1 Task Force on Conflict of Interest. Ethical Conduct in the Public Sector (Ottawa: Supply and Services. May 1984). 18Google ScholarPubMed.

2 Kernaghan, Kenneth, “Codes of Ethics and Public Administration: Progress, Problems and Prospects,” Public Administration 59 (1980). 211–12Google Scholar. See also Privy Council Office, Members of Parliament and Conflict of Interest (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1973)Google Scholar, where it was observed of the Senate and House of Commons Act that “very few cases have ever been taken to court under the sections pertaining to the independence of Parliament,” and “Parliament has never had occasion to expel anyone for conviction under the terms of this Act” (15).

3 Kernaghan, Kenneth, Ethical Conduct: Guidelines for Government Employees (Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 1975);Google Scholar also, Task Force, Ethical Conduct, 57.

4 PCO, Members of Parliament and Conflict of Interest, 25–26. Roughly the same situation applies in the British House of Commons. Alan Doig has concluded that “within the House there is little guidance on how MPs should conduct their private activities other than that they do not offend the criminal law, the Resolutions, and some ill-defined standards concerning individual integrity and the reputation of the House.” See his Corruption and Misconduct in Contemporary British Politics (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984). 222Google Scholar.

5 See the debate on guidelines for ministers, House of Commons, Debates (July 18, 1973), 5735–39Google Scholar.

6 Task Force, Ethical Conduct, 20.

7 Kernaghan, “Codes of Ethics,” 218.

8 Task Force, Ethical Conduct, 58.

9 Fleishman, Joel L., “Self-Interest and Political Integrity,” in Lance Liebman. Fleishman, Joel and Moore, Mark (eds.), Public Duties: The Moral Obligations of Government Officials (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 53:Google Scholar also, Lance Liebman, “Legislating Morality in the Proposed CIA Charter.” ibid., 248–65.

10 Not everyone need share a particular belief or outlook. Moreover, some types of disagreement and some orientations are more important than others. See Elkins, David J. and Simeon, Richard E. B., “A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain,” Comparative Politics 12 (1979), 127–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

11 Almond, Gabriel and Verba, Sidney, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12 For example, Pateman, Carole, “The Civic Culture: A Philosophic Critique,” in Almond, Gabriel A. and Verba, Sidney (eds.), The Civic Culture Revisited (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980), esp. 75–78;Google Scholar and Kavanaugh, Dennis, Political Culture (London: Macmillan, 1972)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

13 Huntington, Samuel P., “Modernization and Corruption,” in Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 59–71;Google ScholarScott, James C., “The Analysis of Corruption in Developing Nations,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 2 (1969), 315–41:CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Heidenheimer, Arnold J. (ed.), Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis (New Jersey: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970)Google Scholar.

14 For example, Doig, Corruption and Misconduct, esp. chaps. 1, 5.

15 For a discussion of these various approaches see John G. Peters and Susan Welch, “Political Corruption in America: A Search for Definitions and a Theory, or If Political Corruption is in the Mainstream of American Politics Why is it Not in the Mainstream of American Politics Research?” American Political Science Review 72 (1978), 974–84CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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17 Peters and Welch, “Political Corruption in America,” 974.

18 For an excellent appreciation of the conflict between “legal categories and formal procedures" and “common sense justifications,” see Chibnall, Steven and Saunders, Peter, “Worlds Apart: Notes on the Social Reality of Corruption,” British Journal of Sociology 28 (1977), 145ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

19 Heidenheimer, Political Corruption, 27.

20 Welch, Peters, “Attitudes of U.S. State Legislators Toward Political Corruption: Some Preliminary Findings,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 2 (1977), 447CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On the advantages and disadvantages of public opinion definitions see Johnson, Michael, Political Corruption and Public Policy in America (Monterey: Brookes/Cole, 1982). 6–8Google Scholar.

21 Brooks, Robert, “The Nature of Political Corruption,” in Heidenheimer (ed.). Political Corruption, 58Google Scholar.

22 Peters and Welch, “Political Corruption in America.” 976. The emphasis on exchange may appear to constitute a narrowing of the earlier definition inasmuch as conflicts of interest can arise where no “donor” is evident. In these cases Peters and Welch treat “public official" and “donor" as synonymous.

