Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home

Differentiation and Dysfunction: An Exploration of Post-Legislative Guidance Practices in 14 EU Agencies

  • Steven VAUGHAN (a1)

Abstract

This paper offers up a map of self-authored post-legislative guidance practice among the EU’s decentralised agencies. It shows that the use of guidance by EU agencies is widespread and significant, but not pervasive in that 14 of the EU’s 33 agencies currently engage in guidance-making. Where guidance is produced, it varies significantly between and within agencies as regards volume and length. These documents are hard to find, they are called a miscellany of different things, and there seems to have sprung up, ad hoc, a hierarchy of guidance that is both interesting and lacking in clarity. The question as to whether such guidance binds those to whom it has been addressed has been fudged, with agencies and courts engaging in exercises of tautology and misdirection to avoid the appearance of anything that looks like binding norm-making by the EU’s agencies. Consultation and participation in the making of guidance seems lackadaisical. This map suggests a level of differentiation that is so ill-thought out, and so ad hoc, so lacking in foresight and oversight, as to be dysfunctional. At the same time, the lack of engagement by the EU courts with these norms suggests that the site of opportunity for a way forward in this area lies other than with the judiciary.

Copyright

Footnotes

Hide All
*

I am very grateful to Aleksandra Cavoski, Elizabeth Fisher, Maria Lee, Robert Lee, Joanne Scott, the editors and the anonymous reviewer for comments on an earlier draft. The usual disclaimer applies.

Footnotes

References

Hide All

1 When Cedefop and EUROFOUND were both established.

2 Busuioc, M, European Agencies: Law and Practices of Accountability (Oxford University Press, 2013), p 14 .

3 Hatzopoulos, V, ‘Hard to Soft: Governance in the EU Internal Market’, (2012) 15 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 101, p 127 .

4 Geradin, D and Petit, N, ‘The Development of Agencies at EU and National Levels: Conceptual Analysis and Proposals for Reform’ (Jean Monnet Working Paper 01/04, 2004), p 4 .

5 Busuioc, note 2 above, p 5.

6 http://europa.eu/about-eu/agencies/index_en.htm [last accessed 1 June 2015].

7 Yataganas, XA, ‘Delegation of Regulatory Authority in the European Union: The Relevance of the American Model of Independent Agencies’ (Jean Monnet Working Paper 03/01, 2001).

8 Harlow, C and Rawlings, R, Process and Procedure in EU Administration (Hart Publishing, 2014), p 244 . This non-delegation doctrine originated in 1958 in the case of Meroni v High Authority, C-9/56, EU:C:1958:133. For a discussion of Meroni, and its impacts, see: Busuioc, note 6 above, p 18 ff. In a more recent case on Meroni, the European Court of Justice held that because the powers of an EU agency were ‘precisely delineated and amenable to judicial review in the light of the objectives established by the delegating authority’ those powers were Meroni compliant. See: UK v European Parliament and Council, C-270/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:18, para 53.

9 M Busuioc, note 2 above, p 19. See also: Griller, S and Orator, A, ‘Everything under Control? The Way Forward for Agencies in the Footsteps of the Meroni Doctrine’ (2010) 35 European Law Review 3 ; and Chiti, E, ‘European Agencies’ Rulemaking: Powers, Procedures and Assessment’ (2013) 19 (1) European Law Journal 93 .

10 Between February and April 2015, I reviewed the websites of the EU’s decentralised agencies. I took a threefold approach to finding the guidance documents. First, I searched the website for the terms ‘guidance’ and ‘guidelines’. Second, I explored the website sections variously headed ‘Publications’, ‘Document Libraries’, ‘Documents’ etc. Third, I had a much less methodical play with the website: looking to see how it was structured and organised, how topics/issues were grouped together etc. I accept this is not, perhaps, the most robust of all methodologies, but the aim in this paper is to provide an introduction and overview to, rather than the final word on, these issues.

11 For a wider review of the possible connections and disconnections between different aspects of EU governance, see Armstrong, KA, ‘The Character of EU Law and Governance: From ‘Community Method’ to New Modes of Governance’ (2011) 63 Current Legal Problems 179 . For a more general review of EU policy making, see Wallace, H, Pollack, MA and Young, AR (eds), Policy-Making in the European Union, 6th ed (Oxford University Press, 2010).

