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When to think like an epistemicist

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Matthew Mosdell
Affiliation:
University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, USA
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Abstract

Epistemicism is the view that seemingly vague predicates are not in fact vague. Consequently, there must be a sharp boundary between a man who is bald and one who is not bald. Although such a view is often met with incredulity, my aim is to provide a defense of epistemicism in this essay. My defense, however, is backhanded: I argue that the formal commitments of epistemicism are the result of good practical reasoning, not metaphysical necessity. To get to that conclusion, I spend most of the essay arguing that using a formal system like classical logic to manage seemingly vague situations requires practical principles to mediate between the formalism and what it aims to represent.

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Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2015

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