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Self-directed Agents1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

W. D. Christensen  and
C. A. Hooker
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Extract

In this paper, we outline a theory of the nature of self-directed agents. What is distinctive about self-directed agents is their ability to anticipate interaction processes and to evaluate their performance, and thus their sensitivity to context. They can improve performance relative to goals, and can, in certain instances, construct new goals. We contrast self-directedness with reactive action processes that are not modifiable by the agent, though they may be modified by supra-agent processes such as populational adaptation or external design.

Self-directedness lies at the nexus of issues concerning the evolution and nature of intentionality, intelligence, and agency. It provides some insight into the evolution of intelligence because it helps explain how organisms are able to manage variable interaction processes, e.g., a hunting strategy that varies with prey type, ground condition, and hunger level. Simple self-directed organisms like bumblebees manage variability in one or a few dimensions.

Type
I. Adaptation and the Mental
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume , Volume 27: Naturalism, Evolution & Intentionality , 2001 , pp. 18 - 52
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 2001

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Footnotes

1

We would like to thank Mark Bickhard, John Collier, and Bill Herfel for constructive discussions. Jill Mcintosh made numerous editorial suggestions which have greatly improved the clarity of the paper and some of the content. CAH thanks the Philosophy Department, Durham University, UK, for generous hospitality during part of the preparation of this paper.

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