12 The concept of ‘yoking’ was introduced by David Trubek and Louise Trubek. See Trubek, DM and Trubek, LG, ‘New Governance and Legal Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry and Transformation’, (Wisconsin Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series No 1047, May 2007).

13 For the full list of these agencies, see Appendix 1 to this paper. For reasons of brevity, I have used the agencies’ acronyms rather than their full names.

14 Armstrong, KA, ‘Differentiated Economic Governance and the Reshaping of Dominium-Law’ in M Adams, F Fabbrini and P Larouche (eds), The Constitutionalization of European Budgetary Constraints (Hart Publishing, 2014).

15 de Búrca, G and Scott, J (eds) Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart Publishing, 2006); de Búrca, G, Kilpatrick, C and Scott, J (eds) Critical Legal Perspective on Global Governance: Liber Amicorum David M Trubek (Hart Publishing, 2014).

16 Each of these terms is used by one or more of the EU agencies under review in this paper. Such diversity has also been seen with post-legislative guidance issued by the Commission – see Hofmann, H, ‘Negotiated and Non-Negotiated Administrative Rule-Making – The Example of EC Competition Policy’ [2006] 43 Common Market Law Review 153 .

17 In other work, I have argued that the functions of post-legislative guidance can be fourfold: (i) it can amplify or expand on the underlying hard law; (ii) it can standardise the actions of those subject to the law; (iii) it can translate the law (ie where guidance implicitly contests and goes against the drafting of the underlying law, ‘translating’ the relevant provisions into something else); and/or (iv) post-legislative guidance can extrapolate from the law (ie guidance can fill in the gaps where the legislative text is silent on a given matter). See Vaughan, S, EU Chemicals Regulation: New Governance, Hybridity and REACH (Edward Elgar, 2015).

18 In Bund für Umwelt, AG Jaaskinen noted that the different parties to case had used the same Commission policy document to argue opposite points: Bund für Umwelt v Germany, C-461/13, EU:C:2010:773, point 106.

19 On the former, see de Búrca, G and Scott, J, ‘Introduction’ in G de Búrca and J Scott (eds), Law and New Governance in the EU and US (Hart Publishing, 2006). On the latter, see Armstrong, KA, ‘New Governance and the European Union: An Empirical and Conceptual Critique in G de Búrca, C Kilpatrick and J Scott (eds) Critical Legal Perspective on Global Governance: Liber Amicorum David M Trubek (Hart Publishing, 2014).

20 Joerges, C and Weimer, M, ‘A Crisis of Executive Mangerialism in the EU: No Alternative?’ in G de Búrca, C Kilpatrick and J Scott (eds), Critical Legal Perspective on Global Governance: Liber Amicorum David M Trubek (Hart Publishing, 2014).

21 Porte, C de la and Pochet, P, ‘Why and how (still) study the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC)?’ (2012) 22 Journal of European Social Policy 336, p 339 .

22 Armstrong, KA and Kilpatrick, C, ‘Law, governance, or new governance – the changing open method of coordination’ (2007) 13(3) Columbia Journal of European Law 649, p 654 .

23 Senden, L, Soft Law in European Community Law (Hart Publishing, 2004), p 118 .

24 Senden, L and Brink, T van den, ‘Checks and Balances of Soft EU Rule Making’ (Report for the European Parliament, March 2012), p 12 ; Senden, L, ‘Soft Post-legislative Rulemaking: A Time for More Stringent Control’ (2013) 19 (1) European Law Journal 57, p 60 . Edoardo Chiti takes a similarly blunt approach in his work in this area, see note 9 above.

25 For those wanting a more rigorous review of soft law, see Snyder, F, ‘The Effectiveness of EC Law’ (1993) 56 (1) MLR 19 ; L Senden, notes 23 and 24 above; and l Senden and T van den Brink, note 24 above.

26 KA Armstrong, note 19 above, p 262 ff; see also: KA Armstrong and C Kilpatrick, note 22 above.

27 KA Armstrong, note 19 above, p 249.

28 On the former, see Trubek, DM and Trubek, LG, ‘The Coexistence of New Governance and Legal Regulation: Complementarity or Rivalry?’ (Paper, Annual Meeting of the Research Committee on the Sociology of Law, Paris, July 2005); de Búrca, G and Scott, J, ‘New Governance, Law and Constitutionalism’ in G de Búrca and J Scott (eds), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart Publishing, 2006); and de Búrca, G, ‘New Governance and Experimentalism: An Introduction’ (2010) 2 Wisconsin Law Review 227 . On the latter, see KA Armstrong, note 19 above.

