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Two Types of Regulatory Competition: Competitive Federalism Versus Reflexive Harmonisation. A Law and Economics Perspective on Centros
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 October 2017
Extract
There is a growing debate about the desirability of allowing greater scope for regulatory competition inside the European Union. The argument for doing so is that competition between the Member States in the production of legal rules will lead to greater economic efficiency than can be achieved through the harmonisation of standards. The Court’s ruling in Centros appears to mark a significant move in the direction of inter-state competition in company law. In deciding that a company founded by Danish citizens in the UK, thereby avoiding Danish minimum capital requirements, could not be denied the right to register an overseas branch in Denmark for the purposes of trading there, the Court has rekindled a long-running debate about the siège réel doctrine.
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- Copyright © Centre for European Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge 1999
References
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