Western Samoa, supra note 5.

¹⁰⁷ Ortiz Sanz Report, para. 82.

¹⁰⁸ The following general principle of interpretation (cited by Judge Fitzmaurice in the Namibia case) is particularly apt in this regard: “When a particular proposal has been considered but rejected, for whatever reason, it is not possible to interpret the instrument or juridical situation to which the proposal related as if the latter had in fact been adopted”: [1971] I.G.J. Rep. 275.

¹⁰⁹ See especially the radio talks by UNTEA’s Department of Information, cited in Paul W. van der Veur, supra note 43, at 62, in which the element of “free choice” to remain with Indonesia or to sever ties with her was stated in emphatic terms.

¹¹⁰ The expression was that of an Indonesian member of Parliament, cited by Shabecoff, Philip, New York Times, July 7, 1969.Google Scholar

¹¹¹ The referendum in Gibraltar is a case in point. See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1967, at 668-76.

¹¹² See especially the trenchant discussion of this point by Wight, Martin, “International Legitimacy,” 4 Int’l Rel. 1–28 (May 1972).Google Scholar

¹¹³ These states and the Soviet bloc considered Papuan self-determination a subterfuge for the perpetuation of Dutch neo-colonialism. See especially the 1961 debates on West New Guinea, supra note 73.

¹¹⁴ For a discussion of ethnic and cultural differences between West Irian and Indonesia, see Lijphart, op. cit., supra note 38, at 25-26.

¹¹⁵ See the remarks of Togo, GAOR (XXIV), Plenary, 1810th Mtg., paras. 76-78; Sierra Leone and Ghana, ibid., 1812th Mtg., paras. 3-5 and 31. Even more revealing were the barbed comments by some of the Brazzaville states on the 1962 West Irian settlement. The territory, it was said, was “being handed over by one colonial Power to another with the blessing of the United Nations.” (GAOR [XVI], Plenary, 1151st Mtg., October 12, 1962, at 474.) Indonesia was accused of having betrayed “the sacred principles of the Bandung Conference.” “The same reasons which justified the Indonesians in demanding the departure of the Dutch, because the Dutch are not Indonesians,” it was argued, “require that the Papuans should not be handed over to the Indonesians, since they too are not Indonesians”; they are, rather, a distinct “ethnic entity.” Ibid., 1153rd Mtg., October 15, 1962, at 507. See also ibid., 1130th Mtg., September 25, 1962, at 104; 1152nd Mtg., October 12, 1962, at 497; and the Indonesian reply, ibid., 1155th Mtg., October 18, 1962, at 537-38 and 544-45. On the Free Papuan appeals to pan-negroid sentiment in Africa, see J. van der Kroef, supra note 38, at 137-38; and supra note 60, at 392.

¹¹⁶ See, e.g., the desire expressed by Emerson, Rupert, “Self-Determination,” 65 Am. J. Int’l L. 475 (1971).Google Scholar