^{page 541 note 3} See Wang Chong , Luenn Herng : ‘Shyh Shyr () of the Jou () Dynasty considered that there are both good and bad in human nature, and that if the good nature in man is singled out for nurture then the good will develop, but if the bad is singled out for nurture then the bad will develop … He therefore wrote a book called Yeang Shu () Fuh Tzyyjiann (), Chi Diaukai (), Gongsuen Nitzyy () and the like also discussed human nature, holding views which agreed with Shyh on some points and disagreed on others, but they all considered that there are both good and bad in human nature’. () Syh Buh Tsong Kan (SBTK) ed. J. 3 pp. 14b–15a.)Google Scholar

^{page 542 note 1} Luenyeu xvii. 2 and 3Google Scholar, SBTK. ed. J. 9 p. 2a 11. 1–2.Google Scholar

^{page 542 note 2} Although this view does not appear in the Bor Hun Tong , Ban Guh makes use of this principle of grading human beings in his Guujin Renbeau (Hannshu, J. 20), and further sub-divides each of the three grades into three.Google Scholar

^{page 542 note 3} Omit the word

^{page 542 note 4} Luenn Herng, J. 3 pp. 18b–19a.Google Scholar

^{page 542 note 5} SBTK. ed. J. 5 p. 5a.Google Scholar

^{page 542 note 6} Luenn Herng, J. 3 p. 17b.Google Scholar This is not found in the extant work of Doong Jongshu. In the Chuenchiou Farnluh we find a rather different view of human nature. My purpose here is merely to show that the dualist view was current in Hann times. Doong was considered, rightly or wrongly, by Wang Chong as holding this view.

^{page 543 note 1} Ell Cherng Chyuan Shu Syh Buh Bey Yaw (SBBY) ed., Ell Cherng Yi Shu J. 22A pp. 10b–11a. This distinction is sometimes alternatively stated as between the material nature (chih jyr jy shinq ) and the moral or rational nature (yih lii jy shinq ). Ju Shi writes: ‘Mencius never mentioned the material nature of man. The greatest contribution Cherntzyy made to morals in his discussion of human nature was his elucidation of this material nature. Once we bring in material nature, all the differences between those who discuss human nature disappear completely’. Jutzyy Yeuley Jyiliueh , Tsongshu Jyicherng ed. J. 1 p. 26.

^{page 543 note 2} Mencius, VIA. 7Google Scholar, SBTK. ed. J. 11 p. 7b 11. 1–2Google Scholar; Legge, , Chinese Classics (2nd ed., rev., Oxford, 1895) vol. ii pp. 404–5.Google Scholar All translations used are my own and, because I wish to make these translations as literal as possible, they are often written in English which is not very idiomatic, but I hope they are at least intelligible. References to Legge are, however, included for the convenience of the reader who may not otherwise have easy access to the Chinese texts.

^{page 543 note 3} Op. cit. IVB. 32, J. 8 p. 15b 11. 7–8; Legge, , p. 340.Google Scholar

^{page 543 note 4} Op. cit. VIB. 2, J. 12 p. 2; Legge, , p. 424.Google Scholar

^{page 544 note 1} Shyuntzyy (SBTK. ed.) ch. 23 ‘That Human Nature is Evil’, J. 17 p. 9a 11. 6–7; Legge, , p. 84.Google Scholar (All the chapters in Shyuntzyy I quote from have been translated by Prof. Homer H. Dubs in his The Works of Hsüntze (London, 1928)Google Scholar, but as it does not contain the Chinese text I shall not give detailed references to it.) Elsewhere, in ch. 5, ‘Against Physiognomy ’, we find: ‘Past and present are the same [omit the word ] Things of the same kind, though they are far apart in time, have the same principle underlying them’ (J. 3 p. 7b 11. 3–4). It is interesting to note in passing that Dr. Hu Shih took this passage as evidence that Shyuntzyy believed in the immutability of species, translating it as follows: ‘The past and the present are the same. The species are not mutable: they are governed by the same principle, no matter how long they have lasted’. (The Development of the Logical method in Ancient China, Shanghai, 1922, p. 153Google Scholar; see also Jonggwo Jershyueshyy Dahgang 1919, pp. 311–12.) The text does not seem to warrant such an interpretation. All that is said is that if things are of the same kind, then irrespective of the position in time they may happen to occupy, the same principle underlies them all; it says nothing as to whether things can change from one species into another or not. If they do, then since they would have become things of a different kind it follows as a matter of course that the principle that used to underlie them before the change would no longer hold. For our present purpose this passage embodies the general principle of which the truth that all men being of the same kind are alike is but a special case.

