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Al-Bīrūnī's Arabic version of Patañjali's Yogasūtra: a translation of the fourth chapter and a comparison with related texts

  • Shlomo Pines and Tuvia Gelblum


The following study contains a translation of al-Bīrūnī’s rendering into Arabic of the fourth and last chapter of Patañjali’s Yogasūtra cum commentary. Our translation of the three preceding chapters was published in BSOAS, xxix, 2, 1966, 302–25 (henceforth abbreviated as BSOAS ch. I); BSOAS, XL, 3, 1977, 522–49 (henceforth abbreviated as BSOAS, ch. II); BSOAS, XLVI, 2, 1983, 258–304 (henceforth abbreviated as BSOAS, ch. III). This translation is based on Ritter’s edition of the Arabic text. Comparison has been made with the unique MS of Ritters Text: Kopriilii, 1589, fols. 412a–419a (written on the margins). We have also compared the text with parallel passages and expressions in al-Birunl's India.



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1 Ritter, H., ‘Al-Bīrūnīs Übersetzung des Yoga-Sītra des Patanjali’, Oriens, ix, 2, 1956, 165200 (henceforth abbreviated as R).

2 We refer to the pagination known to Ritter. Since then the pagination of the MS has been changed: fols. 417a–424a instead of fols. 412a–419a.

3 Kitāb fū tahqūq ma li’l-Hind or al-Būrīnt’s India {Arabic text), Hyderabad, 1958 (henceforth abbreviated as India, Hyd.).

4 Alias Pātañjalayogasūtrāni. Henceforth abbreviated as YS. References are made to the edition printed in P., Deussen, Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie, I, 3, Leipzig, 1908, 511–43 (abbreviated as Deussen). References to certain other editions are given in brackets where appropriate. References to Woods's translation, unless otherwise indicated, are to Woods, J. H., The Yoga-system of Patanjali, or the ancient Hindu doctrine of concentration of mind embracing the mnemonic rules, called Yoga-sutras, of Patanjali and the comment, called Yoga-bhdsya, attributed to Veda-vyasa and the explanation called Tattva-vdisdradt, of Vdchaspati-misra, Cambridge, Mass., repr., 1977.

5 The following commentaries have been used.

6 This sūtra may be translated: ‘The functions of the mind are permanently known, since their master, the self, is unmodifiable’. Cf. YS, sūtra 2.20, quoted and translated below. For the terminology employed in this sūtra cf. Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 3.12a: mahān prabhur vai purusah sattvasya pravartakah ‘A mighty master is the purusa, the instigator of the mind (saliva)…’; Maitri Upaniṣad 6.16:… prabhuḥ sākṣi…‘…the master, the witness…’.

7 The same technique occurs in quotations from Kitāb Sānka (‘The book of Sarikhya’) in India. Thus e.g. Hyd., p. 62,11. 1 seq.:…‘The hermit in the Kitāb Sānka asked:…; the sage said:…’ (cf. tr. Sachau, E. C., Alberuni's India, London, 1910, reprinted Delhi, 1964 (henceforth abbreviated as Sachau), I, 81). (Cf. the wordin this passage toin R, p. 169,1. 10 (BSOAS, ch. 1,1. 9)). Also cf. Hyd., p. 22,11. 13 seq. (Sachau, I, 30) and Hyd., p. 67,11. 11 seq. (Sachau, I, 89).

8 cf. India, Hyd., 61, 11.12–16:…. ‘…before liberation he existed in the world of entanglement, knowing the objects of knowledge only by a phantasmagoric kind of knowing which he had acquired by absolute exertion, whilst the object of his knowing is still covered, as it were by a veil. On the contrary, in the world of liberation all veils are lifted, all covers taken off, and obstacles removed. There the being is absolutely knowing, not desirous of learning anything unknown, separated from the soiled perceptions of the senses, united with the everlasting ideas’ (transl. Sachau, I, 81).

9 cf. Caraka-samhitd, Śārirasthānam, 1.83b: sarve bhāvā hi sarveṣām bhūtānām ātma-sākūikāḥ ‘For in every creature the self is the witness of all the states (of mind)’.

10 For the use of paśyati here cf. Mahābhārata, crit. ed., 12.296.9 (quoted below, n. 11).

11 cf. idem, art. ‘Sarikhya’ in Hastings's Encyclopaedia of religion and ethics, Edinburgh, 1920, vol. 11, 191–2: ‘The soul continues to exist individually in the state of emancipation, i.e. of final separation from matter; but it abides in eternal unconsciousness, since, indeed, the material basis necessary for all the processes of knowledge and experience is wanting’. Also cf. Mahābhārata, 12.296.9b, crit. ed.: kevalam pañcaviṃśaṃ caturvimsam na paśyati. This is rendered by Majumdar, A. K., The Sāṅkhya conception of personality, or a new interpretation of the Sāṅkhya philosophy, 1930, University of Calcutta, Calcutta, 126: ‘The twenty-fifth (i.e. the individual purusa), when [he] becomes free, no longer sees the twenty-fourth category (prakrti)…’. In fact, however, as proposed by Edgerton, F., The beginnings of Indian philosophy, London, 1965, 318, one ought to read here ca, with several MSS, for na, ‘not’. Accordingly Edgerton translates: ‘…he only [kevalam] sees the twenty-fifth and the twenty-fourth (the individual soul and the primal matter)’, taking the verse as a whole to refer to the state before liberation, before the twenty-sixth (i.e. absolute brahman) is ‘seen’ as well. (An alternative translation, retaining the na, is the one provided by Deussen, , Vier philosophische Texte des Mahābhāratam, Leipzig, 1906, 634: ‘Weder den Absoluten [kevalam] noch den Fünfundzwanzigsten schaut das Vierundzwanzigste’).

12 This statement is not borne out by the extant Arabic text of al-Bīrūnī's translation of the YS. There is some similarity between the passage that follows and India, Hyd., p. 58, 1. 5–p. 61, 1. 6:

‘In the book of Patanjali the way to salvation is divided (the text has; we read:) into three parts:

(1) The practical one (consisting) in the gradual habituation of the senses to turn away from what is external to what is internal so that you are only preoccupied with your (own) self..

(2) (Sachau's, edition of India, London, 1987, p. 39,1. 4, as well as Hyd. p. 60,1. 7, have. The readingis adopted here. Cf. R, p. 172,1. 1; BSOAS, ch. I, p. 317,1. 5). The intellectual (way consists) in the knowledge that the changeable existents and the forms which are (destined) to pass away are bad, so that the heart conceives a disgust for them, and longing for them ceases. (In this way) one may transcend the three primary forces which are the cause of actions and their diversity...

(3) It is fitting that (this way) should be an instrument for the (other) two. It (consists in) worship with a view to God's granting the achievement of liberation and to His making one fit for a mould in which gradual progress towards beatitude may be achieved...

(These three parts) are followed by a fourth one (lit.: fourth part), which is based on false beliefs. It is called rasāyana and it (consists in) procedures (involving various) drugs similar to those (used) in alchemy for the achievement of (things) that (by their nature) are impossible….’ The Hyd. edition as well as Sachau's edition havewhich seems to be incorrect. The correct reading may be either‘they are followed by a fourth part’, or‘He made them to be followed by a fourth part’. The reference in both readings would evidently be to Kitāb Patañjali, i.e. the YS.

The first ‘three parts’ referred to in this passage seem to correspond to the ‘three ways’ described in al-Bīrūnī's translation of the YS (see respectively R, p. 171,1. 15; p. 172,1. 1; p. 173,1. 9; BSOAS, ch. I, p. 316, 1. 13; p. 317, 1. 5; p. 319,1. 10). Al-Bīrūnī's above description concerning the fourth part, i.e. rasāyana (cf. also India, Hyd., p. 150,1. 9), poses a problem because: (a) he speaks in the first place about three parts only, and a fourth part seems to be superadded; and (b) nothing in the YS (or in the available commentaries) or in al-Bīrūnī's translation thereof seems to correspond to this part. Several solutions to this problem may be proposed but none of them can be substantiated. The question remains open.

For the expressionhere in Q 57, cf. the term saṅkalpa-siddhi used by Vy. on YS, sūtra 4.1 in order to explain the siddhis produced by tapas (‘ascetic practices’). One of the meanings of saṅkalpa is ‘intention’, i.e. the Arabicoccurring in the phrase which has just been quoted. However, in the recension of Vyāsa's commentary available to us saṅkalpa-siddhi is explained as meaning kāma-rūpī yatra tatra kāāma-ga ity evam-ādi’ ‘among other things, the capacity to assume any shape that one desires (or) to go wherever one wishes’.

It may be noted that Vijñānabhikṣu in his Yogasārasahgraha, op. cit., p. 59, 11. 10–11 uses the expression saṅkalpa-yogaja-dharmābhyām which appears to mean ‘dharmas produced by either sahkalpa or yoga’. The term dharma here appears to mean a quality leading to the acquisition of siddhis. Consequently Vijñānabhiksu appears to consider that saṅkalpa which may mean ‘intention’ (as well as yoga which may mean samādhi) can bring about the acquisition of siddhis. Thus the term saṅkalpa as employed by Vijñāanabhikṣu above corresponds to al-Bīrūnī's‘intention’ regarded as producing siddhis.

The five kinds of siddhis of YS, sūtra 4.1 are paralleled by the five Buddhist ṛddhis of Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakósa, as pointed out by La, Vallée-Poussin, ‘Le Bouddhisme et le Yoga de Patañnjali’, Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques, Brussels, v, 19361937, 241–2: ‘Les facultés magiques sont innées ou produites par la naissance (janma), produites par les herbes (oṣsadhi), les formules (mantra), la pénitence (tapas), la concentration (samādhi).—Comparer Kośa, vii, 122: La ṛddhi est: 1. née de la méditation (bhāvanā = samādhi); 2. obtenue par le fait même de la naissance (upapattilābhikā = janmajā); 3. faite par les formules ou “sciences” (vidyā, mantra); 4. faite par les herbes; 5. néee de l'acte (karmajā).’ The term karma (a word which can also have the meaning ‘ritual act, act of worship’) appears to correspond to tapas. This is confirmed by the fact that in the Bhagavadgītā karma in 5.11 seems to correspond to tapas in 17.14–16. 5.11 reads:

kāyena manasd buddhyd kevalair indriyair api/

yoginaḥ karma kurvanti saṇgaṃ tyaktvdtma-suddhayej /

‘Yogins do their acts with body, mind, spirit, and even the senses disengaged, in order to purify the self, without any interest in the acts themselves’ (transl. van Buitenen, J.A.B., The Bhagavadgītā in the Mahābhārata, Chicago, 1981). 17.14–16 reads:

deva-dvija-guru-prajña-pūjanaṃ śaucam ārjavamj

brahmacaryam ahiṃsā ca śariram tapa ucyate//

anudvega-karaṃ vākyam satyaṃ priya-hitaṃ ca yat/

svādhyādyābhyasanaṃ caiva vahmayaṃ tapa ucyate//

manaḥ-prasādaḥ saumyatvaṃ maunam ātma-vinigrahaḥ/

bhāva-saṃsuddhir ity etat tapo mānasam ucyate//

’ Askesis of the body comprises homage to gods, brahmins, gurus, and sages; purity; uprightness; continence; and non-violence. Askesis of speech comprises speech that does not hurt, is veracious, pleasant, and beneficial, as well as recitation of the daily lesson. Askesis of the mind comprises serenity of mind, gentleness, taciturnity, self-control, and inner purity’ (trans, van Buitenen, op. cit.). This is the only passage in the Bhagavadgītā to which the following account in India (Hyd., pp. 60 seq.) seems essentially to correspond:

‘The author of the book Gītā distributes the duties of worship [] among the body, the voice, and the heart.

