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Ectoplasm Earth

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Justin Tiehen
Justin Tiehen*
Affiliation:
University of Puget Sound, Tacoma, WA 98416, USA
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Extract

What does it mean to say that the mental is nothing over and above the physical? In other words, what exactly is the thesis of physicalism about the mental? The question has not received the philosophical attention it deserves. If that sounds woefully uninformed, it's probably because you are mistaking my restricted thesis of physicalism about the mental for the unrestricted thesis of physicalism simpliciter. Physicalism simpliciter is the doctrine that everything is physical; equivalently, that there is nothing over and above the physical. Physicalism simpliciter has been the subject of intense philosophical scrutiny. There are ongoing debates over how ‘the physical’ should be defi ned for the purpose of formulating the thesis, over how the ‘nothing over and above’ clause should be understood, and over various other matters yet.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy , Volume 42 , Issue 3-4 , December 2012 , pp. 167 - 185
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2012

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