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Reductive Explanation and the 'Explanatory Gap'

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Peter Carruthers
Peter Carruthers*
Affiliation:
University of Maryland, College Park, MD20742, USA
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Extract

Can phenomenal consciousness be given a reductive natural explanation? Exponents of an ‘explanatory gap’ between physical, functional and intentional facts, on the one hand, and the facts of phenomenal consciousness, on the other, argue that there are reasons of principle why phenomenal consciousness cannot be reductively explained: Jackson (1982), (1986); Levine (1983), (1993), (2001); McGinn (1991); Sturgeon (1994), (2000); Chalmers (1996), (1999). Some of these writers claim that the existence of such a gap would warrant a belief in some form of ontological dualism (Jackson, 1982; Chalmers, 1996), whereas others argue that no such entailment holds (Levine, 1983; McGinn, 1991; Sturgeon, 1994). In the other main camp, there are people who argue that a reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness is possible in principle (Block and Stalnaker, 1999), and yet others who claim, moreover, to have provided such an explanation in practice (Dennett, 1991; Dretske, 1995; Tye, 1995,2000; Lycan, 1996; Carruthers, 2000).

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 34 , Issue 2 , June 2004 , pp. 153 - 173
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2004

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