1 Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977.
2 Ibid., p. 270.
3 Ibid., pp. 272-73.
4 Ibid., p. 234.
5 Ibid., p. 277.
6 Ibid., p. 237.
7 The other aspect of personhood, not mentioned here, is that of being held to obligations. A fuller account would need to bring this idea into play, since we might find reasons for according the general right to be free to some non-humans (although we would no doubt take a different view of what counts as a compelling reason for interference in their case). But we would not want to call those non-humans who are accorded a (qualified) right to be free, “persons”. The substantive difference underlying the terminological cavil is that the non-humans can't (and therefore shouldn't) be held to obligations.
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