¹ “The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation” (1976) 89 Harv.L.R. 1281.

² Devotions XVII.

³ Rondel v. Worsley [1969] 1 A.C. 191.

⁴ See, e.g., Halsey v. Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. [1961) 1 W.L.R. 683. Although only one householder brought the action, many of his neighbours had complained of the nuisance and 24 of them actually gave evidence.

⁵ R.S.C., Ord. 18, r.19(1)(d).

⁶ [1976] Q.B. 629. An action for a declaration in these circumstances might no longer be possible but a similar result could be achieved by way of an application for judicial review. See O'Reilly, v. Mackman [1983] 2 A.C. 237 and post, p. 232.Google Scholar

⁷ See Winfield, , The Present Law of Abuse of Legal Procedure (1921).Google Scholar

⁸ Plating Co. v. Farquharson (1881) 17 Ch.D. 49, 57, per Jessel M.R. See also British Cash and Parcel Conveyors Ltd. v. Lamson Store Service Co. Ltd. [1908] 1 K.B. 1006.

⁹ Bradlaugh v. Newdegate (1883) 11 Q.B.D. 1, 13, per Lord Coleridge C.J.

¹⁰ Note that the interest of each licence holder was separate and independent of the interests of the others and thus that the liberalising of the law against maintenance evident, e.g., in Martell v. Consett Iron Co. Ltd. [1955] Ch. 363, might not have helped.

¹¹ Criminal Law Act 1967, ss. 13(1), 14(1).

¹² For recent recognition of this in the Court of Appeal, see, e.g., Cheall v. APEX [1983] Q.B. 126, reversed without affecting this point [1983] 2 A.C. 180.

¹³ E.g., R. v. Miah [1974] 1 W.L.R. 683; R. v. Home Secretary, ex p. Bhajan Singh [1976] Q.B. 198; R. v. Chief Immigration Officer, ex p. Bibi [1976] 1 W.L.R. 979; Ahmad v. Inner London Education Authority [1978] Q.B. 36; Attorney-General v. B.B.C. [1981] A.C. 303, 354, per Lord Scarman; Schering Chemicals v. Falkman Ltd. [1982] 1 Q.B. 1, 18, per Lord Denning. In Malone v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1979] Ch. 344, where no question of the interpretation of statute arose, the Convention, though containing provisions in terms applicable to the matter in dispute, was held to be irrelevant.

¹⁴ Ahmad v. Inner London Education Authority, supra, n. 13, at p. 41.

¹⁵ Malone v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, supra, n. 13.

¹⁶ [1983] 1 A.C. 768. Cf. R. v. London Transport Executive, ex p. Greater London Council [1983] Q.B. 484.

¹⁷ 17 For a striking example, see Chandler v. D.P.P. [1964] A.C. 763.

¹⁸ [1978] A.C. 435, post, p. 241.

¹⁹ Crown Proceedings Act 1947.

²⁰ Wade, , Administrative Law, ed. 4 (1977), Chap. 16.Google Scholar

²¹ Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works (1863) 14 C.B.N.S. 180.

²² Smith, De, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 4th ed. (1980), Chap. 10. See especially Dyson v. Attorney-General [1911] 1 K.B. 410, post, p. 245.Google Scholar

²³ For history, see De Smith, op. cit., supra, n. 22, Appendix 1.

²⁴ See the classic statement of Atkin L.J. in R. v. Electricity Commissioners, ex p. London Electricity Joint Committee [1924] 1 K.B. 171, 205 as explained by Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin [1964] A.C. 40, 74–79.

²⁵ 25 The Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, which awards compensation to the victims of crimes of violence using money voted by Parliament, has no statutory foundation, but it operates under a published scheme of rules which were debated in Parliament, and the courts have assumed jurisdiction to review its decisions by way of certiorari: R. v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, ex p.Lain [1967] 2 Q.B. 864; Same, ex p. Lawton [1972] 1 W.L.R. 1589.

²⁶ R. v. National Joint Council for Dental Technicians, ex p. Neate [1953] 1 Q.B. 704.

²⁷ Vidyodaya University Council v. Silva [1965] 1 W.L.R. 77. Cf. Ridge v. Baldwin, supra, n. 24. See also R. v. B.B.C., ex p. Lavelle [1983] 1 W.L.R. 23.