‘What the body has to do is fasting, prayer, the fulfilment of the law, the service towards the angels and the sages among the Brahmans, keeping clean the body, keeping aloof from killing under all circumstances, and never looking at another man's wife and other property.

‘What the voice has to do is is the reciting of the holy texts, praising God, always to speak the truth, to address people mildly, to guide them, and to order them to do good.

‘What the heart has to do is to have straight, honest intentions[], to avoid haughtiness, always to be patient, to keep your senses under control, and to have a cheerful mind’ (transl. Sachau, I, 80). Evidently al-Bīrūnī uses here the termto render tapas. On tapas as belonging to ritual methods for achieving contact with a deity cf. the juxtaposition of tapas with svādhyādya and īśvara-praṇidhāna in YS, sūtra 2.1, and see BSOAS, ch. II, p. 530, n. 15.

In conclusion, it would not be implausible to suggest that in Q 57 the termcorresponds to tapas of YS, sūtra 4.1. Accordingly all the Sanskrit terms in this sutra seem to be accounted for in the Arabic text of Q 57 and the answer to it, taken together. The ‘first’ way in the Arabic version of the YS (in the Answer to Q 57) corresponds to janma; the ‘second’ way—to mantra; the ‘third’ way—to ośadhi; the ‘fourth’ and ‘fifth’ ways refer to the two ways mentioned in the question, which in turn correspond to tapas and samādhi respectively.

For(‘sincere intention’) in Q 57 cf. Śaṇkara's gloss on bhāva-saṃśuddhi in the above quoted passage from the Bhagavadgītā (17.16): parair vyavahāra-kāle ’māyāvitvam ‘absence of guile when dealing with other people’. (Also cf. bhāva-sudhiṃ and bhāva-sudhitā in Asoka's Seventh Rock Edict (Girnar), 11. 2–3, E. Hultzsch, Inscriptions ofAsoka, Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum, I, Oxford, 1925, 13.)

13 . Hereseems to mean the state of the siddha, i.e. the ascetic endowed with siddhis, whileappears to signify siddha. Cf. our note in BSOAS, ch. III, p. 285, n. 172, and in particular the following passage from India (quoted loc. cit.):

‘The zahid'm this world with no knowledge acquires transcendence (over the guṇas; cf. Hyd., p. 60, 11. 8–9:) and reward but is not liberated…and if he is satisfied with acquiring the above-mentioned eight qualities (the Hyd. edition has; Sachau's edition has; the correct reading seems to be; the eight siddhis seem to be referred to), and glories in, and is successful through, them and regards them liberation, is left with them (only).’ (Forread(‘rejoice in’)? Cf. R, p. 191, 1. 17). Also cf. the definition of siddha in India, Hyd., p. 70,1. 19 seq.:

Siddha is he who has attained by his action the faculty to do in the world whatever he likes, but who does not exert himself on the path leading to liberation’ (Sachau, I, 93).

corresponds to siddhayaḥ in YS, sūtra 4.1. The sūtra reads: janmauṣadhi-mantra-tapaḥ-samādhi- jāḥ siddhayaḥ ‘The siddhis are produced by means of (1) birth, (2) herbs, (3) spells, (4) ascetic practices or (5) concentration.’ For the juxtaposition of oṣadhi with mantra here cf. Bhagavadgītā 9.16:…aham auṣadhaṃ mantro ’ham…‘(The Lord said:)…“I am the herbal extract (i.e. Soma; cf. ibid., 15.13), I am the (efficacious) formula…” Also cf. the following verse from Śivadharmottara quoted in Śarikara's Bhāṣya on Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 1.1 (Gorakhpur n.d., Gītā Press, 46):

mantrauṣadhi-balair yāvaj jīryate bhakṣitam viṣsam/

tadvat sarvāṇi pāpāni jīryante jñāninaḥ kṣaṇāt//

‘Just as poison when taken is dissipated by the powers of spells and herbs, so all sins of a man of insight are dissipated instantaneously.’ Also cf. Dandiṇḍ's Daśakumāracarita, Pīthikā 1, Ucchvāsa 1, last paragraph: maṇi-mantrauṣadhi-māyā-prapañca-cañcutvam, ‘skill in the realm of (acquiring) wondrous powers (by means of) jewels, spells and herbs’. On the effectiveness of incantations and herbs see Vāc. and Vij. on YS, sūtra 1.24; Vātsyāyana on Nyāyasūtra 2.1.69; Mādhava's, Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha, ch. Cārvākadarśana, ed. Vārāṇasī, , 1964, 21. On the meaning of the term mantra in general see Gonda, J., ‘The Indian Mantra’, Oriens, 16, 1963, 244–97. See also ed. Mantra, H. P. Alpert (Albany, N.Y., 1989).

14 Ritter's printed text has. This seems to be a misprint, the correct reading according to the MS beingCf. R, p. 173,1.9; p. 177,1. 15 for al-Bīrūnī's use of the term. The only Sanskrit term in sūtra 4.1 which may correspond tois mantra, ‘spell, incantation’. The term īśvarapraṇidhāna (v.l. for īśvara-prasāda, ‘God's grace’, which occurs in the Ānandāśrama printed text) may possibly be a closer parallel than mantra, as far as meaning is concerned. The term occurs in connexion with a discussion involving the siddhis in Vy. on YS, sūtra 3.6: īśvara-praṇidhānāj jitottara-bhgūmikasya ca nādhara-bhūmiṣu para-citta-jñānādiṣu samyamo yuktaḥ kasmāt tadarthasyānyata evāvagatatvāt ‘For one who has achieved the higher stages through the directing of his mind to God, there is no point in applying Discipline with regard to the lower stages (represented by perfections) such as knowledge of the mind of another person, since the purpose of this (i.e. of the latter) will have been achieved by other means (we read anyala eva, with the Ānandāśrama printed text instead of anyalhaiva which occurs in some MSS) (i.e. by the directing of his mind to God).’ Also cf. Vijñānabhikṣu's following remark, in discussing this sūtra in his Yogasārasaṅgraha (ed. G., Jha, Bombay, 1894, 61 (85–6)):prahlādālnāṃ bhaktyādi-janya-siddhayas ca tapaḥ-siddhi-madhye praveśanīyāḥ ‘Those perfections, belonging to Prahlāda and others, which are produced by devotion (bhakti) etc., are to be (considered as) included in (the category of) the perfections produced by ascetic practices.’ (For the narrative of Prahlāda's fearless devotion to Viṣṇu who endowed him with extraordinary protection from his persecuting father see Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, Book I, ch. xvii seq.; cf. India, Hyd., 302 seq.; transl. Sachau, I, 364 seq.). See also n. 22 below. Also cf. the reference to stuti (‘praise’), abhivādana (‘salutations’) and śraddhā (‘faith’) by Vy. on YS, sūtra 4.10 as means of perfecting the mind and increasing its powers.

15 The MS has(‘pure and devout’). We accept Ritter's reading. In this context these two words seem to be synonymous. Cf. R, p. 192, 1.20 seq.: As long, therefore, as the heart has not yet achieved a purification similar to that of the soul..; (BSOAS, ch. III, 265).

16 In R, p. 183,1. 3 al-Bīrūnī appears to use the termto render the Sanskrit śauca, ‘purity’.

17 Cf.R, p. 176,1.4.

18 may reflect a description of the term tapas of YS, sūtra 4.1. Cf. Bhagavadgītā, 17.16: manaḥ-prasādaḥ…maunam ātma-vinigrahaḥ…tapo mānasam ucyate ‘Serenity of mind…taciturnity, self-restraint…—these are called mental ascetic practices’.

19 Cf. R, p. 189, 1. 5.

20 Cf. upabhoga, ‘enjoyment’ as used, in the expression svargopabhoga ‘enjoyment of heaven’, by Vāc. under YS, sūtra 4.1. Also cf. al-Bīrūnī's use ofin R, p. 177,1. 14.

21 This corresponds to janma in YS, sūtra 4.1. Vy, adloc. explains janma as dehāntaritā, ‘(the fact of) having entered (another) body’. He apparently refers to entering another body after a life, terminated by death, in which the person who has acquired merit stands to achieve siddha-hood. Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda makes here the following comment: dehāntaritā yathā yogādinā dehāntareṣu svargādiṣu janma-siddhiḥ ‘(The fact of) having entered (another) body–as when through yoga (practices) etc. (one enters) another body in heaven or elsewhere. This is the perfection of birth’. Also cf. Bhagavadgītā, 6.40 seq. For the distinction between achievement by birth and achievement by means resorted to in the current life cf. YS, sūtra 1. 19 as interpreted by Vij.

22 This should correspond to mantra in YS, sūtra 4.1. In fact, however, there does not appear to be any correspondence between the Arabic phrase and the Sanskrit text. Nor do the Sanskrit commentaries point to a way of resolving this difficulty. In consequence we propose somewhat hesitantly to amend the Arabic(‘good (deeds)’) to(‘hymns’). From the graphical point of view this emendation presents some difficulty but does not seem to be wholly implausible. Cf. alsoin R, p. 177, 1. 15 seq.:

‘As for the way of attaining it, in the case of the striving (aspirant), and the way of return to it, in the case of the one who forfeited it, it consists in the steadfast performance of acts of worship and in tiring the body, i.e. fasting, prayer, chants of praise and recitations whereby reward and recompense are attained, and all that is directed towards the essence of God, may He be exalted, and by means of which one may come near Him’ (BSOAS, ch. II, 522, Answer to Q 24), Cf. also Vy, on YS, sūtra 2.1: svādhyāyaḥ praṇavādi-pavitrāṇām japaḥ…‘Recitation (svādhyāya) consist in the repetition of purificatory formulas such as “Om”…’. Cf. also al-Bīrūnī's use of the expressionin India (Hyd., p. 61, 1. 1; cf. transl. Sachau, i, 80) in giving an account of the conception of ‘worship’ in the Bhagavadgītā (cf. op. cit., 17.14–16). Cf. R, p. 173,1. 10 (cf. BSOAS, ch. I, 319, Ans. to Q 11). Cf. BSOAS, ch. II, p. 530, n. 15; see also n. 14 above.