29 Scott, J and Trubek, DM, ‘Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in the EU’ (2002) 8 European Law Journal 1, p 16 ; KA Armstrong and C Kilpatrick, note 22 above, p 654.

30 G de Búrca, note 28 above, p 232.

31 L Senden, note 24 above, p 57.

32 Scott, J, ‘In Legal Limbo: Post-Legislative Guidance as a Challenge for European Administrative Law’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 329, p 330 .

33 Wilkinson, M, ‘Three Conceptions of Law: Towards a Jurisprudence of Democratic Experimentalism’ (2010) Wisconsin Law Review 673, p 682 . Maria Lee has suggested that, in the context of the Water Framework Directive (WFD), post-legislative activity might have been a necessary part of the WFD’s ambitious approach. See Lee, M, ‘Law and Governance of Water Protection Policy’ in J Scott (ed) Environmental Protection: European Law and Governance (Oxford University Press, 2009).

34 Levi-Faur, D, ‘Regulation and Regulatory Governance’ (JPRG Paper No. 1, February 2010).

35 Abbot, Carolyn and Lee, Maria argued that, ‘The inclusion of private actors in EU environmental governance, and indeed in other areas of regulation at all levels, is absolutely routine.’ See Abbot, C and Lee, M, ‘Economic Actors in EU Environmental Law’ (2015) Yearbook of European Law doi:10.1093/yel/yev002 [first published online 25 February 2015].

36 DM Trubek and LG Trubek, note 28 above; G de Búrca and J Scott, note 28 above.

37 DM Trubek and LG Trubek, note 12 above, p 3; see also Trubek, DM, Cottrell, P and Nance, M, ‘Soft Law, Hard Law and European Integration: Toward a Theory of Hybridity’ (University of Wisconsin Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1002, 2005).

38 DM Trubek and LG Trubek, note 12 above, p 5.

39 Korkea-aho, E, ‘Legal Interpretation of EU Framework Directives: A soft law approach’ (2015) 40 (1) European Law Review 70 ; Howarth, W, ‘Aspirations and Realities under the Water Framework Directive: Proceduralisation, Participation and Practicalities’ (2009) 21 (3) Journal of Environmental Law 391 ; Scott, J and Holder, J, ‘Law and New Environmental Governance in the European Union’ in G de Búrca and J Scott (eds), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Hart Publishing, 2006); J Scott, note 32 above; and L Senden, note 24 above. It is worth noting that the pieces by W Howarth, E Korkea-aho and by J Scott and J Holder concern post-legislative guidance issued by the Commission and Member States in the context of the EU Water Framework Directive, and not guidance issued by an EU agency.

40 J Scott, note 32 above.

41 Future work might therefore usefully compare post-legislative guidance with other post-legislative frameworks for rule making (rather than with primary legislation).

42 Kilpatrick, C, ‘On the Rule of Law and Economic Emergency: The Degradation of Basic Legal Values in Europe’s Bailouts’ (2015) 35 (2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 325 .

43 Ibid, p 7.

44 Those that did not were: FRONTEX; EASO; ECDC; Cedefop; EFCA; EUROFOUND; GSA; EIGE; EMCDDA; ENISA; CEPOL; EUROPOL; ETF; EUROJUST; and CdT. It is important to note that some of these agencies did produce guidance, but it was co-legislative (sitting alongside, but not linked to, legislation) or extra-legislative (existing in the place of legislation), rather than post-legislative.

45 http://srb.europa.eu/ [last accessed 1 June 2015].

46 Article 8(3), Commission Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 [2014] OJ L225/1.

48 See eg https://osha.europa.eu/en/topics/riskassessment/guidance.pdf [last accessed 1 June 2015].

49 A search of the EEA website for ‘guidance’ produces over 60,000 hits. The same search of the EU-OSHA website produced over 40,000 hits. Both websites were vast and challenging to navigate.