^{page 544 note 2} Op. cit. J. 17 pp. 11a 1. 7–lib 1. 1; Legge, pp. 85–6.

^{page 544 note 3} An objection may be raised here that even if chih is not used as a technical term in Shyuntzyy, it seems to be so used in Mencius, and this may, in some respects at least, be akin to the notion of chih of the Sonq philosophers. Such an objection would, of course, be based solely on Mencius, IIA. 2 (J. 3 pp. 4 ff.; Legge pp. 185 ff.), where the famous haw ran jy chih occurs. As it would be too long to go into details concerning the interpretation of the haw ran jy chih, my answer is briefly this. I am aware that there have been attempts to read metaphysical implications into this phrase of Mencius, but I am inclined to think that the purpose of the whole passage was merely to give a description of what it feels like to be a morally cultivated man so as to provide a criterion for any one who would like to test his own progress in the acquiring of such cultivation. In its use here chih would have very much its ordinary meaning of ‘breath’, something which, in Mencius' own words, ‘fills the body’. As a man who is angry is puffed up with chih, so a man of moral cultivation who has right on his side is filled with the haw ran jy chih. By using the word chih for both, Mencius draws our attention to the resemblance while, by adding the epithet haw ran, he is drawing our attention to the difference. In being filled with righteous indignation, we are not really puffed up with breath as in the case of anger. Nevertheless, there is something akin between the two such as to make this way of speaking illuminating in our search for some subjective sign which can enable us to recognize our success in moral cultivation.

^{page 545 note 1} In this paper I have sometimes rendered the word shin ‘heart’, because, though it is perhaps more natural to render it as ‘mind’, in some contexts ‘mind’ would be misleading. As the word ‘heart’ in English can be used to denote the seat of the emotions, it is an extension rather than a violation of its usage to use it to denote other aspects of the mind.

^{page 546 note 1} Dongshwu-Dwushujih , SBBY ed. J. 3 pp. 1a–1b.Google Scholar

^{page 547 note 1} The word here translated as ‘beginning’ is duan , which means literally a new shoot, a sprout, and therefore something which needs nurture before it can develop fully into a plant.

^{page 547 note 2} Mencius IIA. 6, J. 3 pp. 14b–16aGoogle Scholar; Legge, pp. 201–4.Google Scholar

^{page 548 note 1} Op. cit., VIIA. 6, J. 13 p. 2b 1. 8; Legge, p. 451.Google Scholar

^{page 548 note 2} Op. cit., VIIA. 7, J. 13 p. 3a 1. 3; Legge, pp. 451–2.Google Scholar

^{page 550 note 1} Op. cit., VIA. 7, J. 11 p. 7a 11. 2–4; Legge, p. 404.Google Scholar

^{page 550 note 2} Op. cit., VA. 2, J. 9 pp. 3b–4a; Legge, p. 347.Google Scholar

^{page 550 note 3} Op. cit., VIA. 6, J. 11 p. 6a 1. 7; Legge, p. 403.Google Scholar

^{page 551 note 1} Loc. cit., J. 11 p. 6b 11. 4–7. The quotation from the Book of Poetry is from Jeng Min in the Dah Yea

^{page 551 note 2} This naturally reminds one of Bishop Butler's sermon on the text ‘For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves’. Indeed the resemblance between Mencius' moral philosophy and that of Butler was pointed out long ago by Legge (see Introduction to Chinese Classics vol. ii). I wish, however, to draw attention to the difference between them. Butler, as has often been pointed out, had a hankering after the view that enlightened self-interest and conscience, in the last resort, really point the same way. But Mencius was most uncompromising in his attitude towards self-interest , as can be seen from, for instance, VIIA. 25, where he says, ‘One who gets up with the crowing of the cock and untiringly works for goodness is the same sort of man as Shuenn; one who gets up with the crowing of the cock and untiringly works for profit (lih) is of the same sort as Jyr. If you want to know the difference between Shuenn and Jyr, it is nothing else than this: it is the difference between profit and goodness’ (J 13 pp. 10b 1. 8—11a 1. 2; Legge, p. 464).Google Scholar

^{page 551 note 3} I cannot here go into the problem of the relation between minq and shinq, interesting though it is. For treatment of the history of both notions and their relation I refer the reader to the book by Fuh Synian mentioned on p. 541, n. 1.

