This article examines the position taken by Michel Foucault regarding the Iranian Revolution. Contrary to certain analysts who view his writings pertaining to Iran as an occasion to question Foucaltian politics, the authors maintain that his work constitutes more of an analysis of outright support for the Islamic government. How can we then explain the interpretation made by many analysts who see in these same writings support for Khomeiny? The authors find in Foucaltian analysis a polity of the intellectual. Inspired by Kant's essay on the Age of Enlightenment, Foucault's approach examines the way to surmise History's moments of rift and transformation through the very notion of revolution. In other words, Foucault tries to assess those value systems which lend sense and meaning to revolts. That some may not recognize themselves in this particular approach should not be too surprising as it suggests a form of political praxis which does not necessarily entail a “for or against” position, but rather an understanding of the way in which its discourse partakes in society's governmental inner workings.

The extent of differences in mass-elite political opinion and their theoretical implications have long been a source of interest to democratic theorists. Early classical democratic theorists saw education as the solution to mass-elite political differences, with an educated mass public displaying the same support for democratic institutions as their elite counterparts. By contrast, the later democratic elitists saw little that would reduce mass-elite differences. More recently, modern elite theorists have argued that elites are more polarized on political issues than mass publics, and that political conflict can be moderated by the ability of elites to downplay potentially divisive issues. Using Australia as a case study, these three approaches to mass-elite political differences are analyzed using a matched survey of voters and candidates conducted at the Australia 1987 federal election. The results show little support for education as a factor reducing mass-elite differences and point to the democratic elitists' argument that mass-elite political differences are fixed and enduring. In line with modern elite theories, the results also confirm the existence of more intense issue polarization among elites than among voters, and elites' ability to control the issues that reach the political agenda.

From recent debates about the performance of the Canadian federal system, two images of processes of intergovernmental relations can be extracted: a “competitive” and a “collaborative” image. Differing propositions about the effects on processes and outcomes of the framework of rules and institutions of intergovernmental relations are embodied in these contrasting images. Elinor Ostrom's framework for institutional analysis is applied to the investigation of these effects. Using Fritz Scharpf's analysis of the “pathological” effects of a specific set of collaborative arrangements in West Germany as points of departure and contrast, the working rules underlying Canadian intergovernmental relations are elaborated. The author concludes that a competitive dynamic underpins a high degree of flexibility in these arrangements. Proposals to implement a more collaborative set of arrangements through constitutional reform are critically evaluated in this light, and the author makes suggestions about the course constitutional reform might take following the failure to adopt the Meech Lake Accord.

A traditional focus on the collective, institutional operation of the Supreme Court of Canada has obscured the practical impact on the Charter of Rights of the personal views held by the individual members of the Court. A study of all the Charter cases decided by the Supreme Court from 1983 to 1989 reveals a profound divergence of opinions within the Court. The differences are seen not only in each judge's overall support for Charter claims but also in the patterns of agreement between bilateral pairings of judges who have heard the same cases. The use of subsets of judges to sit on panels to hear Charter cases has meant that both the outcome of Charter cases and the content of our rights have depended to a large extent upon which judges happened to sit on the panels that heard the cases.

The Constitution Act, 1867, contained what were intended to be strong protections of property ownership. These protections gradually eroded, as property was subordinated to democratic will and legislation. The “property rights” debate took place in this context. Those provinces which opposed the property rights clause wanted to safeguard the supremacy of democratic institutions from the potential ramifications posed by such a clause. The federal government, the proponent of the clause, did not intend that such supremacy be usurped. However, the clause was never crucial to the Charter and the federal government abandoned the clause in order to achieve provincial agreement on patriation of the constitution.

This article explores candidate selection in Canadian political parties with a particular focus on the basic processes involved and the character of the candidates they produce. After a review of the popular conventional wisdom the article reports the results of the first systematic nation-wide study of nomination processes in local constituency party associations (carried out at the time of the 1988 general election). Despite democratic forms, competition for party nominations continues to be the exception rather than the norm and national party interests are only weakly articulated.

Ontario's attempt in the 1970s to reform its system of local property taxation aimed to make the local tax system more equitable and efficient in the interest of allowing local governments greater autonomy to act within their own areas of responsibility. In trying to implement the programme, the government used a variety of means to inform local officials about the objectives of reform and to secure their co-operation in achieving it. These efforts failed and the province abandoned the field to local and regional governments, having concluded that the economic and political costs of provincially imposed reform outweighed any advantages to be derived from it. The outcome attested to the influence that local interests and institutions can exercise over provincial policy-making despite their legally subordinate position in the governmental hierarchy.