²⁸ Wade, , op. cit. supra, n. 20, at pp. 518–519.Google Scholar

²⁹ R.S.C., Ord. 53, introduced in 1977, subsequently restated by the Supreme Court Act 1981, s. 31.

³⁰ See Law Commission, Remedies in Administrative Law, Cmnd. 4607 (1976), § 34; Zamir, “The Declaratory Judgment Revisited” (1977) 30 Curr.Leg.Prob. 43, 56–68; De Smith, supra, n. 22, at pp. 574–576.

³¹ Heywood v. Hull Prison Visitors [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1386, following dicta in the Court of Appeal in Uppal v. Home Office [1978] The Times, November 11. Cf. De Falco v. Crawley Borough Council [1980] Q.B. 460. See Moore, “Applications for Judicial Review” [1981] P.L. 28; Sunkin, “Order 53: An Exclusive Procedure” (1981) 44 M.L.R. 721.

³² [1983] 2 A.C. 237; Cocks v. Thanet District Council [1983] 2 A.C. 286. Jolowicz, , “The Forms of Action Disinterred” [1983] C.L.J. 15.Google Scholar

³³ See Milsom, “Trespass from Henry III to Edward III” (1958) 74 L.Q.R. 195, 407, 561.

³⁴ Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 9th ed. (1945), p. 195.

³⁵ The protection of the interests of retail traders that is achieved by the award of damages to an individual (ante, p. 222) is, in the sense intended, “accidental.” So, also, is the protection of the interests of groups such as the shareholders and employees of a company which is achieved when the company succeeds in recovering damages for the loss of, say, a profitable contract. Although obviously intended to be outside the scope of the present enquiry, however, this example does illustrate the extreme difficulty of giving a precise definition of its subject-matter, at least if non-pathological situations are taken into account. The shareholde's derivative action, for example (see, e.g., Gower, , Principles of Modern Company Law, 4th ed. (1979), pp. 647–653; Schreiner, “The Shareholder's Derivative Action-a Comparative Study of Procedures” (1979) 96 S.A.L.J. 203; the subject is too specialised for separate consideration in this paper), may appear to be a procedure adapted for the protection of “diffuse” interests, but its use is limited to cases in which those having control of a company act, or refuse to act, in breach of their duties Where, as is, happily, more usual, they act in accordance with their duties and cause proceedings to be brought in the name of the company in appropriate cases, it is only the interposition of the legal personality of the company which blinds us to the fact that those proceedings are brought for the purpose of protecting the interests of groups such as shareholders and employees.Google Scholar

³⁶ Daniell's Chancery Practice, 8th ed. (1914), p. 147.

³⁷ E.g., Anon. (1675) 1 Ch.Ca. 269 (representation of the inhabitants of a parish); Womersley v. Merritt (1867) 4 Eq. 695 (representation of the large number of partners in an unincorporated business). Those represented were bound by the judgment unless they proved that it had been obtained by fraud or collusion: Commissioners of Sewers of the City of London v. Gellally(1871) 3 Ch.D. 610.

³⁸ R.S.C., Ord. 15, r. 12.

³⁹ A representative action may be allowed, however, even if the members of the class have independent claims, and an injunction issued in favour of them all: Duke of Bedford v. Ellis [1901] A.C. 1; J. Bollinger v. Costa Brava Wine Co. Ltd. (No. 2) [1961) 1 W.L.R. 277; H. P. Bulmer Ltd. and Showerings Ltd. v. J. Bollinger S.A. and Champagne Larson Père el Fils [1978] R.P.C. 79.

⁴⁰ Smith v. Cardiff Corporation [1954] 1 O.B. 210. In the event the plaintiffs action failed: ibid. (No. 2) [1955] Ch. 159. It is not denied that in particular circumstances there may be advantages to a representative action even though only declaratory or injunctive relief is claimed, as in the cases cited supra n. 39, and in John v. Rees [1970] Ch. 345.

⁴¹ For the modern restrictions on the award of “punitive” damages, see Rookes v. Barnard [1964] A.C. 1129; Cassell & Co. Ltd. v. Broome [1972] A.C. 1027.

⁴² E.g., British Transport Commission v. Gourley [1956] A.C. 185; Browning v. War Office [1963] 1 Q.B. 750.