23 . In a Sanskrit commentary available to al-Bīrūunī the term vidyā, ‘knowledge, magic skill’, may have been associated with mantra.

24 This corresponds to the Sanskrit oṣadhi in YS, sūtra 4.1. Vy. ad loc. interprets oṣadhi as rasāyana. The latter term refers to a pseudo-science which by and large corresponds to alchemy. Rasāyana is also related to Āyurveda medicine, where it forms one of its traditional eight branches (cf. Zimmer, H., Hindu medicine, Baltimore, 1948, 90; Filliozat, J., The classical doctrine of Indian medicine, English transl., Delhi, 1964, p. 12, n. 3). Different aspects of its practice are described by commentaries ad loc. Thus Vy.: oṣadhibhir asura-bhavaneṣu rasāyanety evam-ādiḥ ‘By herbs, i.e. by rasāyana (practised or: produced) in the dwellings of demons’ (whereas the perfections due to ‘birth’ belong to the devas, ‘gods’; cf. Vijñānabhikṣu's Yogasārasaṅgraha, op. cit., 61 (85)). This terse comment by Vyāsa is further expounded by Vāc: manuṣyo hi kutaścin nimittād asurabhavanam upasamprāptah kamanīyābhir asura-kanyābhir upanītam rasāyanam upayujyājarāmaraṇatvam anyaś ca siddhīr āsādayati, ihaiva vā rasāyanopayogena yathā māṇḍavyo munī…‘When a human being, having, for some reason or other, approached the mansions of the demons, uses the elixir of life (rasāyana) offered to him by the charming virgin daughters of the demons, he attains immunity from decay and from death and other (such) perfections; or (this perfection may be had even) in this very world by use of an elixir of life, as (exemplified by) the case of Māṇḍavya…’. Vij. ad loc. explains Vyāsa's comment as referring to ‘the production of an elixir of life consisting of a medicinal substance (extracted from) herbs’ (rasāyanaṃ yad oṣadhi-dravyaṃ tadudbhaveti). Bhoja ad loc, however, explains: oṣadhi-siddhayo yathā pdradādi-rasāyanādy-upayogāt ‘The perfections of herbs–as (for instance) by the use of (means) such as the elixir of life (consisting of) e.g. quicksilver’. Finally, Vijñānabhikṣu, discussing the sutra in question in his Yogasārasaṅgraha (op. cit., 61 (85)) provides a rather comprehensive characterization: asurādīnāṃ cauṣadha-siddhir mahābalavātlvādih suvarṅādi-siddhiś ca ‘To the demons belong the perfection produced by herbal extracts, such as the possessing of immense strength (reading mahā-balavattva with a MS instead of the printed mahā-balatva) and the perfection of (the transmutation of baser metals into) gold’. In al-Bīrūnī's translation here rasāyana seems to be identified with herbs (cf. India, Hyd., p. 150,1. 5, quoted below in the present note). The term rasāyana occurs also in a passage in India (Hyd., 58–61, quoted above, n. 12) in which al-Bīrūnī proposes to give an account of four ways leading not to the acquisition of siddha-hood as in the passage under discussion, but to achieving liberation (i.e. mokṣa). On the beliefs concerning rasāyana see India, Hyd., p. 150,1. 2 seq.:

‘They have a science similar to alchemy which is quite peculiar to them. They call it Rasāyana, a word composed with rasa, i.e. gold. It means an art which is restricted to certain operations, drugs, and compound medicines, most of which are taken from plants. Its principles restore the health of those who were ill beyond hope, and give back youth to fading old age, so that people become again what they were in the age of puberty; white hair becomes black again, the keenness of the senses is restored as well as the capacity for juvenile agility, and even for cohabitation, and the life of people in this world is extended to a long period. And why not? Have we not already mentioned on the authority of Patañjali(…) that one of the methods leading to liberation is Rasāyana? What man would hear this, being inclined to take it for truth, and not dart off in foolish joy and not honour the master of such a wonderful art by popping the choicest bit of his meal into his mouth? ‘(Sachau, trans. I. p. 188–9). Cf. Suśrula, Cikitsitasthānam, ch. 29, p. 167 (ed. Madhusudana, Gupta, Calcutta, 1836, vol. II): oṣadhīnāṃ patiṃ somam upayujya vicakṣaṇah/daśa-varṣa-sahasrāṇi navaṃ dhārayate tanum ‘Having used soma, the chief of (medicinal) herbs, a wise (person) carries a new (i.e. youthful; we read navaṃ instead of navān of the printed text) body for ten thousand years.’ Also cf. the chapter ‘raseśvara-darśanam ’ in Sāyaṇa-Mādhava's Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha, where quicksilver is described as having a soteriological function. Cf, also Filliozat, J., ‘Al-Bīrūnī et l'alchimie indienne’, Al-Būrūnī Commemoration volume, Calcutta, Iran Society, 1951, 101–5; Zvelebil, K. V., The poets of power, London, 1973. For further references and bibliography see Eliade, M., Yoga, immortality and Freedom, 2nd ed., Princeton, 1969, 273 seq.; 418–19.

25 The reference by A. Roṣu in his ‘Yoga et alchimie’, ZDMG, Band 132, Ht. 2, 1982, 369 to ‘cinq voies soteriologiques’ as if they were mentioned by al-Bīrūnī in Q 57 of his translation of the YS is inexact: evidently al-Bīrūnī speaks in this question of five ways of acquiring, i.e. siddha-hood and not ofi.e. liberation (see n. 13 above).

It may, however, be noted that in India al-Bīrūnī gives an account of Kitāb Pātañjali in which rasāyana is described as leading towards liberation (). Al-Bīrūnī may have found this view in the commentary on the YS which he used. Cf. Maṇniprabhā (introduction to the fourth chapter): tṛtīye … siddhayaś coktāḥ, tatra kāścid atītānāgata-jñanādi-siddhayaḥ śraddhā-dvārā kaivalya-yogasyāṇgam, kāścid indriya-jayādayaḥ sākṣād aṅgam ‘… and perfections were described in the third chapter; among these certain perfections, such as the knowledge of the past and future, are aids to the yoga of kaivalya (i.e. of liberation), by means of faith; others, such as subdual of the sense-faculties, are immediate aids.’ Here the term śraddhā apparently corresponds to(‘worship’) and indriya-jaya—to(‘withdrawal from sensibilia and control of the senses’) in Q 57. (On the various meanings of śraddhā cf. Minoru, Hara, ‘MNotes on two religious terms–bhakti and śraddhā’, III, 7, 1, 19631964, 124–45; Hacker, P., ‘sraddhā’, Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Oslasiens und Archiv für indische Philosophic 7, 1963, 151–89. For further bibliography on this term see Smith, W. Cantwell, Faith and belief, Princeton, 1979, 209.) The phrase(‘you said previously’) here in Q 57 may reflect Vyāsa's remark: samādhi-jāḥ siddhayo vyākhyātāḥ ‘The perfections produced by concentration have (already) been explained (in YS, chapter III, sūtras 16–19, 21–36, 39–42, 51; cf. Vāc. ad loc: adhastane pāde ‘in the preceding chapter’)’ (Vy. on YS, sūtra 4.1). Also cf. below in the Arabic text (Answer to Q 57, R, p. 183, 1. 9):(‘The fourth and the fifth (ways) are those (characterized) in the first place’).

26 The fourth and the fifth ways are characterized in the question (as distinct from the answer) 57. As regards the fifth way, i.e. the siddhis produced by samādhi, Vy. on YS, sūtra 4.1 confirms al-Bīrūnīs statement that the siddhis in question have already been described: samādhi-jāḥ siddhayo vyākhyātāḥ ‘The perfections produced by samādhi have (already) been explained’. Al-Bīrūnī's assertion that not only the fifth but also the fourth way has been previously referred to may possibly be due to his misunderstanding a text somewhat similar to the one found in Nāgesśa Bhaṭṭa's Bhāṣyacchāyā on YS, sūtra 4.1: tapasā saṅkalpa-siddhis tapo-janyā sā samādhi-jās vyākhyātāḥ ‘By ascetic practices (is achieved) the perfection of saṅkalpa (‘intention’; see above, n. 12), i.e. that which is produced by ascetic practices; as for the products of concentration they have already been described’. If a phrase such as this were slightly altered it could be interpreted as meaning that the siddhis produced by tapas as well as those produced by samādhi had been previously referred to.

27 The MS and Ritter's printed text have. We propose to read.

28 Ritter's reading of this word which is not clear in the MS appears to be correct. India, Hyd., p. 42, 11. 11–12:Also cf. loc. cit. 11. 13–15:. And cf. R, p. 180, 1.6 and R, 189,1.9.

29 i.e. deva. Cf. in Vij. on YS, sūtra 4.1: aihikena karmaṇā devādi-dehāntare …’in entering a body (belonging to) another (genus) such as (the genus) of gods by virtue of (acquiring the respective) karma during the current life-time…’. Also cf. Vāc. ad loc.

30 Al-Bīrūnī usesto render any of the following: rākṣasa, asura, yakṣa. Cf. India, Hyd., p. 68, 1. 13 (cf. transl. Sachau, I, p. 90,1. 29); Hyd., p. 69,1. 19 (cf. transl. Sachau, I, p. 92, 1. 10). Cf. the mention of yakṣa in Maṇiprabhā on YS, sūtra 4.1: janmanā yakṣādīnām ākāśa-gamanīdi-siddhiḥ ‘the perfection of being capable of passing through the air by virtue of being born (into the relevant genus) belongs to yaksas, etc.’.

31 The wordoccurs in India in the following passage (Hyd., p. 68, 11. 16 seq.):

‘According to a famous popular view (among the Hindus), there are eight classes of spiritual beings: (1) The devas, i.e. angels, who inhabit the north. They especially belong to the Hindus … (2) The the religion of the Hindus and acts hostilely to the cows. Despite the near relationship which exists between them and the angels (devas), there is, as (the Hindus) maintain, no end of strife and fighting between them.’ (Cf. the expression daitya-dānaya-mardana, ‘crusher of the daityas and dānavas’, an epithet of Indra, the chief of the devas.)