50 ACER, EMSA, FRA and OHIM.

51 BEREC has 18 ‘Guidance’ documents; CPVO has four ‘Guidance Documents’ and 159 ‘Technical Protocols’; EASA has published 104 ‘Acceptable Means of Compliance’ and ‘Guidance Materials’ documents; EBA has 32 ‘Final Products’ plus 54 ‘Related Documents’ under its ‘Guidelines’; EIOPA has 27 ‘Guidelines’ plus 9 ‘Opinions’; ECHA has 28 ‘Guidance’ documents, 8 ‘Nutshells’, 10 ‘Factsheets’, 16 ‘Practical Guides’ and 14 ‘Formats’; EFSA has 40 ‘Guidance’ documents; and ERA has 11 ‘Technical Specifications’, one ‘Application Guide’, 8 ‘Specific Guides’ plus at least 6 ‘Guidance’ documents.

52 These are two agencies where further exploration of their guidance could usefully be undertaken.

53 http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/search/doc/1895.pdf [last accessed 1 June 2015].

56 Instead, see S Vaughan, note 17 above.

57 Article 29, Council Regulation (EC) 1907/2006 [2006] OJ L33/1.

61 S Vaughan, note 17 above, Chapter 6.

63 Ibid.

64 Article 16(1), Commission Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011 [2011] OJ L326/1.

65 Article 6(2), Council Regulation (EC) No 1211/2009 [2009] OJ L 337/1.

66 Article 18(c) and Article 52, Council Regulation No 216/2008 [2008] OJ L79/2.

67 Article 16(1) Commission Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 [2010] OJ L331/12.

68 Article 31(1), Council Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 [2002] OJ L31/1.

69 Article 16(1), Commission Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 [2010] OJ L331/48.

70 Articles 1 and 2, Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2004 [2004] OJ L220/3.

71 Article 16, Commission Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 [2010] OJ L331/84.

72 Articles 36(1)(a) and 56(2), Council Regulation (EC) No 2100/94 [1994] OJ L227.

73 See http://echa.europa.eu/regulations [last accessed 1 June 2015].

74 Articles 8, 12 and 31, Commission Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 [2014] OJ L225/1.

75 Council Regulation (EC) No 1406/2002 [2002] OJ L394/1.

76 Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 [2002] OJ L3/1.

77 Two of the BEREC Guidelines are internal guidelines addressed to BEREC staff/committees. However, these two documents are not published for public consumption. See http://berec.europa.eu/eng/document_register/subject_matter/berec/regulatory_best_practices/guidelines/4885-internal-guidelines-on-the-operation-of-berec-expert-working-groups [last accessed 1 June 2015].

79 E Chiti, note 9 above, pp 97–98.

80 Commission v UK, Case C-301/10 ECLI:EU:C:2012:36, para 61.

81 For a recent case on this point, see UK v European Parliament and Council, C-270/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:18.

82 E Chiti, note 9 above, p 101.

83 Though it should be noted that there is some similarity between the Article 16 seen in the underlying EBA, EIOPA and EMSA legislation and Article 52 of Council Regulation No 216/2008 [2008] OJ L79/2 establishing EFSA.

84 This provision is almost identical in each of the three pieces of underlying legislation. The only difference is that Article 16(3) of the EBA Regulation also says, ‘Without prejudice to the powers laid down in Article 35, the competent authority shall, without delay, provide the Authority with all information which the Authority considers necessary for its investigation including as to how the acts referred to in Article 1(2) are applied in accordance with Union law.’ Commission Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 [2010] OJ L331/12.

85 Busuioc, M, ‘Rule-Making by the European Financial Supervisory Authorities: Walking a Tight Rope’ (2013) 19 (1) European Law Journal 111, p 118 . Where national competent authorities chose the ‘or explain’ route, the relevant EU agency website contains links to the alternative form of guidance and this different approach is discussed in that EU agency’s annual report. What is not clear is whether, say, the Commission takes an active approach to reviewing the ‘or explain’ alternative approaches and/or the EU agency’s own approach to those approaches.

