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U.S. Foreign Policy and the Governance of Finance

  • Kathryn C. Lavelle

Abstract

What factors explain U.S. participation in multilateral forums that govern finance? Current literature misses the key features of the Federal Reserve, Treasury, and Congress that result in their distinct manners of support for various multilateral arrangements. I revisit the archival record and apply a new understanding to American participation in the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) as the financial regime has evolved since the collapse of fixed parity in the IMF after 1971. I thus explain the puzzle of American ambivalence through an exploration of the fragmented U.S. regulatory system, which inhibits the United States from acting as a unitary, lead actor of multilateral negotiations. Hence, American coordination must take place both domestically and internationally for an agreement to emerge.

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Copyright

Corresponding author

*Corresponding Author: Kathryn C. Lavelle, Ellen and Dixon Long Professor of World Affairs, Department of Political Science, Case Western Reserve University, 10900 Euclid Avenue, Cleveland, OH 44016; Tel.: 216-368-2691; Email: kathryn.lavelle@case.edu

Footnotes

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The author would like to thank Baker Nord Center for the Humanities and the Ellen and Dixon Long Chair for funds that supported the research for this article in Washington, DC and Basel, Switzerland. I would also like to thank Claire Whitfield, Cynthia Lichtenstein, Grace Protasiewicz, and Jeanne Roslanowick for helpful comments and suggestions.

Footnotes

References

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U.S. Foreign Policy and the Governance of Finance

  • Kathryn C. Lavelle

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