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Deconstructing Ontological Vagueness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020


Matti Eklund
Affiliation:
Sage School of Philosophy, Cornell University, 218 Goldwin Smith Hall, Ithaca NY 14853, USA

Extract

I will here present a number of problems concerning the idea that there is ontological vagueness, and the related claim that appeal to this idea can help solve some vagueness-related problems. A theme underlying the discussion will be the distinction between vagueness specifically and indeterminacy more generally (and, relatedly, the distinction between ontological vagueness and ontological indeterminacy). Even if the world is somehow ontologically indeterminate it by no means follows that it is, properly speaking, ontologically vague.


Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2008

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