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Synchronic requirements and diachronic permissions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

John Broome
John Broome*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK Department of Philosophy, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA Department of Philosophy, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia
*
Email: john.broome@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
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Abstract

Reasoning is an activity of ours by which we come to satisfy synchronic requirements of rationality. However, reasoning itself is regulated by diachronic permissions of rationality. For each synchronic requirement there appears to be a corresponding diachronic permission, but the requirements and permissions are not related to each other in a systematic way. It is therefore a puzzle how reasoning according to permissions can systematically bring us to satisfy requirements.

Keywords

Reasoningrulesstatic and dynamic rationalitybasinginstrumental reasoning
Type
Articles
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 45 , Issue 5-6: Special Issue: Belief, Action, and Rationality over Time , December 2015 , pp. 630 - 646
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2015

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References

Broome, John. 2014. Rationality through Reasoning. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.Google Scholar
Kripke, Saul. 1982. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Schroeder, Mark. 2004. “The Scope of Instrumental Reason.”; Philosophical Perspectives 18: 337–364.10.1111/phpe.2004.18.issue-110.1111/j.1520-8583.2004.00032.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar