¹ In subsequent phases of the softwood lumber dispute, the Coalition for Fair Canadian Lumber Imports became, simply, the Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports (CFLI).

² General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 30 October 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [GATT].

³ Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, 22 December 1987 and 2 January 1988, Can. T.S. 1989 No. 3 [CUSFTA].

⁴ North American Free Trade Agreement, 2 December 1992, Can. T.S. 1994 No. 2.

⁵ The term “stumpage” refers to the set of legal arrangements whereby timber harvesters access timber growing on Canadian crown lands. For further discussion of the respective Canadian and US views as to the legal character of stumpage, see discussion later in this article.

⁶ Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigations: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 47 Fed. Reg., 49878 (1982) [Lumber I].

⁷ Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Softwood Products from Canada, 48 Fed. Reg., 24159 (1983) [Lumber I, Final Determination],

⁸ Ibid, at 24167.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid. at 24168.

¹¹ Neither of the approaches appears to have been expressly contemplated by the governing US law but, rather, appear to have been based on the USDOC’s interpretation of the statutory language regarding “assum[ption of] a cost of production.”

¹² Lumber I, Final Determination, supra note 7 at 24168.

¹³ The USDOC noted that this was the method through which British Columbia determined its price for stumpage. With British Columbia accounting for some 67 per cent of lumber exports, the USDOC felt that it could not be said that Canadian stumpage prices did not reflect a true market value. Lumber I, Final Determination, supra note 7 at 24168.

¹⁴ Ibid. After noting that the “preferential” standard “normally means only more favourable to some within a jurisdiction than to others within that jurisdiction,” the department made no finding with respect to the applicability of the provision dealing with providing goods at preferential rates.

¹⁵ Initiation of (Countervailing Investigation: (Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 51 Fed. Reg., 21205 (1986) [Lumber II]. Canada challenged the initiation of the countervailing duty investigation by the United States in the GATT under the dispute settlement provisions of the Tokyo Round Agreement on the Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the GATT, 12 April 1979,31 U.S.T.,4919 [SCM Code]. Canada’s central claim was that there had been no material changes in the situation since the negative countervailing duty determination in 1982. In the absence of such changes, there was not sufficient evidence to initiate an investigation consistent with Article 2(1) of the SCM Code. The panel established to consider this matter did not issue its report until 25 May 1987, a date subsequent to the resolution of the dispute. The brief report, United States -Initiation of a Countervailing Duty Investigation into Softwood Lumber Products from Canada (Complaint by Canada) (1987), unadopted, 34th Supp. B.I.S.D. (1988) at 194 [US – Softwood Lumber I], simply records the conclusion of a mutually satisfactory settlement and briefly outlines its terms.

¹⁶ Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 51 Fed. Reg., 37453 (1986) [Lumber II, Preliminary Determination].

¹⁷ Softwood Lumber from Canada: Results of import investigation, 51 Fed. Reg., 25752 (1986).

¹⁸ Lumber II, Preliminary Determination, supra note 16 at 37455.

¹⁹ Ibid. at 37456.

²⁰ As had been the case in Lumber I, supra note 6, the USDOC’s discretion in interpreting the basic statutory requirement was unfettered by further statutory or regulatory elaboration.

²¹ Carbon Black from Mexico: Preliminary Results of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review, 51 Fed. Reg., 13269 (1986), cited in Lumber II, Preliminary Determination, supra note 16 at 37457.

²² Ibid. at 37458. The overall preliminary rate of 15 per cent included this figure plus the sum of other federal and provincial programs found to provide subsidies.

²³ Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93–618.

²⁴ Initiation of Section 302 Investigation and Request for Public Comment on Determinations Involving Expeditious Action: Canadian Exports of Softwood Lumber, 56 Fed. Reg., 50739 (1991) [Lumber III].