For the general idea underlying the last phrase in the Answer to Q 58 cf. Bhagavadgītā, 14, 18:

ūrdhvaṃ gacchanti saltva-sthā madhye tiṣṭhanti rājasāḥ/

jaghanya-guṇa-vṛtta-sthā adho gacchanti tāmasāḥ//

‘Those abiding in sattva go upwards, those in rajas stay in the middle, those who abide in tamas, the lowest of the guṇas, go downwards’ (transl. van Buitenen). Ṥaiikara ad loc. comments on ūrdhvam gacchanti (‘go upwards’): deva-lokādiṣūtpadyante ’are born in the region of the gods etc.’ while Vallabha ad loc. comments on adhas (‘downwards’): tato ’dho-bhāga-rūpaṃ jaghanyatvena nirūpitaṃ sthānam atalādi yathāsurāṇāṃ vairocanādīnāṃ tatra sthitiḥ ‘A station located in a still lower region, characterized by being inferior, e.g. Atala, which belongs to demons (asuras) such as Vairocana’. Also cf. Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, 1.3.1: dvayā ha prājāpatyā devāṣ cāsurāṣ ca ‘Verily, there are two classes of prajāpati's creatures: devas and asuras’. Also cf. Bhagavadgītā 16.6(a): dvau bhūta-sargau lake ’smin āaiva dsura eva ca ‘There are two kinds of creation in this world, the divine and the demonic’.

The answer to Q 58 corresponds to YS, sūtra 4.2: jāty-antara-pariṇāmaḥ prakṛty-āpūrāt, ‘The transformation into another class (of beings) is due to a consolidation (or: preponderance, lit. ‘overflow, excess’) of (one of the) prakṛtis (i.e. of one of the three guṇas)’. The translation of āpūra as ‘consolidation’ is based on al-Bīrūnī's Arabic text as well as on one of the explanations of āpūra proposed by Vij. ad loc: āpūra-śabdenāpi prakṛtīnāṃ saṃhananam api grāhyam ‘Furthermore, the word āpūra is also to be taken to refer to the consolidation of the prakṛtis’. The word saṃhanana occurring in YS, sūtra 3.46 is rendered by al-Bīrūnī by(‘strengthening’). Consequently it seems probable that in this passage likewise al-Bīrūnī's termis a translation of saṃhanana. In the commentary used by al-Bīrūnī the expression prakṛtīnāṃ saṃhananam used by Vij. or some similar expression may have been employed in the sense of strengthening one of the three guṇas.

Vij.'s alternative explanation consists in distinguishing between āpūra, which does not wholly proceed from the yogī's will, and sahkalpa, in which only the yogī's volition is involved. For sahkalpa which is both cognitive and conative cf. BSOAS, ch. Ill, p. 292, n. 217.

For the understanding of prakṛti (constituent evolving cause) here as referring to the three guṇas cf. Bhāvāgaṇeśa on YS, sūtra 3.44: prakṛty-ākhyaṃ guṇa-trayaṃ cānvayākhyaṃ rūpaṃ sarvakāryeṣv anugatatvāl, ‘And the three guṇas, known as “the prakrtis”, constitute the aspect (of the five elements) which is known as “anvaya” (‘inherence, immanence’) by virtue of their persistence in (the constitution of) all (their) effects (i.e. products)’.

According to Vāc. as well as Vij. on YS, sūtra 4.2 the prakṛtis of the body (kāya) are the five elements, and that of the sense-faculties is asmitā (= ahaṃkara, ‘egoism, self-reference, the awareness “I am” ’) (also cf. Vāc. on YS, sūtra 3.25: prakṛitiḥ = paeñnca-tanmātrāṇi). However, see also Vy., Vāc, Vij. and Ṥankara-Bhagavatpāda on YS, sūtra 3.44 for the relation between the five elements and the three guṇas whereby the latter are inseparable from the former. Thus Vy., loc cit.: bhūtānāṃ caturthaṃ rūpaṃguṇā kārya-svabhāvānupatino ’nvaya-śabdenoktāḥ ‘The fourth aspect (of the five elements) consists of the three guṇas … which persist in the constitution of their effects (i.e. products) and are signified by the term anvaya’. Also cf. Vy. on YS, sūtra 3.47: caturthaṃ rūpaṃ … guṇāḥ yeṣām indriyāṇi sahāhaṃkārāṇi pariṇāmaḥ ‘The fourth aspect (of the sense-faculties) consists of the three guṇas …, the sense-faculties and the awareness “I am” being their modification’. Also cf. Sadāśivendra Sarasvatī on YS, sūtra 4.2: pradhānādayaḥ pṛthivy-antāḥ pṋaktayaḥ ‘What is referred to by prakṛtis begins with Primordial Nature and ends with the element Earth’

For,in the Arabic text (Ans. to Q 58) cf. jāti in YS, sūtra 4.2.

32 . Cf. R, p. 179, 1. 12. R, p. 189, 1. 9; R, p. 194, 11. 12, 14; R, p. 195, 11. 7, 16 and passim. Also cf. India, Hyd., p. 42, 11. 16 seq. Onandsee e.g. Schwarz, M., ‘Acquisition (kasb) in early Kalām’, Islamic philosophy and the classical tradition; essays presented to Richard Walzer (ed. Stern, S. M., Hourani, A. H. and V., Brown), Oxford 1972, 355–87. See also Shlomo Pines and Michael Schwarz, Yaḥya, ’ibn ‘Adī's refutation of the doctrine of acquisition (iktisāb)—edition, translation and notes on some of his other treatises, Studia Orientalia—Memoriae D. H. Baneth Dedicata, Jerusalem, 1979, pp. 62 seq.: ‘Some of the early Mu'tazila, out of a desire to describe God as just in rewarding and punishing men for their actions spoke of man as “creating” (khalaqa) his actions. Some early thinkers such as Dirār ’ibn ‘Amr took exception to this infringement of the prerogative of God as Sole Creator. When, in contradistinction to the Mu'tazila, they insisted that it is God who creates the human action, but nevertheless man performs it and will be taken to task for it, it was only natural that they expressed this “performing”, as distinct from “creating”, by the Qur'ānic kasb, which, as we have seen, denoted both action and responsibility. The more so as Dirār, and after him al-Najjār and al-Ash'arī and his school needed, in order to describe man's role in performing his own actions, created for him by God, a word which conveyed “action” but not “bringing into existence”. The normal Arabic word for “to act”, “to do“ fa'ala can also mean “to bring into existence”. Kasaba which does not convey this latter meaning was therefore preferred…. Abu'l-Husayn al-Najjār and Abu'l-Ḥasan al-Ash'arī (873–935) took over from Al-Dirār that human actions are created by God while man performs (kasaba, acquires) them. Like the Mu'tazila, al-Ash'arī and his school distinguished between voluntary and involuntary actions. But unlike them they did not consider the voluntary action to be created by its human agent. Al-Ash'arī distinguished between necessary (ḍarūra) actions such as “shaking from hemiplegia (falaj) and shivering from fever”, and “acquired” (kasb) actions such as “coming and going”.’

33 . Cf. R, p. 167, 1. 15 (cf. BSOAS, ch. I, p. 309, n. 58); R, p. 193,1.16; R, p. 175,1. 18; R, p. 184,1. 21. Also cf. R, p. 167, 1. 16:—’generation not according to the mode of (ordinary) birth’ (BSOAS, ch. I, 309; R, p. 189, 11.4–5:—‘If he wishes that he, except for his spirit, be transported in this entanglement, from his (own) body to another body …’ (BSOAS, ch. Ill, 262).

34 . This word, which appears in the MS as, has been left out by Ritter.

35 . This term appears to refer to sattva. Cf. R, 191, 11. 7–8:‘He transcends the three forces: the first two which (respectively) are pure good and pure evil, and the intermediate one as between the two’ (BSOAS, ch. Ill, 264, Ans. to Q50). Cf. Bhāvāgaṇeśa on YS, sūtra 4.2: dehendriya-kāraṇasāttvikādy-avayavopacayādbhavati ‘(The transformation into another genus) comes about through the strengthening (or, accummulation, increase) of the constituents endowed with sattva etc. which are the (material) cause of the body and sense-faculties.’

36 lit. ‘from his soul’.

37 . This term appears to refer to tamas. Cf. R, p. 191, 11. 7–8 (see n. 35 above).

38 lit. ‘from his soul’.

39 This corresponds to YS, sūtra 4.3: nimittam aprayojakaṃ prakṛtīnāṃ varaṇa-bhedas tu tataḥ kśetrikavat,‘The instrumental cause does not set in motion the prakṛtis (i.e. the guṇas) but removes with respect to the latter an obstruction, as (is done by) a cultivator.’ Cf. Vy. ad loc: yathā kśetrikaḥ kedārād apāṃ pūraṇāt kedārāntaraṃ piplāvayiṣuḥ samaṃ nimnarṃ nimnataraṃ vā nāpaḥ pāṇināpakarṣaty āvaraṇaṃ tv āsāṃ bhinatti tasmin bhinne svayam evāpaḥ kedārāntaram āplāvayanti tathā dharmaḥ prakṛtīnām āvaraṇam adharmaṃ bhinatti tasmin bhinne svayam eva prakṛtayaḥ svaṃ svaṃ vikāram āplāvayanti ‘Just as a cultivator who wishes to draw water from a fully watered field to another one which is on level with it, or lower relative to it, or to one that is (still) lower, does not draw away the water with his (own) hands but makes an opening in the obstruction, and the opening having been made the water flows by itself from one field to the other, similarly merit brings about an opening in the demerit which serves as an obstruction with regard to the prakṛtis (i.e. the guṇas), and this opening having been made each of the prakṛtis (i.e. guṇas) flows to its modification.’ In al-Bīrūnī's interpretation the purpose of removing the obstruction is to draw off the surplus of water rather than the watering of additional land. The expression apakarṣati lends itself to this interpretation. In reference to the guṇas this may be taken to signify that one may put an end to the preponderance of one of the guṇas.