⁴³ Weinstein, “Some Reflections on the ‘Abusiveness’ of Class Actions” (1973) 58 F.R.D. 299. Cf. Labowitz, “Class Actions in the Federal System and in California: Shattering the Impossible Dream” (1974) 23 Buffalo L.R. 601.

⁴⁴ The Common Law (1881), p. 301.

⁴⁵ There has, however, been discussion of the possibility of introducing a special “consumer class action” in academic circles and at Departmental level. See Tur, “Litigation and the Consumer Interest: the Class Action and Beyond” (1982) 2 Legal Studies 135.

⁴⁶ Markt & Co. Ltd. v. Knight Steamship Co. Ltd. [1910] 2 K B. 1021. Consolidation of independent actions arising out of the same facts so as to avoid repetition of evidence is, of course, possible: R.S.C., Ord. 4, r. 10; Ord. 15, r. 4.

⁴⁷ E.M.I. Records Ltd. v. Riley [1982] 1 W.L.R. 923. Moon v. Atherton [1972] 2 Q.B. recognised the possibility of a representative action for damages where all the members of the class— tenants of a building—had incurred equal expenses in repairing the roof of the building.

⁴⁸ Prudential Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Newman Industries Ltd. [1981] Ch. 229.

⁴⁹ It might well be t he case that even the introduction into English law of a rule similar to r. 23 would not produce similar results because of the absence in England of the “contingent fee.”

⁵⁰ Companies Act 1967, s. 35. See, e.g., Re Lubin, Rosen and Associates Ltd. [1975] 1 W.L.R. 122.

⁵¹ The Race Relations Act 1976 is administered by the Commission for Racial Equality, and the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 by the Equal Opportunities Commission. Both Acts emphasise the Commissions' duties to work towards the elimination of discrimination and to secure compliance with the law without recourse to the courts. The power of the Commissions to bring proceedings in their own name is, in general, exercisable only in cases of persistent unlawful discrimination or where the unlawful act does not cause damage to an individual who could, with the help if necessary of the Commission, bring an action himself.

⁵² See now the Restrictive Practices Act 1976 and the Restrictive Practices Court Act 1976. Certain categories of agreement are, by the legislation, deemed to be contrary to the public interest unless the court is satisfied, on one or more specified grounds, that they should be approved. This creates a lis between the parties to the agreement, on the one hand, and the Director of Fair Trading on the other.

⁵³ See Jacob, “Safeguarding the Public Interest in English Civil Proceedings” [1982] 1 C.J.Q. 312.

⁵⁴ Smith, De, op. cit., supra, n. 22, at p. 432. An early example is Attorney-General v. Hart (1703) Prec.Ch. 225.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ De Smith, ibid., at p. 436. A “public nuisance” is a nuisance which materially affects the reasonable comfort and convenience of life of a class of Her Majesty's subjects: Attorney-General v.P.Y.A. Quarries Ltd. [1957] 2 Q.B. 169, 184, per Romer L.J. It is actionable at the suit of a private individual if, and only if, he has suffered “particular” damage, that is damage over and above the inconvenience suffered by the public at large: Winterbottom v. Lord Derby (1867) L.R. 2 Ex. 316. The plaintiff in Halsey v. Esso Petroleum Ltd., supra, n. 4, had suffered such damage.

⁵⁶ The court will not entertain an argument to the effect that it would be more to the advantage of the public that the law should be disregarded than that it should be obeyed: Attorney-General v. London and North Western Railway [1900] 1 Q.B. 78, where the statutory rule in question required that railway trains should not exceed a speed of 4 miles per hour when travelling over a level-crossing.

⁵⁷ E.g., Attorney-General v. Chaudry [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1614 where the speed with which the civil jurisdiction could be invoked as compared with the criminal may actually have been important to the preservation of life.

⁵⁸ R.S.C., Ord. 52.

⁵⁹ Attorney-General v. Bastow [1957] 1 Q.B. 514; Attorney-General v. Harris [1961] 1 Q.B. 74, where the trial judge's refusal of an injunction on the ground that the defendant's repeated breaches of the law had caused no damage to the public ([I960] 1 Q.B. 31) was reversed.

⁶⁰ H.C.Deb., Vol. 631, cols. 684–695 (1 December 1960).

⁶¹ Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers [1978] A.C. 435, 481, per Lord Wilberforce.