²³ Self-Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigation: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 56 Fed. Reg., 56055 (1991). The United States’s interim measures and the initiation of the countervailing duty investigation were challenged under the dispute settlement mechanism of the GATT’s SCM Code, supra note 15. The panel in United States – Measures Affecting Imports of Softwood Lumber from Canada (Complaint by Canada) (1993), 40th Supp. B.I.S.D. (1994), adopted 27 October 1993 [US – Softwood Lumber IL], ruled that the imposition of interim measures by the United States was inconsistent with its GATT obligations. In the view of the panel, the measures represented provisional measures applied before a countervailable subsidy had preliminarily been found to exist. As such, the measures were inconsistent with Article 5.1 of the SCM Code. The panel rejected, however, Canada’s separate claim regarding the initiation of the countervailing duty investigation.

²⁶ Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 57 Fed. Reg., 22570 (1992) [Lumber III, Final Determination].

²⁷ This article does not undertake a detailed analysis of the log export restraint issue. Nonetheless, for the sake of completeness, it is useful to incorporate the following points. The USDOC’s Lumber III détermination found, in essence, that, by limiting the quantity of logs that might be exported from the province, British Columbia increased the supply of such goods within its jurisdiction and thus pushed down the price that lumber manufacturers needed to pay to obtain these inputs. This was found to be both a subsidy and specific to certain enterprises. These findings were challenged, and ultimately overturned in the context of Canada’s challenge under Chapter 19 of the CUSFTA, supra note 3 discussed later in this article in regard to its other dimensions. Subsequently, the United States’s treatment generally of export restraints in countervailing duty investigations was also the subject of a separate challenge by Canada in the WTO. See United States – Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidies (Complaint by Canada), Panel Report, WTO Doc. WT/DSigzj/R and Corr. 2 (2001).

²⁸ As with the export restraints issue, the scope of this review is such that the US International Trade Commission’s (USITC) Lumber III injury findings, as well as CUSFTA Chapter ig review thereof, are not examined in detail in this article. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that the initial USITC determination was remanded by the Chapter 19 panel for want of support in substantial evidence. This was also the case with respect to the USITC’s first and second determinations on remand. The Lumber III episode was ultimately settled before any third remand determination was issued by the USITC.

²⁹ These proposed regulations appear never to have entered into force. They were nevertheless applied by the USDOC, on something of a provisional basis, for the purposes of the Lumber III investigation.

³⁰ Lumber III, Final Determination, supra note 26 at 22583.

³¹ Ibid. The USDOC did not, in its findings, address the other criteria, although it claimed to have “considered” them. Thus, unlike in Lumber II, the USDOC did not expressly address the degree to which governments exercised discretion in the allocation of stumpage rights.

³² Re Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, Chapter l9 Panel, Doc. USA–92–1904–01 (1993) at 43-4 [Re Softwood Lumber, CUSFTA Panel Report].

³³ Re Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, Chapter 19 Panel, Decision on Remand USA–92–1904–02 (1993) at 26 [Re Softwood Lumber, CUSFTA Report on Remand],

³⁴ Ibid. at 40.

³⁵ Ibid. at 50–51.

³⁶ The panel’s decision in this regard was challenged under the extraordinary challenge procedure of Chapter ig of the CUSFTA. By a majority of two to one, the Extraordinary Challenge Committee found no reason to disturb the panel’s findings and affirmed the panel’s decision. See Re Softwood Lumber from Canada, Extraordinary Challenge Committee, Doc. ECC–94–1904–oiUSA (1994) [Re Softwood Lumber, Extraordinary Challenge Committee]. Subsequently, the CFLI initiated a constitutional challenge in respect of the CUSFTA Chapter 19 procedures. This challenge, however, was withdrawn around the time that the Softwood Lumber Agreement, discussed later in this article, was concluded.

³⁷ These four alternatives are materially the same as the four alternatives put forward by the USDOC in the context of the Lumber II investigation, see supra note 16.

³⁸ Lumber III, Final Determination, supra note 26 at 22586–87.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid. at 22587.

⁴² Re Softwood Lumber, CUSFTA Panel Report, supra note 32 at 44–59.

⁴³ See Re Softwood Lumber, CUSFTA Report on Remand, supra note 33 at 60.

⁴⁴ Ibid. at 50–65.