40 Lit. ‘secondly’.

41 Bothused in the phraseandused here inmean an organic or living body.

42 For Q 60 cf. Bhoja, introduction to YS, sūtra 4.4: yadā … yogino yugapat karma-phalabhogāyātmīya-niratiśaya-vibhūty-anubhavād yugapad aneka-śarīra-nirmitsā jayate … ‘When … for the sake of exhausting (lit.: experiencing) his karma at one time the yogi desires to construct simultaneously several bodies in view of his mastery (lit.: experience) of unexcelled powers …’. Cf. Vācaspatimiśra's Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭākā in Nyāyadarśana of Gautama, ed. Anantalal, Thakur, Darbhanga, 1967, p. 156,11. 7 seq.: … yogarddhi-vaś;ād yugapad utpāditānekavidha-dehopbhogenāpy upapatteḥ … acintyo hi samādhi-prabhāva ity uktam ‘…since in virtue of the extraordinary powers attained by yoga it is also possible (for the sage to effect the dwindling away of his karma) by exhausting (lit.: experiencing) (it) simultaneously through various bodies (of his own) creation … the super-human powers attained by concentration are traditionally declared to be indeed surpassing thought.’ Also cf. op. cit., p. 27,1. 12 (cf. Jacobi, H, Über das ursprüngliche Yogasystem. Nachträge und Indices in Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie d. Wissenschaften, Phil.-hist. KL., 1930, 322). Also cf. Vy. ad loc: yadā tu yogi bahūn kāyān nirmimūte tadā kim eka-manaskās te bhavanty athāneka-manaskā iti ‘But when the yogī constructs many bodies, do these (bodies) have a single mind or have they several minds? ‘. Also cf. Vāc. ad loc: tatra nānyā-manastve kāyānāṃ praticittam abhiprāya-bhedād ekābhiprāyānurodhaḥ parasparaṃ pratisandhānaṃ ca na syātāṃ puruṣāntaravat, ‘In that case if the bodies be provided with more than one mind then the intention of each mind would be different from those of the others and consequently there would be no conformity to one mind as well as no interrelation of memories, just as in the case of disparate persons.’ Also cf. Vy. on YS, sūtra 3.14: nānya-dṃṣṭasya smaraṇam anyasyāstīti ‘What has been perceived by one cannot be remembered by another’.

43 Cf. YS, sūtra 4.4: nirmaṇa-cittāny asmitā-mātrāt, ‘The constructed minds (proceed) from (the awareness) “I am“ only’. Cf. Sāāṅkhyasūtra, sūtra 5.84: na bhūta-prakṛtitvam indriyāṇām ahaṃkārikatva-śruteḥ ‘The faculties (of cognition and action) are not constituted by the elements, since according to the scriptures they are produced from ahaṃkāra (the category of ego-awareness)’ Also cf. Vy. on YS, sūtra 3.47: … teṣāṃ tṛtīyam rūpam asmitā-lakṣaṇo ahaṃkāraḥ; asya sāmānyasyendriyāṇi viၛeṣāḥ ‘The third aspect of these (i.e. of the sense-faculties) is the (category of) ego-awareness—consisting of (the awareness) “I am”—which is the generic character of which the sense-faculties are the particulars.’

On the notion of nirmāṇa-citta cf. Vāyu-Purāṇa as quoted by Vāc. ad loc: Vy. on YS, sūtra 1.25. Also cf. Vātsyāyana on Gautama's Nyāyasūtra 3.2.19: yogī khalu ṛddhau prādur-bhūtāyāṃ vikāraṇa-dharmā nirmāya sendriyāṇi śarīrāntarāṇi teṣu yugapaj jneyāny upalabhate ‘Once the super-human powers are manifested (i.e. realized) in him, a yogī endowed with extrasensory perception may construct various bodies equipped with the (various sense-) faculties and may apprehend (with those bodies) (different) objects of cognition simultaneously.’ Also cf. Bādarāyaṇa's Brahmasūtra, 4.4.15: pradīpavad āveśaḥ; lathā hi darśayati ‘The entering (of one self into several other bodies) is analogous to the (case of the one) flame (lighting several other flames), for thus the scriptures declare.’ Cf. also Ṥaṅkara ad loc: eka-mano-’nuvartīni samanaskāny evāparāṅi śanīrāṇi satyasaṅkalpatvāt srakṅyati…eṣaiva ca yoga-śāstreṣu yoginām aneka-śarīra-yoga prakriyā ‘Through the realization of his act of wishful imagination (the sage) will create other bodies equipped with minds which function in accord with one particular mind … And this is the yogic procedure concerning the multiplication of bodies of yogīs as described in the doctrinal teachings of Yoga’. Also cf. the Buddhist concept of nirmāṇ-kāya (see e.g. Louis de La Vallée Poussin. ‘Studies in Buddhist dogma: The three bodies of a Buddha (trikdya)’ in JRAS, 1906, 943 seq.; Anesaki, M., ‘Docetism (Buddhist)’ in Hastings's, J.Encyclopaedia of religion and ethics, vol. IV, 839). Also cf. the concept of aupapādika-dehāḥ ‘(divine creatures) whose bodies are self-produced (i.e. without parent's sexual union)’ in Vy. on YS, sūtra 3.26 (see Vāc and Vij. ad loc). For further references concerning nirmāna-citta and related doctrines see Gopinath, Kaviraj, Aspects of Indian thought, (ch.: Nirmāṇakāya), Calcutta, 1966, 137ߝ7.

44 Cf. YS, sūtra 4.5: pravṛtti-bhede prayojakaṃ cittam ekam anekeṣām ‘While the functions (of the several bodies) are distinct there is a single mind that impels the several (bodies).’ The phrase ‘of the several bodies’ may be replaced by ‘of the several minds’, and the phrase ‘the several bodies’ by ‘the several minds’. Both interpretations occur in Bhoja ad loc. The first interpretation is adopted by Deussen; for the second see also Vy. ad loc.

45 Cf. YS, sūtra 4.6: tatra dhyāna-jam anāsayam ‘(The mind) produced by meditation is without (any) latent residuum; (for the term anắśaya, cf. YS, sūtras 1.24; 2.12.) Also cf. Bhoja, introducing this sūtra: janmādi-prabhavdc ciltdt samddhi-prabhavasya cittasya vailaksanyam …’ (With a view to point out) the distinction between a (constructed) mind produced by concentration and one produced by (any of the other four sources of perfections mentioned in sūtra 4.1) birth etc…’. While Vy. and Bhoja describe the superiority of the mind produced by meditation (dhyānd), which Bhoja identifies with concentration (samādhi), al-Bīrūnī refers to the superiority of the ‘way’ () which leads to the production of this type of mind (see Q and Ans. 61). For al-Bīrūnī's description of this way as consisting in controlling and suppressing the senses cf. Maṇiprabhā, introducing sūtra 4.1 (see n. 18 above) and Q 57 above in al-Bīrūnī's text. It is probable that al-Bīrūnī encountered this characterisation in the commentary used by him with reference to sūtra 4.6. Cf. Vij. ad loc.: yogenaiva jñānotpattyā vāsanoccheda-sambhavāt ‘For it is only by yoga that insight is generated bringing about the removal of the subliminal traces’. Also cf. Vāc. on YS, sūtra 4.5 (quoting the Vāyu-Purāṇa): prāpnuyād viṣayān kaiścit kaiścid ugram tapas caret ‘With some (of his constructed bodies) (Yogīśsvara) attains (the enjoyment of) sense-objects whereas with others he engages in severe ascetic practices’ (and cf. n. 18 above).

46 lit. ‘void, empty’.

47 lit. ‘void, empty’.

48 The answer to Q62 corresponds to YS, sūtra 4.7: karmāśuklākṛṣṇaṃ yoginas trividham itareṣṣm ‘The yogi's activity (karma, i.e. the traces of actions) is neither white nor black (whereas) that of others is of three kinds (white, black or mixed)’. Also cf. Bhagavadgītā 18.12:

aniṣṭam iṣṭam miśraṃ ca trividhaṃ karmaṇaḥ phalam/

bhavaty atyāgināṃ pretya na tu saṃnyāsināṃ kvacit//

‘Now, there are three kinds of fruits to an act: disagreeable, agreeable and mixed; but such is the karman of the non-renouncers hereafter, but never of the renouncers’ (transl. Van Buitenen). (The Arabic‘free (of involvement)’ may correspond to tyāgī or saṃnyāsī.)

For the statement(‘Consequently their hearts are divided because of the recompense or the retribution for the acquisition (of the action in question)’) cf. YS, sūtra 4.8. The sūtra reads: tatas tad-vipākānuguṇānām evābhivyaktir vāsanānām ‘Thence proceeds the manifestation of those traces (vāsanās) only which correspond to the fruition (of the various kinds of karma)’. Cf. also Vy. and Vāc. (with Rāghavānanda Sarasvatī) on YS, sūtra 1.24.

49 Lit. ‘a far one’.

50 . Cf. India, Hyd., p. 272, 1.10:‘Others maintain that the director (of the world) is karma, i.e. action’.

51 A parallel passage in India (quoting Q and Ans. 63), Hyd., p. 42,11. 13 seq., reads:

‘The action is attached to the spirit for it is the acquisition (of the spirit), and the body is the instrument of the latter’. This parallel passage hasinstead ofrefers to ‘deed’, i.e. the deed of the soul. According to both readings the body is an instrument of the soul. The notion that the body is an instrument of the soul has probably been taken over by al-Bīrūnī from the Aristotelian philosophy. See e.g. Aristotle, , De Anima, II, 1, 412bl. The Arabic term generally used (by al-Bīrūnī and others) to render the Greek organon is. Cf. e.g. the Arabic translation of Themistius's commentary on Aristotle's, De Anima, ed. Lyons, M. C, Oxford, 1973, Glossary, 234.

For the idea expressed in the sentence in Ans. 63 under consideration cf. also the following passage in India, Hyd., p. 37,11. 5 seq.:

‘…However, the action is attributed to the soul even though the latter has nothing to do with it. This is analogous to the case of a man who happens to get into the company of people unknown to him. They are robbers returning from a village they have raided and destroyed. He has scarcely walked with them a short distance when they are overtaken by avengers. Being thought to belong to that band this innocent man is dragged off together with them and treated precisely as they are; thus the same affliction befalls him, without his having participated in their action.’ (The Hyd. printed text haswe read:). Also cf. Bhagavadgītā 18.16:

tatraivaṃ sati kartāram ātmānaṃ kevalaṃ tu yaḥ/

paśyaly akṛta-buddhitvān na sa paśyali durmatiḥ//

‘This being the case, when one, out of failure to understand, regards his transcendent (kevalam) self as the agent of his actions, one is in error and does not see.’

