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The ontology of character traits in Hume

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Erin Frykholm*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas, 1445 Jayhawk Blvd., 3090 Wescoe Hall, Lawrence, KS66045, USA
*

Abstract

This paper argues that Hume can account for character traits as lasting mental qualities without violating his reductionist account of the mind as a changing bundle of ideas and impressions. It argues that a trait is a disposition to act according to certain passions or motivations, explained entirely with reference to the ideas and impressions constituting one's current self. This account is consistent with Hume's view of the mind, and relies solely on his accounts of the association of impressions and ideas, and of the relationship between belief and passion, to establish relations that can properly be called lasting mental qualities.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2012

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References

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Dees, Richard H. 1997. “Hume on the Characters of Virtue.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 35 (1): 4564.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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Penelhum, Terrence 1975. Hume. London: Macmillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Penelhum, Terrence 2009. “Hume's Moral Psychology.” In The Cambridge Companion to Hume, edited by Norton, David Fate 2nd ed., 238269. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Purviance, Susan M. 1997. “The Moral Self and the Indirect Passions.” Hume Studies 23 (2): 195212.Google Scholar
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