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Deindustrialization and the Demand for Protection

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 January 2021

Heather-Leigh Kathryn Ba Open the ORCID record for Heather-Leigh Kathryn Ba [Opens in a new window]  and
Tyler Coleman
Heather-Leigh Kathryn Ba*
Affiliation:
Political Science, University of Missouri Columbia College of Arts and Science, 113 Professional Building, Columbia, MO65211-6080, United States; Email: tcc96h@mail.missouri.edu
Tyler Coleman
Affiliation:
Political Science, University of Missouri Columbia College of Arts and Science, 113 Professional Building, Columbia, MO65211-6080, United States; Email: tcc96h@mail.missouri.edu
*
*Corresponding author: Heather-Leigh Kathryn Ba, Political Science, University of Missouri Columbia College of Arts and Science, 113 Professional Building, Columbia, MO 65211-6080, United States; Email: bah@missouri.edu
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Abstract

Current explanations of demand for anti-dumping protections focus on the role of the business cycle, and fluctuations in real exchange rates. However, empirical evidence supporting these explanations is based primarily on the experience of industrialized countries. Here, we examine anti-dumping petitions in a broader sample of thirty-four industrialized and middle income countries from 1978–2015. We also propose a new determinant of demand for anti-dumping petitions—changes in the pattern of industrial production between developed and developing economies over this period have contributed to deindustrialization in advanced economies and premature industrialization some developing countries. These changes threaten established industries and motivate them to demand protection.

Keywords

protectionismantidumpingdeindustrializationtradepolitical institutions
Type
Research Article
Information
Business and Politics , Volume 23 , Issue 2 , June 2021 , pp. 264 - 281
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of V.K. Aggarwal

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