52 . On the termsandcf. India, Hyd., p. 270, 11. 18 seq. This passage includes the following statement:‘(Muhammad ibn Zakariyyā al-Rāzī) considers that zamān and mudda differ in that (the former;, in contradistinction to the latter, is subject to number’. Also cf. op. cit., p. 272,11. 10 seq.:

‘In Viṣṇudharmottara (it is stated that) Vajra said to Mārkaṇḍeya: “Explain to me the times. He answered that duration () is ātma-puruṣa, i.e. the spirit—puruṣa being the lord of the universe. Then he began to explain to him the partial times and their masters as we mentioned in the respective chapters (in this book). The Hindus divided duration into two periods (or: moments): (a period of) motion, which measures time, and (a period of) rest, of which it is permissible (to hold) that it measures (time) by means of the imaginative faculty—a parallel (being drawn) between it and that which moves, which measures (in) a primary (manner). The aevum (dahr) of the Creator is, according to them, measured but not numbered, because of the denial of finiteness with regard to Him. (They believed this) although it is very difficult and impossible to imagine (something) that is measured but not numbered.’

In this passage of India, al-Bīrūnī ascribes to the Hindus views in which Aristotelian notions appear to be utilized. The word which al-Bīrūnī employs in speaking of the belief of the Hindus, according to which time measures motion and rest, is also used in the Arabic translation of Aristotle's Physics, 220b, 14f. Cf. Arisṭūtālis, , Al-Tabi'a, ed. Baddawi, A, Cairo, 1964, I, 442:‘For not only do we measure motion by time but also time by motion’ (is an emendation made in accordance with the Greek original; the Arabic printed text hasand). In Physics, Book IV, Aristotle speaks both of time being the number of motion and of its measuring motion. Al-Būrūnīs differentiation—in relation to the aevum of God—between what is numbered and what is measured may be due to this use of the two terms by Aristotle. The view ascribed to the Hindus by al-Bīrūnī, according to which rest as well as motion may be said to measure time was also held, according to the testimony of Simplicius and Sextus Empiricus, by the Greek philosopher Strabo of Lampsacus. It was also adopted by some Arabic and Jewish philosophers. See Pines, S., Nouvelles études sur Awhad at- Zamān Abu'l-Barakdt al-Baghdādī, Paris, 1955, 74 ff. Cf. also Pines, S., Beiträge zur islamischen Atomslehre, Berlin, 1935, 49 seq. For al-Bīrūnī's use of the termsandcf. below, Ans. to Q 75 (R, p. 198,1. 12). Also see our excursus above.

53 A parallel passage in India, Hyd., 42–3, reads:. Obviously al-Biruni used in both passages the same word, either(‘fashions’)might correspond towhich occurs in the same sentence ()

54 —lit. ‘covers’. A parallel passage in India, Hyd., p.43, 11.3–4 reads:

‘the light of the soul is covered by the turbid nature of the body’ (Sachau, l, 56). Also cf. R, p. 178, 1. 10 (Ans. 27):

‘Ignorance consists in representing a thing in a way contrary to its true reality. Thus (an ignorant person) regards the impure as pure…the earthy turbid body as eternal and as being man himself’ (Cf. BSOAS, ch. II, 523). Also cf. the expression prakāśavaraṇa, ‘the covering which obstructs the light’ in YS, sūtras 2.52 and 3.43. Cf. also YS, sūtra 4.30. Cf. also R, p. 183, 11. 14–15.

55 At this point Ritter inserts the following sentence taken from the parallel passage in India, Hyd., p. 42, 11.4 seq.:‘(As may happen, to cite) an example, to a man who recollects something that he knew and then forgets it because of (a fit of) insanity that befalls him or a (bout of) sickness that overcomes him or because of intoxication that befuddles his mind (lit.: heart).’ The idea that forgetfulness may be generated by bodily states occurs in Galen's abridgement of Plato's Timaeus extant in an Arabic translation (the Greek original is lost); cf. Galeni Compendium Timaei Plalonis, ed. P., Kraus and R., Walzer, London, 1951, p. 32 of the Arabic text—corresponding to Plato's Timaeus 86e–87a. The Arabic word in this abridgement rendering the Greek λήθη(forgetfulness) is.

The three causes of forgetfulness mentioned in the Arabic text above are attested in Indian sources. Thus e.g. (a) impairment of memory as an aspect of mental derangement is dealt with in Caraka-samhitā, Cikitsāsthdnam, ch. 9, verse 13:

saṃpūraṇair manda-viceṣṭasya

soṣmā kapho marmaṇi saṃpravṛddhaḥ/

buddhiṃ smṛtiṃ cāpy upahatya cittaṃ

pramohayan saṃjanayed vikāram//

‘In (a person) whose movements are retarded due to over-feeding, the phlegm, combined with heat, having increased in the joints (lit.: the vulnerable parts), impairs (the powers of) judgement and memory, and confounding the mind causes (its) derangement.’

(b) Impairment of memory induced by sickness is recognized by SŚtnīvāsa, in his Yatīndramatadīpīk (B.S.S., 1907, 4): kāla-dairghyād vyādhy-ādind vā saṃskāra-pramoṣāt smṛty-abhāvaḥ ‘Loss of memory is caused by the effacement of subliminal impressions which in turn is brought about either by the lapse of a long period of time or by sickness etc’

(c) Intoxication as a cause of forgetfulness is mentioned by Śrīdhara's, Nyāyakandalī on Praśastapādabhāṣya (V.S.S., 1895, 268): madenāpi saṃskārasya vināśaḥ ‘The destruction of subliminal impressions (constituting memory) is also brought about by intoxication.’ (Cf. Jadunath, Sinha, Indian psychology: cognition, vol. I., Calcutta, 1958, for further references and other causes of loss of memory mentioned in Sanskrit sources, e.g.: intense pain, pleasure or wrath.) For the description in Indian medical sources of the effect of intoxication on the strength of one's memory— sharpening it in the first stage of intoxication but weakening it in the second—cf. Julius, Jolly, Medicin (Grundriss der indo-arischen Philologie und Altertumskunde), Strassburg, 1901, 120, §92 ( = English transl. entitled ‘Indian medicine’, 2nd ed., Delhi, 1977, 146).

Also cf. Pancasikha as quoted by Vy. on YS, sūtra 2.6: buddhitaḥ paraṃ puruṣam ākāra-śīla-vidyādibibhir vibhaktam apaśyan kuryāt tatrātma-buddhiṃ mohena. This is translated by S. N. Dasgupta as follows: ‘Not knowing the purusa beyond the buddhi to be different from it in nature, character, and knowledge, etc., a man has by forgetfulness the notion of self therein’ (in his Yoga philosophy in relation to other systems of Indian thought, repr., Delhi, 1974, 161). Dasgupta's original interpretation of moha here as referring to forgetfulness is in keeping with the notion of smṛti-vibhraṃśa in Caraka-saṃhitā, Śarīrasthāna, ch. 1, verse 1.101:

tattva-jñāne smṛtir yasya rajo-mohāvṛtdtmanaḥ/

bhraśyate sa smṛti-bhraṃśaḥ smartavyaṃ hi smṛtau sthitam//

‘He who, with his self enveloped by rajas and tamas, loses his memory with regard to the true knowledge (which he possessed in the past) is known as smṛti-bhraṃśa (‘one whose memory is deranged’), for what is worth remembering is (normally) retained in memory’ (cf. also Dasgupta, S.N., History of Indian philosophy, Cambridge, 1961, II, 416 seq.). Also cf. Bhagavadgītā 2.63: saṃmohāt smṛti-vibhramaḥ ‘Loss of memory comes about from delusion’; op. cit., 18.73: nasto mohaḥ smṛti labdhā ‘Delusion has been destroyed and memory (of the true nature of the self–ātma-tattva-viṣsayā; cf. śaṇkara, ad loc.) is regained.’

The answer to Q 63 corresponds to YS, sūtra 4.9: jāti-deś;a-kāla-vyavahitānām apy ānantaryaṃm smṛti-saṃskārayor eka-rūpatvāt ‘Though there is separation because of the class (into which one is born), and because of space and time, there is nevertheless continuity on account of the correspondence between the subliminal impressions and memory.’ The separation and memory mentioned in the sūtra seem to refer to the traces (vāsanās) mentioned in the preceding sūtra. Also cf. YS, sūtra 4.10. Another possible rendering of eka-rūpatva is ‘identity’ (cf. Deussen's transl.).

The opposition between body and soul referred to by al-Bīrūnī in the present passage is mentioned by Maṇiprabhā ad loc. in a sentence ascribed to an ‘objector’ (nanu): dehasyānātmatve…‘if the body is not the self…’. Also cf. R, p. 176, 1. 8:‘(At this stage) his psychic powers overcome his body…’ (BSOAS, ch. I, 323). There is a possibility that in view of the fact that the opposition between body and soul is one of the main themes of the mainstream of Greek and Arabic philosophy al-Bīrūnī in the present passage had recourse to expressions which were used in the philosophical tradition with which he was familiar.

The wordis used by al-Bīrūnī to render at least three terms:

(a) puruṣa: cf. India, Hyd., p. 30, 1. 11:‘They call the soul’ puruṣa;cf. BSOAS, ch. I, 307; BSOAS, ch. III, 304. cf. India, Hyd., p. 36,1. 19. (Note the distinct employment of the word‘spirit’ e.g. in India, Hyd., p. 47, 11. 18 seq., p. 38, 11.3, 14 to refer to the transmigrating soul after death; cf. the Sanskrit term jīva).

(b) ītman: cf. R, p. 178,1.10:

‘Ignorance consists in representing a thing in a way contrary to its true reality. Thus (an ignorant person) regards the impure as pure, pleasure as good, distress as well-being, the earthy turbid body as eternal and as being man himself; he is ignorant of the fact that (man) is the soul rather than the body.’ (This corresponds to YS, sūtra 2.5: anityāsuci-duhkḥdnātmasu nitya-śuci-sukhātma-khyātir avidyā ’ Ignorance is the apprehension of the impermanent as permanent, of the impure as pure, of pain as pleasure and of not-self as self’; cf. BSOAS, ch. II, 523, Ans. 27).

(c) citta (mind): cf. R, p. 170, 11. 12:‘(It also consists in) the quelling of the faculties of the soul.’ (This corresponds to YS, sūtra 1.2: yogaś citta-vṛtti-nirodhaḥ ‘Yoga is the suppression of the modes of functioning of the mind’; cf. BSOAS, ch. I, 314).