⁴⁵ The USDOC’s decision on revocation followed affirmation of the panel’s decision by an Extraordinary Challenge Committee. See Re Softwood Lumber, Extraordinary Challenge Committee, supra note 36.

⁴⁶ United States – Canada Softwood Lumber Agreement, 29 May 1996, Can. T.S. 1996 No. 16,

⁴⁷ Including the countervailing duty and anti-dumping provisions of Tide VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 103-465 [Tariff Act], as well as the actions provided for under sections 201–4 and 301–5 of the Trade Act of 1974, supra note 23.

⁴⁸ Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103–465, 108 Stat. 4804.

⁴⁹ Tariff Act, supra note 47.

⁵⁰ Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Annex lA of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, (1994) 33 I.L.M. 15 [SCM Agreement].

⁵¹ Antidumping and Countervailing Duties, 19C.F.R. §351 (1994).

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ A comprehensive examination of the degree to which the softwood lumber dispute has been responsible for shaping elements of WTO subsidies rules is not undertaken in this article. The evolution of Article 2 of the SCM Agreement, supra note 50, may nevertheless be an excellent illustration of the dynamic relationship between WTO rules and the pressures created by domestic experience with trade regulation, such as the United States’s experience with softwood lumber issues.

⁵⁴ The final country-wide subsidy rate found was 19.34 Per cent, based mainly on the sum of benefits attributable to stumpage transactions in British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario, Québec, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba. Notice, of Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Final Negative Critical Circumstances Determination: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 67 Fed. Reg., 15545 (2002) [Lumber IV, CVD Determination]. The majority of the department’s reasoning for the Lumber IV, CVD Determination was provided in an unpublished “decision memorandum” [LumberIV, Decision Memorandum]. The USDOC excluded exports from the Maritime provinces in the Lumber IV, CVD Determination. The rate was subsequently revised to 18.79 per cent following correction of “ministerial” errors. Unlike in its Lumber III investigation, the USDOC did not examine the claims pertaining to log export restraints in British Columbia.

⁵⁵ Anti-dumping duty rates ranged from 2.18 per cent to 12.44 per cent. Six individual company-specific rates were determined for the six Canadian respondents, and an “all others” rate of 8.43 per cent was applied to other Canadian exporters.

⁵⁶ Adopting what appears to be a fairly novel approach, in reaching its threat determination, the USITC cumulated the allegedly injurious effects of both the dumped and subsidized imports of softwood lumber and completed a single injury inquiry.

⁵⁷ Notice ofAmended Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Face Value and Antidumping Duty Order: Certain Softiuood Lumber Products from Canada, 67 Fed. Reg., 36068 (anti-dumping) and 36070 (CVD) (2002).

⁵⁸ Canada had previously challenged the USDOC’s preliminary subsidy determination (and critical circumstances determination) at the WTO. The WTO panel report, United States – Preliminary Determination with Respect to Softwood Lumber from Canada (Complaint by Canada), Panel Report, WTO Doc. WT/DS236/R (2002) [US – Softwood Lumber III, Panel Report], which was not appealed, confirmed the consistency of the USDOC’s preliminary determination with the SCM Agreement, supra note 50, in some respects. In particular, the panel found at paras. 7.28–7.30 that the USDOC’s determination that the provision of stumpage represented provision of a good, and therefore a financial contribution, by the provincial government to be consistent with the SCM Agreement. The panel, however, found other elements of the USDOC’s preliminary countervailing duty determination to be contrary to the United States’s WTO obligations. In particular, the panel found the USDOC’s analysis of benefit to be flawed on account of its use of cross-border benchmarks for measuring the adequacy of Canadian stumpage prices (ibid. at paras. 7.46 and 7.57.) In addition, the panel found that aspects of the USDOC’s preliminary critical circumstances determination were not consistent with the SCM Agreement (ibid. at para. 7.103).

⁵⁹ Tariff Act, supra note 47 at § 771 (5) (D) (iii).

⁶⁰ Lumber IV, Decision Memorandum, supra note 54 at 29–30.