⁶² R. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [1980] Q.B. 407, 419. See also Wade, op. cit., supra, n. 20, at p. 511.

⁶³ Edwards, , The Law Officers of the Crown (1964), pp. 286–295; De Smith, op. cit., supra, n. 22, at pp. 431^433, 444–450; Wade, op. cit., supra, n. 20, at pp. 510–517.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ The Attorney-General must be consulted before the original statement of claim is amended, his consent must be renewed if the relator wishes to appeal and, no doubt, as nominal plaintiff the Attorney-General can terminate the proceedings against the wishes of the relator: Supreme Court Practice (1982), § 15/11/2; Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers [1978] A.C. 435, 478, per Lord Wilberforce.

⁶⁵ Attorney-General v. Vivian (1825) 1 Russ. 226.

⁶⁶ London County Council v. Attorney-General [1902] A.C. 165, 167–168, per Lord Halsbury L.C.

⁶⁷ R.S.C, Ord., 15, r. 11.

⁶⁸ Formerly the relator action was much used by local government authorities. Now, however, they may generally bring proceedings in their own name where they “consider it expedient for the protection of the interests of the inhabitants of their areas”: Local Government Act 1972, S. 222

⁶⁹ Text supra, at n. 67.

⁷⁰ Legal Aid Act 1974, Sched. 1, Pt. II, para. 3. The Royal Commission on Legal Services, Cmnd. 7648 (1979), § 13.70 recommends that legal aid should be available to defendants in relator actions, but makes no recommendation with regard to the relator himself.

⁷¹ Edwards, op. cit., supra, n. 62, citing Sir Hartley Shawcross, Attorney-General, in H.C.Deb., Vol. 483, cols. 679–690 (29 January 1951). See also e.g. Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers [1977] Q.B. 729, 741–746, per Silkin, Attorney-General, arguendo and Same [1978] A.C. 435, 442–444, per Silkin, Attorney-General, arguendo; 489–490, per Viscount Dilhorne, himself a former Attorney-General.

⁷² MrSilkin, Sam, Attorney-General, in H.C.Deb., Vol. 924, cols. 1699 et seq. (27 January 1977).Google Scholar

⁷³ Lord Shawcross in a letter to The Times, 2 August 1977, cited Mercer, “Public Interest Litigation in Britain and Canada” [1979] P.L. 214, 222.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ [1977] O.B. 729; [1978] A.C. 435.

⁷⁵ In reply to an interviewer's question about the legality of the proposed action he replied that the matter had never been tested in the courts, and that the relevant laws dated from Queen Anne and were more appropriate for dealing with highwaymen and footpads. In fact the applicable provisions were contained in the Post Office Act 1953 and the Post Office Act 1969.

⁷⁶ Though the Secretary of and doubtless supported by an organisation known as the National Association for Freedom, Mr. Gouriet's position was simply that of a member of the public.

⁷⁷ [1977] Q.B. at p. 758.

⁷⁸ Ibid., at p. 761.

⁷⁹ [1978] A.C. at p. 475, per Lord Wilberforce.

⁸⁰ Clarke v. Bradlaugh (1881) 8 Q.B.D. 63, 68–69, per Brett L.J. The most important exception relates to actions intended to be brought against persons out of the jurisdiction of the court: R.S.C., Ord. 6, r. 7; Ord. 11, r. 1.

⁸¹ Art. 30.

⁸² Nouveau code de procedure civile, arts. 122–126. The French judge must himself raise a fin de non-recevoir if it appertains to ordre public and may raise ex officio that based on lack of interest: art. 125.

⁸³ R.S.C., Ord. 18, r. 19(l)(a).

⁸⁴ Wenlock v. Moloney [1965] 1 W.L.R. 1238.

⁸⁹ Hubbuck v. Wilkinson [1899] 1 Q.B. 86, 91, per Lindley M.R. Nevertheless, cases under the rule can reach the House of Lords, as in Gouriel v. Union of Post Office Workers itself.

⁸⁶ Riches v. D.P.P.[1973] 1 W.L.R. 1019.

⁸⁷ Attorney-General v. Independent Broadcasting Authority [1973] Q.B. 629.

⁸⁸ Supra, n. 74.