For understanding al-Bīrūnī's passage under consideration in accordance with (c), cf. the following verse quoted by Vy. under YS, sutra 3.15:

nirodha-dharma-saṃskārāḥ pariṇāmo ‘tha jīvanam/

ceśtā śaktiś ca cittasya dharmā darśana-varjitāḥ//

‘The characteristics of the mind which are subconscious (lit. ‘excluded from sight’, i.e. bereft of self-awareness, in contradistinction to pratyaya, which is self-illuminating ‘cognition’) are: suppression (of the modes of functioning), merit (and demerit; v.l.: karma), subliminal impressions (smṛter anumīyate ‘inferred from memory’, cf. Vāc. ad loc.), modification, as well as vitality, movement, and potency’. Cf. also Vy. on YS, sūtra 4.10, where a contrast is drawn between the expression bāhya (‘external’) which is explained as śarīra (‘body’), on the one hand, and ādhyātmika (‘internal’, lit.: ‘pertaining to the self’) which is explained as mānasam (‘mental, of the mind’).

For an alternative understanding of al-Bīrūnīs present passage in accordance with (a) or (b) cf. Gautama's Nyāyasutra 3.2.40: smaraṇaṃ tv ātmano jñna-svābhdvyāt ‘Memory belongs to the self, since the latter's essence consists in knowing’. Cf. also Vātsyāyana on opcit. 3.1.14: tasyā ātmagunatve sati sad-bhāvāt apratiṣedhaḥ ātmanaḥ ‘Since it (i.e. smrti, ‘memory’) subsists as a quality of the self, the (existence of the) self cannot be denied’.

56 Cf. R, p. 176, 1. 5, where the phrase(‘the wicked and the evil’) appears to correspond to apuṇnya-śileṣu (‘of unrighteous character or habitual behaviour’) in Vy. on YS, sūtra 1.33; in contradistinction to(‘the righteous’), which corresponds to puṇyātmakeṣu (‘of righteous nature’), loc. cit. The possibility cannot be ruled out that the term(‘evil’) used by al Bīrūnī here corresponds to the Sanskrit term doṣa (lit. ‘defect, fault, bad condition’ but also ‘transgression, sin’) as used e.g. in the following verse from Kūrma-Purāṇa (Uttara) 3.20–21 quoted by Vij. on YS, sūtra 2.12:

rāga-dveṣādayo doṣāh sarve bhrānti-nibandhanāḥ/

kāryo hy asya bhaved doṣaḥ puṇyāpuṇyam iti śrutih//

tad-vaśād eva sarveṣām sarva-deha-samudbhavaḥ//

‘Defects, such as desire and aversion, are all based on error; according to the scriptures this (error) results in the (further) defect consisting of righteous and unrighteous (actions). It is on account of this (error) that all the bodies of each and every (creature) are produced (in a process of transmigration).’ It will be noted that doṣa in this excerpt refers to both puṇya and apuṇya as one concept.

57 Q 64 may anticipate the following phrase in Q 65:(‘so that no end either is known to it’).

For the discussion contained in the present and in the following Q and Ans. cf. Vātsyāyana on Gautama's Nyāyasūtra 1.1.2: tattva-jñānam tudoṣeāu doṣa-nimitto ’yaṃ saṃsāra iti; pretyabhāve khalv…nimittavaj janma nimittavān janmoparama ity anādiḥ pretya-bhāvo ’pavargānta iti, naimiltikaḥ san pretya-bhāvaḥ pravṛtti-nimilla iti ‘The knowledge of reality with regard to the Defects, (doṣa, which also has the meanings ‘transgression, wickedness, evil’) (takes the form:) “Transmigration has the Defects as its cause”; with regard to rebirth (knowledge of reality takes the form:) “Birth has a cause; the cessation of (repeated) birth has a cause; (the cycle of) rebirth is beginningless but ends in liberation; being an effect, rebirth is caused by activity (pravṛtti, i.e. karman: merit and demerit)”.’

58 The Arabic text has:. An alternative translation would be: ‘even though it exists’. For the present sentence cf. the expression vijñāta-pūrvāparanta ‘(the wise man) who comprehends the prior and final limits (of empirical existence)’, in Vy. on YS, sūtra 29, with Vāc. adloc.

59 For a parallel passage to the one beginning withsee India, Hyd., p. 43, 1. 5, whereis replaced by(‘do you not see ……?)

60 In the Arabicin the plural. Cf.below, R, p. 195, 1.21. Cf. the expression(‘(this) revolving world’) in India, Hyd, p. 59, 1. 1. Also cf. the expression saṃsāracakra (‘wheel of transmigration’) in Vy. and Maṇiprabhā on YS, sūtra 4.11.

61 In the parallel passage in India (‘kinds’) is replaced by(‘finding’).

62 For the Ans. to Q64 cf. Vāc. under YS, sūtra 4.10: tasya mātur aṅkdl praskhalataḥ kampamānasya māṅgalya-cakrādi-lāñchitaṃ tad-uraḥ-sūtram atigāḍdham pāṇi-grāham avalambamānasya bālakasya kampa-bheānumitd dveṣānuṣakte duḥkhe yā smṛtis tan-nimitto maraṇa-trāsaḥ kathaṃ bhaved iti … tac caitad evam prayogam ārohati jāta-mātrasya bālakasya smṛtiḥ pūrvānubhava-nibandhanā smṛtitvād asmad-ādi-smṛtivad iti … evam smitādy-anumita-harṣādayo ’pi prāci bhave hetavo veditavyāḥ ‘How can there be in a child, fallen forward from its mother's lap and trembling in consequence, a fear of death due to the memory of pain associated with aversion, as is inferred from the peculiar quivering of the child as it clasps very tightly in its hand the thread marked with the disk and other auspicious objects which hang around its mother's neck?…. All this can be logically formulated thus. The memory belonging to a child just born is based on a previous experience. Because it is a memory. Just like our own…. Similarly from laughter and other (phYSical acts) we must infer joy etc…. in some previous life to be causes (of the acts of the child)’ (transl. Woods). Also cf. Vij. ad loc. Cf. also Vy. ad loc. and on sūtra 2.9.

63 This corresponds to YS, sūtra 4.10: tāsām anāditvaṃ cāśiṣo nityatāt ‘They (i.e. the vāsanās, ‘traces, residues’) are beginningless because of the eternity of desire (āsiḥ)’. For the meaning of āsiḥ cf. the term abhiniveśa as used in YS sūtra 2.9 (also cf. the use of the term āsiḥ by Vy. ad loc). See BSOAS, ch. II, p. 535, n. 47.

64 We accept Ritter's reading. The MS has. Cf. the expression svābhāvikī, ‘natural’ in Vy. on YS, sūra 4.10.

65 i.e. neither its beginning nor its end are known.

66 Cf. below R, p. 195,1. 21. Cf. n. 68 below. Q 65 corresponds to a certain extent to the following question posed by an opponent in Maniprabhā, introduction to YS 4.11: nanv anādivāsanānāmkatham ucchedas ‘Objection: “How can there be a cutting off of traces (of action) which are beginningless?”.’ In the Arabic phrase(‘his being wholly cut off from attaining liberation’) may be due to a misinterpretation of the Sanskrit text. As we have seen, uccheda (‘cutting off’) is used in the opponent's question with reference to the cutting off of the traces. The termis used in the Ans. to Q 65 with reference to the cutting off of‘action’ (karma). This use corresponds more or less to the sense in which uccheda is used in the Maniprabhā both in the objector's question and in the answer.


68 Probably some kind of a priori knowledge is meant.

69 This corresponds to YS, sūtra 4.11: hetu-phalāśrayālambanaih samgrhīatvād eṣām abhāve tadabhāvaḥ ‘Because (of the fact that the vāsanās, ‘latent traces, residues of action’) are constituted by cause, effect, substrate and the support, the absence of these (factors) entails the absence (of the traces).’ Maniprabhā ad loc. explains the sūtra as follows: tatra vāsanānām kleśa-karmāni hetavah dehāyur-bhogaḥ phalaṃ cittam āśrayaḥ śabdādikam ālambanam ‘(In the sūtra) the karmas (i.e. merit and demerit) of (i.e. depending on) the afflictions are the “causes” of the traces; body, the length of life and the experience (of the individual) are the “effect”; the mind is the “substrate”; the senseobjects are the “support”.’

For the Arabic sentence(‘If the causes were to be cut off then the “action” would also be cut off and would come to its end and its termination’) cf. Maṇiprabhā ad loc: kāraṇānām abhāvād ucchedo bhavatīti (‘Because the causes cease to be the traces also cease to be’). The Arabic termsandcorrespond exactly to the Sanskrit term uccheda, ‘cutting off’. Also cf. Mādhava's Sarvadarśanasaṇgraha (ch. Pātañjala-darśanam), ed. Uma Shankar Sharma, Varanasi, 1964, 737: kāraṇābhāvat kāryābhāva iti pramāṇa-siddhārthe…‘since the principle of the cessation of the effect when the cause has ceased is established by the recognized means of knowledge.’

70 Cf. above R, p. 194, 1. 11 (Ans. to Q62). Also cf. dharmāharmau, ‘merit and demerit’ in Maṇiprabhā on YS, sūtra 4.11.

71 Cf. R, p. 194, 1. 12 (Ans. to Q 62):‘free (of involvement)’ as opposed toloc. cit.

72 lit. ‘matter’.

73 Possibly ‘good’ and ‘evil’ here refer to sattva and tamas respectively. Cf. R, p. 181, 11.2–3 (transl. BSOAS, ch. II, 525, Ans. to Q 34); see BSOAS, ch. II, p. 540, n. 92.

74 This word seems to correspond to sukha as opposed to duhkha (cf.). Cf. BSOAS, ch.I, p.311, n. 74.

75 Cf. Vy. on YS, sūtra 4.11: hetur dharmāt sukham adharmād duhkham sukhād rāgo duhkhād dveṣas tataś ca prayatnas tena manasā vācā kāyena vā parispandamānaḥ param anugṛhṇāty upahantivā talaḥ punar dharmādharmau sukha-duhkhe rāga-dveṣāv iti pravṛttam idam şaḍ-araṃ saṃsāracakram ‘The cause is the revolving six-spoked wheel of transmigration: from right living arises joy, from wrong living arises woe; from joy arises desire, from woe arises aversion; from (either)—effort; hence, being moved to act in the mind, in speech or with the body, ne either does good or evil to others, consequently there is once more right living and wrong living, joy and woe, and desire and aversion.’ Cf. also Maṇiprabhā ad loc. Also cf. YS, sūras 2.7–8 (quoted by śaṇkara Bhagavatpadaād loc), with Bhoja and Maṇiprabhā ad loc.

76 We adopt Ritter's readingfollowed by a question mark. The MS has

77 We adopt Ritter's readingfollowed by a question mark. The MS

78 Cf. above, n. 60.

79 : ‘the matter of the tw o’.

80 Instead of Ritter's reading, we read

81 We propose to readRitter has. In a footnote he says that this is not clear in the MS, the last character being missing.

