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Higher-order knowledge and sensitivity

  • Jens Christian Bjerring (a1) and Lars Bo Gundersen (a1)

Abstract

It has recently been argued that a sensitivity theory of knowledge cannot account for intuitively appealing instances of higher-order knowledge. In this paper, we argue that it can once careful attention is paid to the methods or processes by which we typically form higher-order beliefs. We base our argument on what we take to be a well-motivated and commonsensical view on how higher-order knowledge is typically acquired, and we show how higher-order knowledge is possible in a sensitivity theory once this view is adopted.

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Copyright

Corresponding author

*Corresponding author. Email: fillg@cas.au.dk

References

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Keywords

Higher-order knowledge and sensitivity

  • Jens Christian Bjerring (a1) and Lars Bo Gundersen (a1)

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