⁸⁹ See [1977] Q.B. at p. 738, per Lord Denning M.R.; at p. 739, per Lawton L.J.; ibid., at p. 761, per Lord Denning M.R.; at p. 771 per Lawton L.J.

⁹⁰ See especially [1978] A.C. at p. 477, per Lord Wilberforce; at p. 496, per Lord Diplock. See text supra, n. 34 and Jolowicz, “The Judicial Protection of Fundamental Rights under English Law,” Part III, in Cambridge-Tilburg Law Lectures, Second Series 1979 (1980). An important further step in the direction of building into English law and practice the distinction between “public” and “private” law was taken by the House of Lords in O'Reilly v. Mackman [1983] 2 A.C. 237. See p. 254, post.

⁹¹ Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974, s. 14. There are some exceptions to this immunity, but none relevant.

⁹¹ [1978] A.C. at pp. 483–484, per Lord Wilberforce; at pp. 492–493, per Viscount Dilhorne; at pp. 499–500, per Lord Diplock; at pp. 506, 513, per Lord Edmund-Davies; at p. 518, per Lord Fraser.

⁹³ Ibid., at p. 483.

⁹⁴ [1911] 1 K.B. 410. See Smith, De, op. cit., supra, n. 22, at pp. 479–480.Google Scholar

⁹⁵ [1911] 1 K.B. at p. 421,per FarwellL.J. The plaintiff could, of course, have raised the illegality of the form as a defence if he had refused to supply the information and proceedings had then been taken against him.

⁹⁶ E.g. Ex pane Island Records [1978] Ch. 122 (subsequently overruled by the House of Lords in Lonrho Ltd. v. Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd. [1982] A.C. 173; see R.C.A. Corp. v. Pollard [1983] Ch. 135); Meade v. Haringey London Borough Council [1979] 1 W.L.R. 637. Cf. Barrs v. Bethell [1982] Ch. 294, a decision at first instance.

⁹⁷ See, e.g., Allen v. Gulf Oil Ltd. [1981] A.C. 1001 and comment Jolowicz, [1981] C.L.J. 226. The point emerges most clearly in Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers itself.

⁹⁸ Ante, p. 231.

⁹⁹ R.S.C., Ord. 53, r. 3(2) and (3). A hearing may be requested, and if the application for leave is refused without a hearing, may be renewed: ibid., r. 3(4) and (5). Appeal against a refusal of leave lies to the Court of Appeal (Practice Direction [1982] 1 W.L.R. 1375) but not from the Court of Appeal to the House of Lords: Re Poh [1983] 1 W.L.R. 2.

¹ R.S.C., Ord. 53.

² The rule-making power is generally limited to matters of procedure and practice: Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925, s. 99. Now the Supreme Court Act 1981, s. 84. See Inland Revenue Commissioners v. N.F.S.S.B. [1982] A.C. 617, 637, per Lord Diplock; at p. 647, per Lord Scarman.

³ s. 31(3).

⁴ Smith, De, op. cit., supra, n. 22, at pp. 409–421, 550–553Google Scholar; Wade, , op. cit., supra, n. 20, at pp. 543–546, 608–612. Yardley “Certiorari and the Problem of Locus Standi” (1955) 71 L.Q.R. 388; Robertshaw “‘Persons Aggrieved” and the Locus Standi Problem” [1971] P.L. 169.Google Scholar

⁵ R. v. Guardians of the Lewisham Union [1897] 1 Q.B. 498, 500, per Wright J., applied as recently as 1970 in R. v. Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1970] 1 W.L.R. 450.

⁶ R. v. Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [1968] 2 Q.B. 118; Same [1973] Q.B. 241.

⁷ R. v. Greater London Council [1976] 1 W.L.R. 550, 558–559, per Lord Denning MR.; Wade, , op. cit., supra, n. 20, at p. 612.Google Scholar

⁸ [1982] A.C. 617. Cane, “Standing, Legality and the Limits of Public Law” [1981] P.L. 322; Feldman, “Standing in the Lords: a Matter of Interest” (1982) 45 M.L.R. 92; Griffiths, “Mickey Mouse and Standing in Administrative Law” [1982] C.L.J. 6.

⁹ [1980] 1 Q.B. 407.

¹⁰ Ibid., at p. 424, per Lord Denning M.R.