⁶¹ Separate Chapter 19 panels were established to review the USDOC’s dumping determination and the USITC’s threat of injury determination. More recently, Chapter 19 proceedings have been initiated in respect to certain administrative reviews of the softwood lumber measures.

⁶² Re (Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada: Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination,Chwplev 19 Panel, Doc. USA–CDA–2002–1904–03 (2003) at 20 [Re Softwood Lumber, NAFTA CVD Panel Report], (In this article, consideration of subsequent remand determinations by the same NAFTA panel are referred to hereinafter as Re Softwood Lumber, NAFTA CVD Panel Report, Report on First Remand; Re Softwood Lumber, NAFTA CVD Panel Report, Report on Second Remand, and so on).

⁶³ United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Softwood Lumber from Canada ( Complaint by Canada), Appellate Body Report, WTO Doc. WT/ DS257/AB/R (2003) at para. 167 [US – Softwood Lumber IV, Appellate Body Report). The Appellate Body report dealt with an appeal from the panel in United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Softwood Lumber from Canada (Complaint by Canada), Panel Report, WTO Doc. WT/DS257/R (2003 ) [US – Softwood Lumber TV, Panel Report).

⁶⁴ US – Softwood Lumber IV, Appellate Body Report, supra note 63 at para. 75.

⁶⁵ Tariff Act, supra note 47 at § 771 (5) (E).

⁶⁶ Antidumping and Countervailing Duties, supra note 51, at para. 351.511 (2) (i).

⁶⁷ Ibid. at para. 351.511 (2)(ii).

⁶⁸ Ibid. at para. 351.511(2) (iii).

⁶⁹ Lumber IV, Decision Memorandum, supra note 54 at 37. The rejection of internal Canadian prices as a benchmark makes the Lumber IV analysis markedly different from that adopted in Lumber III (see discussion earlier in this article). This difference in approach provides an illustration of one difference between the old “preferential” test for measuring the existence of a subsidy and the modern “adequacy of remuneration” test.

⁷⁰ Ibid. The USDOC further rejected using sale prices from actual transactions in the Maritime provinces or from imports, citing insufficient information.

⁷¹ Lumber IV, Decision Memorandum, supra note 54 at 40–5. In so finding, the USDOC rejected a number of arguments by the respondents, in particular, those focusing on the inherent differences between stands of timber in Canada and the United States. The USDOC felt that adjustments to the US prices could address these considerations. These arguments echoed arguments that had been accepted by the USDOC in Lumber II, see supra note 15.

⁷² See assessment for each of the six provinces in the Lumber IV, Decision Memorandum, supra note 54 at 54–144.

⁷³ Re Softwood Lumber, NAFTA CVD Panel Report, supra note 62 at 20 ff.

⁷⁴ The findings of the NAFTA panel in this regard are notably similar to the view expressed by the USDOC itself during the course of the Lumber I proceedings. See note 12 in this article.

⁷⁵ Remand Determination, available at <http://ia.ita.doc.gov/remands/index.html> (15 December 2005) (Lumber IV, CVD Remand Determination). (Subsequent remand determinations by the USDOC in respect of this matter are hereinafter referred to in this article as Lumber IV, CVD Second Remand Determination; lumber IV, CVD Third Remand Determination; and so on. They are available at the same online location).

⁷⁶ 13.23 per cent ad valorem (Lumber TV, Remand Determination, supra note 75 at 47). The USDOC’s revised methodology was reminiscent of the “residual value” analysis discussed in Lumber I, supra note 6.

⁷⁷ Re Softwood Lumber, NAFTA CVD Panel, Report on First Remand (7 June 2004), supra note 62 at 7 ff.

⁷⁸ 7.82 per cent ad valorem for the period 1 April 2000 to 31 March 2001. See Lumber TV, CVD Second Remand Determination (30 July 2004), supra note 75 at 26.

⁷⁹ Re Softwood Lumber, NAFTA CVD Panel, Report on Second Remand (1 December 2004), supra note 62 at 25–6.

⁸⁰ Lumber IV, CVD Third Remand Determination (24 January 2004), supra note 75 at 28–9.

