1. See Finnis, John, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 2nd ed (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011)Google Scholar [NLNR] at 437: “… simply ethics and political philosophy adequately done”. See also NLNR 18, 23, 251, 280, 374, See Finnis, ‘Natural Law Theory: its Past and its Present’ (2012) 57 Am J Juris 81 at 92.

2. Only perhaps, for the philosopher Germain Grisez, the originator of this interpretation of St Thomas, writes in the same vein (sometimes jointly with Finnis). For some references see below.

3. Finnis, NLNR, supra note 1 at 90-91.

4. See Ernest L Fortin, “The New Rights Theory and the Natural Law” (1982) 44:4 Review of Politics 590. For Finnis’s belated response, see “Grounding Human Rights in Natural Law” (2015) 60:2 Am J Juris 199.

5. See, e.g., Hittinger, Russell, A Critique of the New Natural Law Theory (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989) at 50–52;Google Scholar Hittinger, “Natural law as ‘Law’: Reflections on the Occasion of Veritatis Splendor” (1994) 39 Am J Juris 1; Porter, Jean, The Recovery of Virtue (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1990) at ch 2;Google Scholar Porter, Nature as Reason (Grand Rapids: Wm B Eerdmans, 2005); Porter, Ministers of the Law (Grand Rapids: Wm B Eerdmans, 2010) at 66-67, 182-84; Rowland, Tracey, Culture and the Thomist Tradition (New York: Routledge, 2003) at 136–48.Google Scholar

6. The exceptions are Vernon J Bourke, “Is Aquinas a Natural Law Ethicist?” (1974) 58:1 The Monist at 52; Pinckaers, Servais, The Sources of Christian Ethics (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1995) at 134-67, 327–53;Google Scholar Hibbs, Thomas S, Virtue’s Splendor (New York: Fordham University Press, 2001) at 9, ch 2; and (to a point)Google Scholar Irwin, Terence, The Development of Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) at I §§ 301-06, 309.Google Scholar

7. The phrase, due to Hittinger, is not one that its adherents readily accept, for they wish to stress faithfulness and continuity with Aquinas. I use it, with due hesitation, for the sake of convenience.

8. See Germain G Grisez, “The First Principle of Practical Reason” (1965) 10 Nat L Forum 168.

9. See Aquinas, Summa Theologiae at I-II.94.2c.

10. See, e.g., Grisez, supra note 8 at n 4; Finnis, NLNR, supra note 1 at ch II-V; Grisez, Finnis & Joseph Boyle, “Practical Principles, Moral Truth and Ultimate Ends” (1987) 32 Am J Juris 99; Finnis, Grisez & Boyle, “‘Direct’ and ‘Indirect’: A Reply to Critics of our Action Theory” (2001) 65 The Thomist 1; Finnis, The Collected Essays of John Finnis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), vol 1 at ch 9-10; Finnis, Fundamentals of Ethics (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1983) at III.4.

11. Finnis, NLNR, supra note 1 at 46.

12. Aquinas, supra note 9 at I-II.100.11c.

13. See ibid at I-II.63.1c.

14. For Finnis’s list of seven basic goods, see, e.g., NLNR, supra note 1 at III-IV.

15. See Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political and Legal Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) at 106-07; Finnis, “Direct and Indirect”, supra note 10; Finnis, NLNR, supra note 1 at 100-33, 451, 454-56. In Aquinas, at 103-31, he discusses integral human fulfilment at length; but note that as a practical philosopher, Finnis would regard that notion as ultimately uninformative except insofar as the master moral principle and its derivatives (e.g., no arbitrary priority amongst persons) specify how a person is to attain it.

16. I owe the insight concerning the standard topic on laws of nature to Jean Porter, “Does the Natural Law Provide a Universally Valid Morality?” in Lawrence S Cunningham, ed, Intractable Disputes About the Natural Law: Alasdair MacIntyre and Critics (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009) at 53, 62-67. See her text for examples of the discussion of this standard topic.

17. Aquinas, supra note 9 at I-II.1, prologue.

18. See ibid at I-II.5.4c.

19. See, e.g., Francisco Suarez, De Legibus at II.7.5, II.15.2; Suarez, Disputationes Metaphysicae at X.2.11-13; Aquinas, supra note 9 at I-II.98.4, ad 3.