¹¹ Arsenal Football Club v. Ende [1979] 1 A.C. 1. See also R. v. Paddingion Valuation Officer [1966] 1 Q.B. 380.

¹² [1982] A.C. at p. 637, per Lord Diplock.

¹³ Ibid., at p. 635, per Lord Wilberforce.

¹⁴ Ibid., at p. 630, per Lord Wilberforce; at p. 643, per Lord Diplock.

¹⁵ Ibid., at pp. 632–633, per Lord Wilberforce.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ The problem and the method of solution evidently adopted by the House of Lords provide an interesting parallel to developments in France relative to the fins de non-recevoir which, while having the character of preliminary objections, are such as to defeat a claim altogether. See, e.g., Motulsky, sub.Cass.civ. 2^e, 6 juin 1962, J.C.P. 1963. II. 13191. The present solution, contrary to that adopted in 1958 (Décr. no. 58–1299 du 22 déc. 1958 ancien code de procedure civile, art. 192), is to allow a fin de non-recevoir to be raised en tout état de cause, but a party who fails to do so timeously with the intention of causing delay may be penalised in damages: nouveau code de procédure civile, art. 123.

¹⁸ [1982] A.C. at p. 630, per Lord Wilberforce; at p. 644, per Lord Diplock.

¹⁹ Ibid., at p. 631.

²⁰ Ibid., at p. 644.

²¹ The procedure was simplified in 1933 (Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1933, s. 5) and again in 1938 (Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1938, s. 7) when they ceased to be “writs” and became “orders.”

²² Pride of Derby and Derbyshire Angling Association Ltd. v. British Celanese Ltd. [1955] Ch. 149. Innumerable similar examples could be given, as also of injunctions carefully tailored to balance the interests of the parties and those associated with them. See, e.g., Kennaway v. Thompson [1981] Q.B. 88. Where the plaintiff can show an infringement of a positive legal right of his own, however, the court will be reluctant so to use its discretion as, effectively, to deprive him of that right: Charrington v. Simons & Co. Ltd. [1971] 1 W.L.R. 598.

²³ Redland Bricks Ltd. v. Morris [1970] A.C. 652.

²⁴ Attorney-General v. Staffordshire County Council [1905] 1 Ch. 336; Kennard v. Cory Bros. [1922] 1 Ch. 265; Redland Bricks Ltd. v. Morris, supra, n. 23.

²⁵ The mode of proceeding by writ represents the norm, and is that which is generally regarded as typical of English procedure. For the originating summons, see R.S.C., Ord. 7, 28.

²⁶ R.S.C.Ord. 28, r. 4.

²⁷ The procedure is laid down in R.S.C., Ord. 53. See also Supreme Court Act 1981, s. 31.

²⁸ Ante, p. 248.

²⁹ It would, however, be difficult to make use of a similar device in an action started by writ since no evidence is normally given before the trial. For “striking out” see ante, p. 242.

³⁰ Uppal v. Home Office, supra, n. 31, per Roskill L.J., cited in Heywood v. Hull Prison Visitors [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1386, 1394.

³¹ Ante, pp. 243 and 248.

³² [1982] A.C. at p. 638. Emphasis added.

³³ R.S.C. (Amendment No. 4) 1980, now incorporated in R.S.C., Ord. 53, rr. 3 and 5.

³⁴ The applicant for judicial review may be placed at a disadvantage as compared with the plaintiff in an ordinary action by the rule that the application must be made promptly, and in any event within three months from the date when the occasion for it arose, unless the court extends the period. An ordinary action is subject only to the ordinary law of limitation of actions which, as a general rule, allows six years. This point was regarded as of particular importance in O'Reilly v. Mackman, but it does not affect the substance of the right of a person who acts timeously to challenge the legality of the decisions or actions of public authorities.

³⁵ Ante, p. 254

³⁶ Ante, text at n. 32.

³⁷ See Inland Revenue Commissioners case [1982] A.C. at p. 630, per Lord Wilberforce; ibid., at p. 636, per Lord Diplock.

³⁸ Ante, pp. 239–242.

³⁹ Ante, p. 245.

⁴⁰ See Jolowicz, , “The Parties and the Judge in Civil Litigation” in Canadian Institute for Advanced Legal Studies, The Cambridge Lectures 1981, p. 160.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Loc. cit., supra, n. 1