23 A comparison of the sample and the backbench population from which it is drawn shows that on the critical variables of region and party there is a close correspondence. This is particularly true for party where the Liberals are only slightly underrepresented in the sample. In the case of region, Quebec is underrepresented and British Columbia and the Maritimes slightly overrepresented.

24 A strong case could probably be made that the item SCHOOL is not corrupt at all. This may be so, but the type of analysis favoured by Peters and Welch seeks to avoid an either/or judgment. Whatever discomfort is created by this technique is offset by the ranking that is obtained.

25 A similar procedure is employed in Peters and Welch, “Attitudes of U.S. State Legislators.” On the whole, respondents did not select the “neutral” score of 4. The highest proportion of those who did so was 13 per cent on the item SCHOOL.

26 Loon, Richard Van and Whittington, Michael, The Canadian Political System (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1981), 480Google Scholar.

27 Factor analysis, which assumes that observed variables are linear combinations of some underlying factors, is an alternative procedure for aggregating variables. However, given that only five variables were at issue in this case, additive scales based on a conceptual distinction were considered preferable. Ruralism is based on MPs' evaluations on a nine-point ordinal scale ranging from totally urban to totally rural. Objective measures, while available, are surrogates that fail to capture all of the elements of the rural/urban distinction. A purely subjective measure, on the other hand, permits a role for MPs' perceptions. The employment of an ordinal variable of any kind in a multiple regression analysis requires that care be taken with respect to the interpretation of coefficients. For a brief, balanced discussion of the issues with appropriate references to the more specialized literature, see H. T. Reynolds, The Analysis of Cross-Classifications (New York: Free Press, 1977), 98–100.

28 Ruralism is based on MPs' evaluations on a nine-point ordinal scale ranging from totally urban to totally rural. Objective measures, while available, are surrogates that fail to capture all of the elements of the rural/urban distinction. A purely subjective measure, on the other hand, permits a role for MPs' perceptions. The employment of an ordinal variable of any kind in a multiple regression analysis requires that care be taken with respect to the interpretation of coefficients. For a brief, balanced discussion of the issues with appropriate references to the more specialized literature, see Reynolds, H. T., The Analysis of Cross-Classifications (New York: Free Press, 1977), 98–100Google Scholar.

29 The mean for Conservatives was highest among members of the three parties on both CONFLICT and SERVICE. For this reason it has been selected as the constant in the dummy variable analysis.

30 Meisel, John, Working Papers on Canadian Politics (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972), 1–14Google Scholar.

31 Paltiel, K. Z., “Canadian Attitudes on Election Expenses, 1965–66,” Study 7, Report of the Committee on Election Expenses (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966)Google Scholar.

32 Simeon, Richard and Elkins, David, “Regional Political Cultures in Canada,” this JOURNAL 7 (1974), 397Google Scholar.

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37 An example of this is provided by Henry Jacek, “John Munro and the Hamilton East Liberals: Anatomy of a Modern Political Machine,” in Freeman, Bill and Hewitt, Marsha (eds.), Their Town: The Mafia, the Media and the Party Machine (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1979), 62–73Google Scholar.

38 Young, Walter, The Anatomy of a Party: The National CCF 1932–61 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), 4Google Scholar.

39 Christian, William and Campbell, Colin, Political Parties and Ideologies in Canada (2nd ed.; Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1983), chap. 4, esp. 129Google Scholar.

40 It must be noted that it is not necessarily contemptible to express tolerance for some of the acts described and no burden of guilt is attached to any of the subcultures identified.

41 “Expanded” means simply main-effects models with all of the independent variables included. Multicollinearity is not a serious problem in either of these models. The highest correlation between independent variables is -.56 between WEST and LIB. All others are considerably lower.

42 Perlin, George, The Tory Syndrome: Leadership Politics in the Progressive Conservative Party (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1980). 184Google Scholar.

43 Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported. The figures in parentheses are t-ratios (that is, the ratio of an estimate to its standard error) which suggest the magnitude of the difference between estimates based on these data and those derived from a randomly generated set of data. A t-ratio of 2.0 in a two-tailed test indicates that results are significant at the .05 level.