^{page 551 note 4} ‘ … ’, Shyuntzyy, ch. 23, SBTK ed. J. 17 pp. 2b–3aGoogle Scholar; Legge, p. 80.Google Scholar

^{page 551 note 5} The word wey as used in Shyuntzyy is free from the pejorative sense of ‘hypocritical’. It is possible that the word originally used by Shyuntzyy was simply wei ‘to do’. At any rate, wey is used in Shyuntzyy as a technical term in opposition to shinq (human nature). It covers both the human activities of doing something and making something, e.g. moral behaviour and the making of articles by a craftsman. Since there is no English word which covers the same range of meaning, I have chosen arbitrarily the term ‘human artifice’, which should therefore be understood in the sense just described.

^{page 552 note 1} ‘’, loc. cit., p. 3a 11. 2–3.

^{page 552 note 2} Op. cit., ch. 22, J. 16 p. 14b 11. 3–4. There are two further translations of this chapter which may be consulted: (a) by Prof. Duyvendak, J. J. L., T'oung Pao vol. xxiii (1924) pp. 221–254CrossRefGoogle Scholar, (b) by Prof. Mei, Y. P., Philosophy East and West vol. i no. 2, 07, 1951, pp. 51–66. Both contain the Chinese text.Google Scholar

^{page 552 note 3} Loc. cit., p. 1b 11. 7–8.

^{page 552 note 4} Op. cit., ch. 19 J. 13 p. 1a 11. 4–5.

^{page 552 note 5} Op. cit., ch. 9, J. 5 p. 13a 1. 8; also ch. 10, J. 6 p. 5a 1. 7.

^{page 552 note 6} Op. cit., ch. 10, J. 6 p. 2a 11. 2–6.

^{page 552 note 7} Op. cit., ch. 9, J. 5 pp. 12b–13a.

^{page 553 note 1} Op. cit., ch. 10, J. 6 pp. 1b 1. 8–2a 1. 1.

^{page 553 note 2} Although Shyuntzyy uses only the argument that the number of things fall short of that which would satisfy all the desires of all men to the full, he need not have relied completely on this. Even were there enough things to go round, there may still be strife when different people desire one and the same thing. For the solution of this sort of conflict, there need to be rules to establish the precedence of claims.

^{page 553 note 3} Loc. cit., J. 6 p. 2a 1. 7.

^{page 553 note 4} The cutting down of the number of desires is put forth in Mencius VIIB. 35 (J. 14 pp. 15a–bGoogle Scholar; Legge, , p. 497)Google Scholar, as the best means for nourishing the mind.

^{page 553 note 5} Op. cit., ch. 22, J. 16 p. 13a 1. 5–p. 13b 1. 3.

^{page 554 note 1} The word kee means (1) possible, and (2) morally permissible. The argument here is that we stop seeking a thing once we realize that it is impossible (i.e. unattainable). But then it is assumed that what has been established is that we stop seeking a thing once we realize that it is impermissible. This sliding from something which is at least plausible to something which is palpably false is, of course, unacceptable. Fortunately this defect in the argument is not of very great importance to our present purpose. It is enough that we do sometimes stop seeking a thing once we realize that it is morally impermissible though we may continue to desire it.

^{page 554 note 2} In some versions there are nine extra characters here: , ‘There are desires by nature, but the mind exercises control over them’. See Kubo Ai (Chikusui) , Junshi Zōchū , Kan 16 p. 13b.

^{page 554 note 3} Loc. cit., J. 16 p. 13b 11. 4–8.

^{page 555 note 1} ‘’, loc. cit., J.16 pp. 1b1.8—2a 1.3.

^{page 555 note 2} Loc. cit., J. 16 pp. 14a 11. 5–6, 1. 8—14b 1. 2.