86 See Articles 8(3) and 31(1) of Commission Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 [2014] OJ L225/1.

87 M Busuioc, note 85 above, p 112.

88 I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer for a specific suggestion on these two aspects.

89 Grimaldi v Fonds des maladies professionnelles, C-322/88, EU:C:1989:4407.

90 Korkea-aho, E, Adjudicating New Governance: Deliberative Democracy in the European Union (Routledge, 2015), p 1 .

91 L Senden, note 23 above, p 112.

92 By way of a starting point into this literature, see the special issue of International Organization (2000) 54 (3).

93 Kirton, JJ and Trebilcock, MJ, ‘Hard Choices, Soft Law: Voluntary Standards in Global Trade’ in JJ Kirton and MJ Trebilcock (eds), Hard Choices, Soft Law: Voluntary Standards in Global Trade, Environment and Social Governance (Ashgate, 2004), p 9 .

94 See, eg Weil, P, ‘Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?’ (1983) 77 (3) American Journal of International Law 413 ; Klabbers, J, ‘The Undesirability of Soft Law’, (1998) 67 (4) Nordic Journal of International Law 381 ; Hillegenberg, H, ‘A Fresh Look at Soft Law’, (1999) 10 (3) European Journal of International Law 499 .

95 L Senden, note 23 above, p 112.

97 The European Ombudsman has considered the nature of disclaimers in a number of recent rulings. For an account of these, see M Lee, ‘Accountability and Co-Production Beyond Courts: The Role of the European Ombudsman’ (Working Paper for ‘Regulating Risks in the EU: The Co-production of Expert and Executive Power, Amsterdam, 21–22 May 2015).

98 ACER; EMSA and OHIM.

99 BEREC; EBA; EFSA; ERA; ESMA.

100 EASA; ECHA; EIOPA; EMA.

101 CPVO; and FRA.

103 BEREC; EFSA; EBA, EIOPA and ESMA; EASA; EMA.

105 http://www.ema.europa.eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/regulation/general/general_content_000043.jsp&mid=WC0b01ac05800240cb [last accessed 1 June 2015] – this is ‘comply or explain’ model is also seen in guidance issued by BEREC and EFSA.

106 Momentive Specialty Chemicals v ECHA (ECHA Board of Appeal, Case A-006-2012, 13 February 2014), para 61.

107 https://eiopa.europa.eu/publications/annual-reports [last accessed 1 June 2015].

108 EMSA, ‘EU States Claims Management Guidelines’ (December 2012), p 5.

109 The exact wording is not identical in each ECHA guidance document, as the agency is responsible for multiple EU regulatory regimes. All of the guidance documents can be found here: http://echa.europa.eu/support/guidance [last accessed 1 June 2015].

110 NV Elektriciteits v ECHA (ECHA Board of Appeal, Case A-001-2010, 10 November 2011), paras 40, 88–94 and 168.

111 PPG and SNF SAS v ECHA, C-625/11, EU:C:2013 (not yet reported), para 34. I am grateful to Kenneth Armstrong for bringing this case to my attention.

112 France v Commission, Case C-57/95, ECLI:EU:C:1997:164, para 7; see also J Scott, note 32 above, p 329.

113 There is a real empirical gap in the work on post-legislative guidance, a gap which could be usefully filled.

114 For a detailed account of these functions, see S Vaughan, note 17 above.

115 Save, perhaps that Opinions tend to be issued to the Commission (or other EU body).

117 ECHA, ‘General Report 2011’ (ECHA, 2011), p 46 – see https://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/13560/mb_06_2012_general_report_2011_final_en.pdf [last accessed 1 June 2015].

118 NV Elektriciteits v ECHA, note 110 above, paras 40, 88–94 and 168.

119 Ibid, para 56.

121 As of 17 April 2015, there were 984 separate FAQ answers on the ECHA website. See http://echa.europa.eu/support/qas-support/search-qas [last accessed 1 June 2015].

122 For a review of this case law, see Craig, P, EU Administrative Law (Oxford University Press, 2012), ch 18.

123 KA Armstrong, note 19 above, p 251.

124 The websites of the following agencies are particularly poorly designed and hard to use: EU-OSHA; EEA; GSA; ERA; OHIM; and CdT. The websites of the EASA and EBA, however, are very slick and navigable.

125 Eg the CPVO Protocols.

126 Eg the ERA guidance and the single set of OHIM ‘Guidelines’.

127 Eg some of ECHA’s and EIOPA’s guidance documents.

128 C Kilpatrick, note 42 above, p 29.

129 S Vaughan, note 17 above.

130 See, further, on translation: Polska Telefonia v Prezes Urzedu Komunikacji Elektronicznej, C-410/09, ECLI:EU:C:2010:395; and O Stefan, ‘European Union Soft Law: New Developments Concerning the Divide between Legally Binding Force and Legal Effects’ (2012) 75 MLR 879.