⁸¹ Re Softwood Lumber, NAFTA CVD Panel, Report on Third Remand (23 May 2005), supra note 62 at 26.

⁸² Lumber IV, CVD Fourth Remand Determination (7 July 2005), supra note 75 at 36.

⁸³ Re Softwood Lumber, NAFTA CVD Panel, Report on Fourth Remand (5 October 2005), supra note 62 at 10.

⁸⁴ Specifically, 0.80 per cent ad valorem. See Canadian government press release “U.S. Finally Determines Canadian Lumber Not Subsidized: One Step towards Resolution,” <http://woi .internationai.gc.ca/MinPub/Publication.asp? Language=E&publication_id=383463> (15 December 2005). A finding of de minimis subsidy in an initial investigation requires termination of the investigation. The position with respect to the NAFTA review on this issue is complicated, however, by developments resulting from the parallel WTO review of this same issue. See discussion later in this article.

⁸³ US – Softwood Lumber IV, Panel Report, supra note 63 at para. 7.65.

⁸⁶ US – Softwood Lumber TV, Appellate Body Report, supra note 63 at paras. 119–22.

⁸⁷ Ibid., at para. 103.

⁸⁸ Tariff Act, supra note 47 at § 771 (5A).

⁸⁹ These considerations parallel those set out in Article 2.1 (c) of the SCM Agreement, supra note 50.

⁹⁰ Antidumping and Countervailing Duties, supra note 51 at para. 351.502(a).

⁹¹ Lumber IV, Decision Memorandum, supra note 54 at 52.

⁹² US – Softxuood Lumber IV, Panel Report, supra note 63 at para. 7.1 116.

⁹³ Ibid. at para. 7.121.

⁹⁴ Lumber TV, Decision Memorandum, supra note 54 at 18–19. Canadian respondents in the earlier Lumber Til episode had argued that the USDOC was required to complete an investigation into the existence of “upstream subsidies” in these same two situations and the USDOC had taken a similar approach in declining to make an assessment of upstream subsidies.

⁹⁵ Ibid. at 18–19.

⁹⁶ Ibid. Although the USDOC acknowledged that there might be cases in which subject merchandise was produced by remanufacturers who did not benefit from stumpage, it suggested that this should not affect its overall calculation of the country-wide rate of subsidization. Rather, it reasoned that it was simply a question of how the overall subsidy was divided amongst recipients, and, as such, a matter to be dealt with through the calculation of a company-specific rate (as opposed to affecting the country-wide rate).

⁹⁷ Re Softwood Lumber, NAFTA CVD Panel Report, supra note 62 at 58–65.

⁹⁸ US – Softwood Lumber TV, Panel Report, supra note 63 at para. 7.91.

⁹⁹ US – Softwood Lumber TV, Appellate Body Report, supra note 63 at para. 152.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. at para. 163.

¹⁰¹ The Appellate Body’s ruling related only to cases of sales of logs by a sawmill owning harvester to another sawmill. The panel’s pass-through finding with respect to sales of logs from independent harvesters was not appealed by the United States. Ibid. at para. 127.

¹⁰² Ibid. at para. 157.

¹⁰³ That is, the Lumber IV, CVD Determination, supra note 54, as reviewed by the WTO, and not as revised following remands within the framework of review under NAFTA Chapter 19.

¹⁰⁴ The initial period of investigation was 1 April 2000 to 31 March 2001. The revised rate was 18.62 per cent ad valorem.

¹⁰⁵ Amendment to Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders on Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 69 Fed. Reg., 75305 (2004).

¹⁰⁶ Notice of Implementation under Section 129 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act; (Countervailing Measures (Concerning (Certain Softwood Lumber from, Canada, 69 Fed. ReS- 75917 (2004).

¹⁰⁷ Al the time of writing, liquidation, for the most part, remains suspended pending the outcome of the parallel proceedings under Chapter 19 of the NAFTA, discussed earlier in this article.

¹⁰⁸ The rate of duty determined in the first assessment review was 17.18 per cent ad valorem. This was corrected for ministerial errors on 24 February 2005, resulting in a rate of 16.37 percent ad valorem. Notice of Amended Final Results of Duty Administrative Review: (Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, 70 Fed. Reg., 9046 (2005).

