Where, following divorce, a mother remarries, it is not uncommon for her to wish to change the surname of the children to that of the stepfather. In these cases the jurisprudence of the courts has established over a substantial period of time that a parent may not unilaterally change the name of a child but that, if the matter is brought before the court, the question of a proposed change must be determined on the basis of the welfare principle. The Children Act 1989 (section 13) had made this explicit where a residence order was in place but, surprisingly, some had questioned whether the automatic prohibition had survived the Children Act in the much larger number of cases where no such order is made. The direct issue before the House of Lords in Dawson v. Wearmouth [1999] 1 F.L.R. 1167 was whether the Court of Appeal had correctly exercised its discretion in allowing an appeal by a mother against the judge's decision to sanction a change of name. In unanimously holding that it had, the House must be taken to have tacitly affirmed the above principles, which will govern the situation in the absence of a court order (for a review of the authorities see the commentary on the Court of Appeal's decision by Jonathan Herring at [1998] C.L.J. 266).