131 Italy v Commission, C-566/10P, EU:C:2012:752. As discussed in C Kilpatrick, note 42 above, p 18.

132 It would be possible to ask the respective agencies for copies of previous guidance versions, or to put in a more formal right to information request.

136 Lee, M, ‘The Ambiguity of Multi-Level Governance and (De-)Harmonisation in EU Environmental Law’, (2012) 15 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 357, p 361 .

139 http://berec.europa.eu/eng/news_consultations/ [last accessed 1 June 2015].

140 Article 52, Council Regulation No 216/2008 [2008] OJ L79/2.

143 ECHA, ‘General Report 2009’ (Helsinki, 2009) section 1.5. Later versions of the Procedure were published in 2011 and 2013.

144 It is not clear what this deadline is or how it is disseminated.

145 ECHA, note 145 above, p 5.

147 C Abbot and M Lee, note 35 above, p 28.

148 Schmidt, VA, ‘Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, Output and ‘Throughput’ (2013) 61 (1) Political Studies 2 . This paper is not the place to assess the output legitimacy of the guidance produced by the EU’s agencies. In my work on EU chemicals regulation, I found very few instances, across the thousands of pages of guidance produced by ECHA, where I had concerns as to the end product of the agency’s norm making. See S Vaughan, note 17 above, chs 5–8.

149 J Scott and DM Trubek, note 29 above, p 9 ff.

150 Hervey, T, ‘‘Adjudicating in the Shadow of the Informal Settlement?’: The Court of Justice of the European Union, ‘New Governance’ and Social Welfare’ (2010) 63 (1) Current Legal Problems 92, p 138 .

151 Scott, J and Sturm, S, ‘Courts as Catalysts: Re-Thinking the Judicial Role in New Governance’ (2007) 13 (3) Columbia Journal of European Law 565, p 591 .

152 For an overview of why this is so, see Heyvaert, V, Thornton, J and Drabble, R, ‘With reference to the environment: the preliminary reference procedure, environmental decisions and the domestic jury’ (2014) LQR 413 .

153 Sogelma v EAR, C-415/07, EU:C:2009:220.

154 J Scott, note 32 above, p 339.

155 J Scott, note 32 above, pp 340–342.

156 J Scott, note 34 above, p 331.

157 France v Commission, C-325/91, EU:C:1993:3283, para 14.

158 Expedia Inc v Competition Authority, C-226/11, EU:C:2012:795; Germany v Commission, C-288/96, EU:C:2000:537; Grimaldi, note 89 above.

159 Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo in Lodato Gennaro & C. SpA v INPS and SCCI, C-415/07 EU:C:2009:220, point 3; Chemische Fabrik Kreussler C-308/11, EU:C:2012:548.

160 BP Chemicals Ltd v Commission, T-184/97, EU:T:2000:217, para 64.

161 J Scott, note 32 above; E Korkea-aho, note 39 above. There is more, generic case law on the use of soft law instruments, but the cases on the situations where soft norms have yoked to hard legislation are much fewer in number.

162 J Scott and S Sturm, note 151 above.

163 C Abbot and M Lee, note 35 above, p 28.

164 I would suggest that the ERA, EFSA, ECHA, EBA, ESMA and EIOPA approaches to guidance would be useful starting points.

165 Vos, E, ‘EU Agencies: Features, Framework and Future’ (Maastricht Faculty of Law Working Paper 2013/3), p 35 .

166 Fuller, L, The Morality of Law (Yale University Press, 1969).

167 KA Armstrong, note 14 above, p 6.

* I am very grateful to Aleksandra Cavoski, Elizabeth Fisher, Maria Lee, Robert Lee, Joanne Scott, the editors and the anonymous reviewer for comments on an earlier draft. The usual disclaimer applies.

Keywords

Differentiation and Dysfunction: An Exploration of Post-Legislative Guidance Practices in 14 EU Agencies

  • Steven VAUGHAN (a1)

Metrics

Altmetric attention score

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

Abstract views

Total abstract views: 0 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between <date>. This data will be updated every 24 hours.

Usage data cannot currently be displayed