^{page 556 note 1} The first half of this quotation has already appeared on p. 551, where the original Chinese text is given in n. 4. The Chinese text then goes on as follows: Op. cit., ch. 23, J. 17 P. 2b 11. 6–8; Legge, , p. 80.Google Scholar

^{page 556 note 2} Op. cit., ch. 10, J. 6 pp. 5a 1. 8—5b 1. 1. Read ‘dah lih ’ for ‘been lih ’.

^{page 556 note 3} Op. cit., ch. 9, J. 5 pp. 3b 1. 8—4a 1. 1.

^{page 557 note 1} Read

^{page 557 note 2} Op. cit., ch. 23, J. 17 pp. 10b–11b; Legge, , p. 85.Google Scholar

^{page 557 note 3} In chapter 21 ‘Jiee Bih ’, however, in answer to the question, ‘How does the mind get to know the Way (daw )?’ we are given what seems to be a general recipe for attaining knowledge of the daw, viz. emptying, unity and tranquillity (of the mind). This seems to dispense with the necessity of the sages as inventors of morality. As I have pointed out above (see p. 541, n. 1), the present text of Shyuntzyy is a very heterogeneous collection, and it is rather to be expected that there should be inconsistent views in different parts of the work. In our present case, the theory of mind and knowledge as found in chapter 21 is Taoist in flavour rather than Confucianist. See Yunru, Yang, Shyuntzyy Yanjiow (Gwoshyue Sheau Tsongshu , Commercial Press, 1933) pp. 58–62.Google Scholar

^{page 558 note 1} Op. cit., ch. 23, J. 17 pp. 11b–12b; Legge, p. 86.Google Scholar

^{page 559 note 1} The word I have here rendered as ‘really’ is liang . A word of explanation may not be out of place, as, since the Sonq philosophers, the phrase liangjy and liangneng have been taken to mean ‘original morally good knowledge’ and ‘original morally good capacities’. Ju Shi, for instance, says in his commentary, ‘By “liang” is meant “originally good”’ (Menqtzyy Jyijuh , SBBY ed. J. 15 p. 4b 11. 6–7). By the time of Wang Yang-Ming , this interpretation was so firmly established that liangjy liangneng, in the sense of the originally good knowledge and capacities, became the corner-stone of his whole philosophy. But there seems to be no good grounds for this interpretation. The normal adjective for ‘morally good’ is shann . Apart from twice being used as a personal name, liang occurs only twelve times in Mencius, of which seven times are in the combination liangren , which approximates very closely to the English phrase ‘good man’ in its idiomatic meaning of ‘husband’. This has nothing to do with the use of the word under discussion. Of the other five occurrences, two seem to mean not ‘morally good’ but ‘good of its kind’: (1) IIIB. 1 , ‘The best charioteer (lit. the best craftsman) under heaven’ (J. 6 p. 2a 11. 3–4; Legge, p. 263)Google Scholar; (2) VIB. 9 , ‘What is to-day called a good minister would in ancient times have been called a pest to the people’ (J. 12 p. 12b 1. 3; Legge, p. 440).Google Scholar In VIA. 17 (J. 11 p. 16a 1. 4; Legge, , p. 420)Google Scholar decidedly means ‘not truly (genuinely, really) noble’, while in IVA. 15 we have ‘Of what is in man there is nothing more genuine (i.e. incapable of deceit) than his eyes’ (J 7 p. 11b 1. 6; Legge, p. 306).Google Scholar Lastly in VIA. 8 we have ‘His letting go of his true (original) heart is like what is done to the wood by axes and bills’ (J. 11 p. 9a 1. 6; Legge, pp. 407–8).Google Scholar These last three passages point to the use of the word liang as meaning ‘truly, genuinely, really’. I have therefore followed Peir Shyuehae in extending this interpretation to the present passage. (See Menqtzyy Jenqyih Buujenq , in Gwoshyue Luenntsong vol. ii no. 2, pp. 188–9, Tsing Hua University, 1930).Google Scholar The gloss given by Jaw Chyi in his commentary is shenn (very, greatly), which would give an interpretation of liangjy and liangneng as ‘know well (best)’ and ‘to be well (best) able to do’, which does not differ materially from the present one.

^{page 560 note 1} Mencius VIIA. 15, J. 13 pp. 6a–6bGoogle Scholar; Legge, p. 456.Google Scholar

^{page 560 note 2} See above, p. 547.