20. Finnis, NLNR, supra note 1 at 90-91: the sidelining of the virtues is clear from the fact that this is the only sentence in the entire book to mention the virtues directly. Perhaps as a consequence of criticism, Finnis’s later book Aquinas gives more explicit treatment to the virtues, but they remain subordinate (see main text above).

21. Finnis, Aquinas, supra note 15 at 124; also at 107: virtue in action ‘means practical reason in action’. Cf Aquinas, supra note 9 at I-II.58.2c, ad 3 for a correction of this picture.

22. Finnis, NLNR, supra note 1 at 422 (2011 postscript).

23. Aquinas, supra note 9 at III.15.6 ad 2.

24. See ibid at I-II.4.7c: Aquinas talks of bodily or external good [bonis corpis; bona exteriora], but note the reference to that which is needed for contemplative and active virtue, hence e.g., natural goods like bodily health, knowledge, etc. See also Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics at I.5.1095b-1096a, I.8.1099a; Aquinas, supra note 9 at I-II.3.5c).

25. See Aquinas, supra note 9 at I-II.2.8c, ad 3.

26. See Augustine, De Civitate Dei at XIV.28; Aquinas, supra note 9 at I-II.108.4c; Aquinas, De Caritate VI.

27. See respectively Finnis, NLNR, supra note 1 at 91-95; Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae de Virtutibus 9 ad 6 & 7.

28. See Aquinas, De Perfectione Spiritualis Vitae at 13.3: we do not love things such as knowledge, virtue and external goods in themselves, but only as an aid to oneself in virtue of the service they render one. (Thus everything is referable to love of God that is necessary for salvation—or—to love of oneself absolutely, leading away from God.)

29. See, e.g., Finnis, NLNR, supra note 1 at 280-81.

30. See Aquinas, supra note 9 at I-II.3.8c.

31. See, e.g., Aquinas, ibid at II-II.20.1 ad 3; Aquinas, Sent I.14.2.2, II.18.2.2.4, IV.49.1.3.1; Aquinas, De perfectione spiritualis vitae IV. It is also implicit at I-II.1.5. See also Porter, supra note 5 at 53.

32. See Aquinas, supra note 9 at I.2.1 (knowledge of the existence of God is not self-evident); Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles at III.38.1.2161 [Aquinas, SCG] (natural knowledge is insufficient); on the importance of inclinations for natural law, see Aquinas, supra note 9 at I-II.94.2c.

33. See Finnis, “Grounding Human Rights in Natural Law” 60 (2015) Am J Juris 199; Aquinas, supra note 9 at I-II.58.3 ad 1.

34. See Aquinas, supra note 9 at I-II.58.5, I-II.60.1c. See also the excellent account of reason’s role in moral judgment in Sherwin, Michael S, By Knowledge and By Love (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2005), especially at 23–24.Google Scholar

35. Aquinas, supra note 9 at I-II.65.1c [recta ratio agibilium]. Notice that for Aquinas, prudentia is the perfection of reason, not reason itself: I-II.66.2c.

36. See ibid.

37. See ibid at I-II.65.4c.

38. See Aquinas, De Virt at 1c.

39. See ibid at 4 ad 3.

40. See ibid at 8c.

41. See ibid at 4 ad 8, 9c.

42. See Aquinas, supra note 9 at II-II.24.1 ad 2.

43. See ibid at II-II.31.1 ad 2, see also II-II.117.2 ad 1, II-II.117.5c ad 3.

44. See ibid at II-II.31.2c.

45. See ibid at I-II.1.5c, I-II.1.6c, I-II.13.3 ad 2, I-II.90.2c, also I-II.12.3 ad 2.

46. See Mary Keys’s illuminating discussion of the ways in which Aquinas adds to Aristotle’s ethics, so that Thomist natural law is not a mere copy of Aristotle: Aquinas, Aristotle and the Promise of the Common Good (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 23, 67.

47. See Aquinas, supra note 9 at I-II.1.5c, I-II.5.3-4, I-II.94.2c.

48. See ibid at I-II.90, preamble, but see also especially I-II.63.1c & 63.2 ad 2.

49. See ibid at I-II.90.4 ad 1.

50. See, e.g., Aquinas, supra note 9 at I.62.1c & ad 3.

51. See ibid at I.60.3c. For an excellent discussion of good in Aquinas see Porter, The Recovery of Virtue, supra note 5 at 35-38.

