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2 Especially Wright, CrispinTruth and Objectivity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).Google Scholar

3 See Aumann, Robert J. “Agreeing to Disagree,” Annals of Statistics 4 (1976): 1236-39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 Some accommodation must be made for coarsening, which is considered permissible. Here I am treating input as “pre-processed,” so that everything that comes in is intended to be preserved.

5 For instance, according to proponents of this view, we may not be aware that we are projecting subjective responses onto the environment. See Mackie, J.L.Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (London: Penguin, 1997), 42Google Scholar, where he calls this the “pathetic fallacy.“

6 Wright, Truth and Objectivity, 92–93.Google Scholar

7 See Wright, Crispin “Introduction” to Realism, Meaning and Truth, 2nd. ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).Google Scholar

8 Pollner, MelvinMundane Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).Google Scholar

9 Rasmusen, EricGames and Information (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1989), 165.Google Scholar

10 Becker, GaryAccounting for Tastes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 24.Google Scholar

11 Ibid., 203-24.

12 “Language entry move” is an expression used by Wilfrid Sellars to designate an action through through which an agent comes to occupy a position in a language game that is not based on a transition from some other point in the game. See Sellars, “Some Reflections on Language Games,” in his Science, Perception and Reality (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), 329.Google Scholar See also Brandom, Making It Explicit, 221-22.Google Scholar

13 Wittgenstein, LudwigPhilosophical Investigations, trans. Ancombe, G.E.M. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967), 117 [§381].Google Scholar

14 Peirce, C.S.Collected Works of Charles Sanders Pierce, vol. 5. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1934), 359.Google Scholar

15 Here I am following Savage, L.J.The Foundation of Statistics (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1954).Google Scholar

16 Davidson, Donald “A New Basis for Decision Theory,” Theory and Decision 18 (1985): 87–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

17 Natural events can still be included, by simply treating nature as one more “player,” the probability of whose moves are fixed in advance and common knowledge among the players.

18 See Hargreaves Heap, Shaun P. and Varoufakis, YanisGame Theory: A Critical Introduction (London: Routledge, 1995), 52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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21 This is admittedly informal, but conveys the basic idea underlying Aumann's argument. For reflection on these issues, see Aumann, Robert J. “Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality,” Econometrica 55 (1987): 1–18.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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23 Consider, for instance, the examples assembled by Lewis, C.S.The Abolition of Man (London: Oxford University Press, 1944), 41–48.Google Scholar

24 This is Elster's, Jon formulation, in The Cement of Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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26 See Durkheim, EmileMoral Education, trans. Wilson, Everett K. and Schnurer, Herman (New York: Free Press, 1961)Google Scholar.

27 Garfinkel, Harold “Studies in the Routine Grounds of Everyday Activities,” in his Studies in Ethnomethodology (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984): 35–75.Google Scholar

28 See, e.g., Martin, Judith MissManners Rescues Civilization (New York: Crown, 1996), 29–63.Google Scholar

29 This is captured by Kant's idea that moral reasoning is governed by the regulative idea of the kingdom of ends. The laws governing this realm have no substantive content, but are merely those that all could will in common. This is unlike the laws governing the physical realm, which are not only subject to the formal constraint that they be the same for all, but also have their substantive content fixed.

30 Kymlicka, WillMulticultural Citizenship (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).Google Scholar

31 See Taylor, Charles “What is Human Agency?” in Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

32 Even here there are very high levels of agreement (although the patterns of convergence vary according to class and status group; see Bourdieu, PierreDistinction, trans. Nice, Richard [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984]).Google Scholar

33 Rawls, JohnPolitical Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), xxiv-xxvii.Google Scholar