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Comparative Economic Organization—Within and Between Countries

  • Witold J. Henisz (a1) and Oliver E. Williamson (a2)

Abstract

This paper explores the implications of going beyond transaction cost theory's implicit focus on domestic investors to include multinational actors. As developed herein, the discriminating alignment between the level of hazards (contractual and/or political) and the mode of governance carries over. In the open-economy context, such an alignment reflects the hazards that arise from the nature of the transaction and those that arise from the nature of the political and regulatory environment.

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Copyright

Corresponding author

The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 2021 Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall, Philadelphia, PA 19104–6370, USA. E-mail: henisz@wharton.upenn.edu
University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA. E-mail: owilliam@haas.berkeley.edu

References

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