52. See Finnis, The Collected Essays of John Finnis, supra note 10 at I.9, 149; Finnis, Aquinas, supra note 15 at 95; Grisez, supra note 8 at 179.

53. See Sherwin, supra note 34 at 56-57, though he does go on to say that this allows us to apprehend the goods of human flourishing, not the widest range of true or false goods. See also his excellent discussion of natural inclination. See 41-118. See also Porter, Nature as Reason, supra note 5 at 68-125.

54. See, e.g., Aquinas, supra note 9 at I-II.100.1c, I-II.94.6c.

55. See Aquinas, De Veritate at 16.2 ad 6, relied on by Finnis, Aquinas, supra note 15 at 87.

56. See Aquinas, De Ver at 16.2sc. See also 16.3c, ad 2, ad 5.

57. See Aquinas, De Virt at 2c.

58. See Aquinas, De Car at 12 arg 16; thus sinners make use of the primary precept only in a defective way, they do not use it perfectly but in relation to a defective good. See also De Car at 12c.

59. Aquinas, supra note 9 at I-II.91.2sc [emphasis added]. See also I-II.94.1 ad 2.

60. Further evidence of this is provided by Aquinas, ibid at II-II.79.1.

61. See ibid at I-II.90.2c, I-II.94.2c.

62. See Finnis, Aquinas, supra note 15, References at notes 85, 227; Aquinas, supra note 9 at I-II.94.2c.

63. See Aquinas, supra note 9 at I-II.96.3, I-II.98.1, II-II.77.4; Aquinas, De Regno at I.2-3.

64. See Aquinas, supra note 9 at I-II.90.4, I-II.95.3, I-II.96.1.

65. See ibid at I-II.97.2, I-II.97.4, II-II.120.1.

66. See ibid at II-II.62.4, I-II.105.2 ad 9.

67. See ibid at I-II.87.6.

68. See ibid at I-II.94.2c. Aquinas agrees with Aristotle on the naturally political nature of human beings: I-II.96.2c, I-II.99.2c, II-II.26.3c, II-II.29.1 ad 1, II-II.47.10 ad 2, II-II58.8c, II-II.58.9 ad 3.

69. Aquinas, De Regno, supra note 63 at I.15.106 (Aquinas adds, ‘… being directed to live well’). See also De Reg at I.2.10-15; supra note 9 at I-II.95.4c.

70. See especially Aquinas, supra note 9 at I-II.104.1c: they get their force not from reason alone but (also) from their enactment [non habeant vim obligandi ex sola ratio sed ex institutione].

71. See ibid at I-II.95.2c.

72. See ibid at I-II.104.1 ad 1 (detachment), I-II.90.3 ad 2 (authority); Aquinas, De Virtutibus Cardinalibus 4.4.

73. See ibid at I-II.96.4c & ad 3, I-II.97.1 ad 2, II-II.117.6c.

74. See ibid at I-II.96.4c.

75. See ibid.

76. See ibid at I-II.92.1 ad 4.

77. See ibid at I-II.62.1, I-II.91.4c; Aquinas, SCG, supra note 32 at III.37, III.151; Aquinas, De Caritate 8c, 9 ad 12 & 14 (on ordo caritatis), De Perfectione Spiritualis Vitae at 2.1.

78. See ibid at I-II.94.2c.

79. See Aquinas, Sent at III.23.1.4.3c, ad 1 (this is a very important quaestio for an understanding of Aquinas’s moral theology). See also Aquinas, Sent I.17.1.1, IV.49.1.3.1 ad 2.

80. See Aquinas, supra note 9 at I-II.62.1c, I-II.63.3c, I-II.65.3c; Aquinas, De Virt at 10c, ad 4 & 8.

81. See Aquinas, supra note 9 at I-II.65.2c, I-II.63.3 ad 2, I-II.65.3c, II-II.23.7c; Aquinas, Sent at III.23.3.1.1 ad 2.

82. See Aquinas, supra note 9 at II-II.18.2 ad 4; Aquinas, SCG, supra note 32 at III.27-37.

83. See the texts accompanying note 23; also Annas, Julia, The Morality of Happiness (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) at 329–33.Google Scholar

84. See Aquinas, De Spe 4 (NB the tenuous reference to Aristotle).

85. See Aquinas, Sent III.27.2.4.3c: charity is the mover, form and end of every virtue; Aquinas, supra note 9 at II-II.117.6.