¹⁰⁹ United States – Final Countervailing Duly Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada – Recourse to Article 21. 5 of the DSU by Canada, Panel Report, WTO Doc. WT/DS257/RW (2005) [US – Softwood - Article 27.5].

¹¹⁰ The cash deposit rates cited here relate only to the countervailing duty element of the applicable duties. Further cash deposits are collected in respect of imports subjected to anti-dumping duties.

¹¹¹ Perhaps for this reason, further disciplines on applying countervailing measures to widely available subsidies (both under United States law and under the SOM Agreement, supra note 50) have been imposed through other elements of the subsidy equation. For example, certain widely available government measures, the provision of “general infrastructure,” is excluded from the part of the definition of “financial contribution“ that was relevant to the softwood lumber dispute. Likewise, the principle recounted by both the NAFTA CVD panel and the WTO Appellate Body that the subsidy numerator in a countervailing duty rate determination must “match“ and be spread over a denominator incorporating sales of all subsidized products will tend to dilute a thinly spread subsidy, making countervailability less likely, or, at least, reducing substantially any rate of subsidization found.

¹¹² Re Softwood Lumber, NAFTA CVD Panel Report, supra note 62 at 39.

¹¹³ US – Softwood Lumber IV, Panel Report, supra note 63 at para. 7.121 and footnote 188 to para. 7.121. The panel’s findings on specificity were not appealed.

¹¹⁴ US – Softwoood Lumber IV, Appellate Body Report, supra note 63 at para. 167(b).

¹¹⁵ The WTO Appellate Body reversed a finding by the panel regarding remanufactured lumber that differed from that adopted by the NAFTA panel. See US – Softwood Lumber IV, Appellate Body Report, supra note 63 at para. 163.

¹¹⁶ This was essentially the same approach that had been adopted to this issue in the earlier Lumber III, supra note 26, episode of the dispute.

¹¹⁷ The decisions of this NAFTA Chapter ig panel have been upheld by an extraordinary challenge committee. See Re Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, Extraordinary Challenge Committee, Doc. ECC-2004-1904-01 USA (2005).

¹¹⁸ Re Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada: Final Affirmative Antidumping Determination, Chapter 19 Panel, Doc. USA-CDA-2002-1904-02 (2003) at 61 [Re Softwood Lumber, NAFTA Dumping Panel Report). (In this article, consideration of subsequent remand determinations by the same NAFTA panel are referred to hereinafter as Re Softwood Lumber, NAFTA Dumping Panel, Report on First Remand; Re Softwood Lumber, NAFTA CVD Panel, Report on Second Remand, and so on).

¹¹⁹ United States – Final Dumping Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada (Complaint by Canada), Appellate Body Report, WTO Doc. WT/DS264/AB/R ( 2004) [ US – Softwood Lumber V, Appellate Body Report].

¹²⁰ Re Softwood Lumber, NAFTA Dumping Panel, Report on Second Remand (9 June 2004), supra note 118 at 43.

¹²¹ Asimilar approach was taken by another NAFTA Chapter 19 panel in the 2001 proceedings involving Mexico’s anti-dumping measures in respect of high fructose corn syrup from the United States. In this case, which was governed by Mexican law, the panel applied a principle of “comity” between international tribunals and declined to itself review claims in regard to which the WTO panel in Mexico – Anti-Dumping Investigation of High Fructose Corn Syrup ( HFCS) from the United Slates (referred to by the NAFTA panel as the SG-WTO case) had made findings. The report of the NAFTA panel recalls that the panel

issued an Order in which it… recognized that the SG-WTO had completed its review of the Final Determination and consequently, its review is limited, in what it considers legally justified to the points not considered by the SG-WTO applying the Principle of Comity.

See Re Revieiv of the Final Determination of the Antidumping Investigation on Imports of High Fructose. Corn Syrup Originating from the United States of A vínica, Chapter 19 Panel, Doc. MEX-USA-98-1904–01 (2001) at para. 188.