^{page 560 note 3} Mencius did not compare moral behaviour with sexual behaviour, but I have chosen it as an illustration because, when Gawtzyy said, ‘Sex and eating are human nature’, Mencius did not dispute the statement (VIA. 4, J. 11 p. 3a; Legge p. 397), for his view was not that sex and eating are not human nature, but that human nature is not merely sex and eating. As he accepted sex as part of original human nature, and sex in Mencius' day could only have been understood in the narrow sense of sex behaviour between man and woman, his view of sex must have been the common sense one assumed here. Needless to say, my point here has nothing whatever to do with modern psychological views about sex.

^{page 561 note 1} Something of this kind can be seen in the contemporary issue between the Sociological school of moral theory which claims that morality has grown out of tribal custom and the Intuitionist school which holds that morality is part of the nature of things. Great importance seems to be attached to this issue. See, for instance, SirRoss, David, The Bight and the Good (Oxford, 1930) pp. 12–14.Google Scholar The reason why Ross feels so strongly about the matter seems to be found in the following quotation: ‘But beliefs have the characteristics which bodies have not, of being true or false, of resting on knowledge or of being the product of wishes, hopes, and fears; and in so far as you can exhibit them as being the product of purely psychological and non-logical causes of this sort, while you leave intact the fact that many people hold such opinions you remove their authority and their claim to be carried out in practice.’ (p. 13Google Scholar, my italics.)

^{page 562 note 1} It is interesting to note in this connexion that it is never very clear whether in Shyuntzyy's view one particular sage king invented morality or a number of sage kings invented it. It would be difficult to know what the other sage kings were responsible for, if only the first was responsible for the invention. It is equally difficult to see how a number of sage kings coming at fairly long intervals could have been jointly responsible for the invention. This seems to be a case of the form of a particular language being the cause for a philosopher failing to make an important distinction by not requiring such a distinction to be made, for, as there is no ‘number’ in Chinese, it was unnecessary for Shyuntzyy to make any distinction between ‘sage king’ and ‘sage kings’. The same linguistic form being used in both cases, Shyuntzyy had no need to think clearly even to himself whether it was one or more. If he had been aware of the need for making such a distinction and the difficulty involved in saying specifically that morality was invented at a definite time by a particular sage, he might have had second thoughts about the theory of its being invented at all.

^{page 562 note 2} See Shyuntzyy, ch. 23, J. 17 p. 4bGoogle Scholar; Legge, p. 81.Google Scholar

^{page 562 note 3} Loc. cit., p. 3a; Legge, p. 80.Google Scholar

^{page 562 note 4} See above, p. 555.

^{page 563 note 1} Mencius VA. 7, J. 9 p. 13b 11. 5–6; Legge, p. 363Google Scholar; VB. 1, J. 10 p. 1b 11. 4–5; Legge, p. 370.Google Scholar

^{page 563 note 2} Op. cit., J. 11 p. 8b 11. 1–4 Legge, pp. 406–7.Google Scholar

^{page 563 note 3} When the king, after he had spared an ox about to be sacrificed because he could not bear seeing the poor animal going to its death, ordered that a lamb be substituted, he was suspected by the common people of being parsimonious, and had to admit that on the surface the affair must have looked so to the people and that he was really unable to say exactly what his motive was. Mencius pointed out to him that there was a difference between sending the lamb to its death and sending the ox. The king had seen the ox trembling at its imminent fate but he had not seen the lamb. The king then said, ‘I did the act, and yet, when I looked into my own heart, I failed to discover my own intention. You say it for me and I feel within me that you have hit upon what I was really after’. (Op. cit., IA. 7, J. 1 pp. 9a ff.; Legge, pp. 137 ff.)Google Scholar

^{page 564 note 1} Op. cit., VIA. 1, J. 11 p. 1; Legge, p. 394.Google Scholar

^{page 564 note 2} Op. cit., IVB. 14, J. 8 p. 5a; Legge, pp. 322–3.Google Scholar

^{page 564 note 3} Op. cit., VIA. 10, J. 11 p. 11a 11. 6–7; Legge, p. 411.Google Scholar

^{page 564 note 4} Shyuntzyy, ch. 23, J. 17 pp. 3b–4aGoogle Scholar; Legge, pp. 80–1.Google Scholar

^{page 565 note 1} See above, p. 554, n. 1.