86. See Aquinas, supra note 9 at II-II.57.1c. For a classic discussion see Gilleman, Gérard, The Primacy of Charity in Moral Theology (Westminster: Newman Press, 1959) Parts II-III.Google Scholar

87. See Aquinas, Sent at III.30.2c: this question discusses two aspects of forgiveness, one pertaining to the necessity of wishing eternal good to one’s enemies as their ultimate end, the other with the perfection of wishing temporal goods for one’s enemies (but the necessity of not wishing them temporal evils). See also Sent III.30.1c & ad 1; Aquinas, supra note 9 at II-II.23.1 ad 2, II-II.79.3c; Aquinas, De Car at 8c.

88. See, e.g., Aquinas, De Car at 10 ad 9.

89. See Aquinas, Sent at III.29.1.

90. See ibid at III.30.5 ad 3; Aquinas, supra note 9 at I-II.114.4; cf II-II.23.7c.

91. See Aquinas, supra note 9 at II-II.25.1c & ad 1; Aquinas, De Car 8 ad 14.

92. See Aquinas, supra note 9 at II-II.31.2; Aquinas, Sent III.29.6: sharing in Christ’s love is a form of friendship that is more noble than familial or political friendship (i.e., between fellow citizens); but it is admixed with these other loves in the mortal world; though NB supra note 9 at II-II.31.3c.

93. See Aquinas, Sent at III.29.8c, III.27.2.2c; Aquinas, supra note 9 at I-II.108.1 (on the importance of the Holy Spirit), I-II.108.3 (on the beatitudes).

94. See Aquinas, De Perfectione Spiritualis Vitae 13.9: charity must be practical and fruitful [efficax et operosa].

95. See Finnis, Aquinas, supra note 15 at 192: “I have a duty of strict justice (not merely ‘charity’) to relieve [the in extremis needs of others]”; and the accompanying footnote: “Misleadingly (in some respects), Aquinas’s main treatment of the duty [to the poor] is under the heading of ‘charity’….” Cf Aquinas, De Car 8c: charity consists of both precepts and counsels of perfection: both operate in relation to loving one’s enemies, but only the latter demands “active” love (e.g., showing generosity to an enemy when there is no duty of assistance).

96. See, e.g., Aquinas, supra note 9 at I-II.108.4c, ad 4; II-II.59.3 ad 1.

97. For an account of the importance of the Sermon on the Mount for ethics, particularly in Aquinas’s ethics, see Pinckaers, supra note 6 at 134-78; also Tobias Schaffner, “Is Francisco Suarez a Natural Law Ethicist?” in Kirstin Bunge et al, eds, The Concept of Law (Lex) in the Moral, Legal and Political Thought of the School of Salamanca (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog Verlag, 2015).

98. See especially Aquinas, supra note 9 at I-II.107.2-108.4.

99. See ibid at II-II.151.5c & ad 2, III.84.5 ad 2.

100. See ibid at I.20.1c. Aquinas makes the point explicit in relation to charity at II-II.24.8c, which speaks of the love of ‘divine things, whilst scorning all else except as demanded by the needs of present life.’ See also II-II.24.9 (on charity’s progress), II-II.24.10c & ad 2; Aquinas, De Car 8c.

101. This roughly summarises Aquinas, supra note 9 at II-II.28-43. See further Eberhard Schockenhoff, ‘The Theological Virtue of Charity’ in S Pope, ed, The Ethics of Aquinas (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2002) 244 at 244-58.

102. See Finnis, NLNR, supra note 1 at 92: “none [of the goods is] merely an aspect of any of the others … [each one] can reasonably be regarded as the most important. Hence there is no objective hierarchy amongst them; cf 450: “no single, objective hierarchy”. Contrast Aquinas, supra note 9 at II-II.26.1, II-II.26.5-7, II-II.27.6; Aquinas, Sent at III.29.1.1; Aquinas, De Caritate IX.

103. See especially Aquinas, supra note 9 at II-II.24.8c, II-II.26.5c & ad 2, II-II.24.10.

104. On charity’s perfection see Aquinas, supra note 9 at II-II.24.8, II-II.184.2; Aquinas, Sent III.27.3.4; Aquinas, De Caritate X-XI.