82 We propose to readRitter hasand in a footnote he remarks that his reading conforms to the MS and that perhaps one should readwhich is followed by a question mark.

83 Cf. Vy., introduction to YS, sūtra 4.12: nāsty asataḥ sambhavo nāsti sato vināśa iti dravyatvena sambhavantyaḥ kathaṃ nivartiṣyante vāsanā iti ‘Since there is no possibility of that which is nonexistent coming into existence, nor of destruction of that which is an existent, how will the traces, being as they are (existing) entities, cease to exist?’ (cf. Bhoja ad loc.). For the sat-kārya theory underlying this argument cf. Bhagavadgītā 2.16:

nāsato vidyate bhāvo nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ/

uahayor api dṛṣṭo 'ntas tv anayos tattva-darśibhiḥ//

‘There is no becoming of what did not already exist, there is no unbecoming of what does exist: those who see the principles see the boundary between the two (i.e. between being and nonbeing)’ (transl. van Buitenen). Also cf. Gauḍapāda's Āgamaśāstra, kārikā 3.28:

asato māyayā janma tattvato naiva yujyate/

vandhyā-putro na tattvena māyayā vāpi jāyate//

‘The birth of the non-existent (either) through illusion (or) in reality is by no means reasonable: the son of a barren woman is not born, either in reality or through illusion’. Cf. also SK, kārikā 9: asadakāranāt…sat kāryam ‘Since the non-existent cannot be produced…the effect must pre-exist (in its cause).’

84 Ritter's text has. We read(‘being’).

85 —‘subsists in potentia’. For the example of the white (object) becoming yellow and then black cf. below Ans. to Q 77 (R, p. 198,1. 17) and n. 149.

86 Ritter's text hasWe propose the readingCf. Q 66 and n. 81 above.

87 The answer to Q66 corresponds to YS, sūtras 4.12–13. Sūtra 4.12 reads: atītānāgataṃ svarūpato 'sty adhva-bhedād dharmāṇām ‘The past and the future exist in virtue of their own nature because of the difference in the states (lit. ‘paths’) of the characteristics.’ Cf. sūtra 3.14: tatra śāntoditāvyapadeśya-dharmānupātī dharmī ‘A (substance) possessed of characteristics is correlated to characteristics which are quiescent (i.e. past) or emergent (i.e. present) or uncharacterizable (i.e. future)’; see BSOAS, ch. HI, p. 271, n. 42. Also cf. Bhagavadgītā 2.28:

avyaktādīnī bhūtāni vyakta-madhyāni bhāratal/

avyakta-nidhanāny eva tatra kā paridevanā//

‘Bhārata, in their beginning things (or creatures) are unmanifest (i.e. subsist in the future, in potentia); in their intermediate state they are manifest (i.e. exist in the present, in actu); in their final state they are (again) unmanifest (i.e. subsist in the past); why lament over this?’. In their translations of this sūtra (4.12) Rajendralala Mitra and Deussen take atītānāgatam as qualifying citta. This interpretation seems to be rather far-fetched. For the term adhvan and for similar theories held by the Buddhist Sarvāstivāda school concerning the existence of the future and the past see Stcherbatsky, Th., The central conception of Buddhism, rep. Calcutta, 1956, 31 seq.

Sūtra 4.13 reads: te vyakta-sūkṣmā guṇātmānaḥ ‘They (the characteristics) are either manifest (i.e. actualized in the present) or subtle (i.e. latent either in the past or in the future); (they) pertain to the (three) guṇas.’ On the meaning of guṇātmānaḥ as used here see Bhoja ad loc: tad-ātmānas tatsvabhāvās tat-pariṇāma-rūpād ity arthaḥ— ‘tad-ātmānaḥ means to be of the nature of something, or to be a modification of something’.

88 This correspond to YS sūtra 4.14: pariṇāmaikatvād vastu-tattvam ‘Since (in every single case) there is (only) one modification (of the three guṇas) the that-ness of (each) external object (comes about)’. In this translation we have followed the interpretation of the Sanskrit commentators Bhoja, Vy. and Maṇiprabhā which is apparently also the interpretation propounded by the commentary used by al-Bīrūnī. Maṇiprabhā, like al-Bīrūnī, uses the example of the wick, oil and fire combining to produce one lamp: varti-tailāgnīnām eko dīpa-pariṇāmaḥ (also cf. Vāc. ad loc. and SK, kārikā 13 with the Tattvakaumudī ad loc). For the meaning of vastu in the sūtra above cf. the use of the word in sūtra 4.15 below. A different interpretation of the sūtra under consideration (4.14) is proposed by Deussen. According to him the sūtra asserts that the reality of the objective world may be inferred from the unity of the modifications (which the various cognizing subjects undergo): ‘Aus der Einheit der Umwandlungen (welche die verschiedenen erkennenden Subjekte erfahren) ist zu schliessen auf die Realität der objektiven Welt.’ Deussen appears to consider that in this contexttattva means ‘reality’ and that pariṇāma (‘modification’) refers to cognizing subjects rather than to external objects.

89 For the sentence as a whole cf. YS, sūtra 3.55: sattva-puruṣayoḥ śuddhi-sāmye kaivalyam and R, p. 192, 11. 20 seq. (see BSOAS, ch. III, p. 304, n. 284). Also cf. Vij. on YS, sūtra 1.4 for his ‘dual reflection’ doctrine: yathā ca citi buddheḥ pralibimbam evaṃE buddhāv api citpralibimbaṃ svīkāryam ‘It must be conceded that just as the mind is reflected in pure consciousness so is the latter in the former’. Also cf. Vij.'s description of the purified mind by using the term prasāda (‘clarity’) and the simile nirmala-darpanavat (‘like a mirror cleansed of dirt’) (Vij. under YS, sūtra 1.2). Cf. R, p. 192,11. 20 seq.; p. 193, 1. 3.

90 In this context we have chosen to translateby ‘intellection’, which is one of the possible meanings (cf. R, p. 176,1. 11-Ans. to Q 23; BSOAS, ch. I, p. 324,1. 2), rather than ‘intellect’ (cf. R, p. 197, 1. 12—Q 70 below), because Vy. and Maṇiprabhā apparently believe that the sūtra text reflects a discussion with Buddhists. The termmay correspond to vijñāna (‘cognizing’); cf. Vy. on YS, sūtra 4.14: nāsty artho vijñāna-visahacarah; asti tu jñānam artha-visahacaram ‘There is no object dissociated from (the act of) cognizing; but there is knowing dissociated from (any) object.’ (Also cf. Yogasudhākara ad loc: nanu kṣaṇika-vijñānātmaka-cittātiriktaṃ vastu nāsty eveti vadantam bauddham praty āha…‘To the Buddhist who objects by asserting that there is nothing whatsoever distinct from the mind, which consists of momentary cognizing, he (Patañjali) replies…’.)

91 A parallel idea occurs in Vy. on YS, sūtra 1.41: tad evam abhijāta-mani-kalpasya cetaso grahītr-grahana-grāhyeṣu puruṣendriya-bhūteṣu yā tat-ātha-tad-añjanatā teṣu sthitasya tad-ākārāpattiḥ sā samāpattir ity ucyate ‘Thus it is in this way that when the mind, (being) like a flawless gem comes to be applied to (lit.: be tinged by) the cognizer, the instrument of cognition and the object of cognition–i.e. the puruṣa, the sense-faculties and the elements (i.e. the things of the world)–it assumes the form of these; and this is called the state of identification (or, coalescence)’. Cf. Bhoja ad loc: tasya grahītṛ-grahaṇa-grāhyeṣv ātmendriya-viṣayeṣu tat-stha-tad-añjanatā samāpattir bhavati ‘In that (mind) arises the identification which consists in the respective “colouring” being applied to the cognizer, the instruments of cognition and the object of cognition—i.e. to the self, the sense-faculties and the objects of cognition.’ (Also cf. YS, sūtra 4.22). Cf. India, Hyd., p. 53,11. 1–8 (quoted by R, p. 176, n. 3; cf. BSOAS, ch. I, p. 324, n. 224):

‘The Hindus say: “……(4) This kind of knowledge is raised above time, and he who has it can dispense with names and epithets, which are only instruments of human imperfection. In this stage the intellectus and the intelligens unite with the intettectum, so as to be one and the same thing.” This is what Patañjali says about the knowledge which liberates the soul’ (transl. Sachau, l, 69–70). The formula asserting the union ofandfrequently occurs in Arabic Aristotelian philosophy and must have been familiar to al-Bīrūnī (cf. BSOAS, ch. I, 307).

92 Ritter's text readsbut in his footnotes he indicates thatmay be read instead of, andinstead ofWe accept Ritter's readingand propose to readinstead ofsuggested by Ritter.

93 The conception that only the(= vijñāna) exists seems to correspond to that of the Vijñānavāda Buddhists. Cf. Vāc. on YS, sūtra 4.14.

94 The MS and Ritter's printed text havebut in a note Ritter suggests the emendationThis emendation has been adopted by us. The phrase(‘You do not affirm (anything) but Truth (i.e. God))’ makes sense if addressed to a Ṣūfī and this might have occasioned a scribal error. Cf. Yogasudhākara on YS, sūtra 4.14 quoted in n. 90 above.

95 This statement is not in keeping with the latter part of Ans. 68 in which it is argued that objects exist in their own right independently of the intellect. Possibly one or more words are missing in the Arabic text or the latter may be corrupt.

96 The wordpossibly refers to the idea that an object may be a point of conjunction or a common basis for different conceptions or perceptions of the object in question. Cf. YS, sūtra 4.15: vastu-sāmye citta-bhedāt tayor vibhaktaḥ (v.1: viviktaḥ) panthāḥ ‘Because the object remains the same whereas minds (cognizing it) are different the paths of the two diverge (vibhaktaḥ = viviklaḥ)’. Also cf. Vy. ad loc: bahu-cittālambanībhūtam ekaṃ vastu sādhāraṇam ‘A single object being the basis for the (conceptions or perceptions of) many minds is common (to all of them).’


98 The MS as we read it hasRitter has in his text(Accordingly the expressionhere would mean lit. ‘under the form of affection’.)

99 Ritter's text haswhich does not seem to make sense. We emend with some hesitation:(‘considers her’).

100 With regard to the passage ‘(This is) like (the case of) a man's wife whom the husband…calls…associate’ cf. Vāc. on YS, sūtra 4.15: asti hi rakta-dviṣṭa-vimūḍha-madhyasthāām ekasyāṃ yoṣiti pratīyamānāyāṃ pratisandhānaṃ yā tvayā dṛśyate saiva mayāpīti ‘For in the case of a single woman who is presented-to-the-minds of several persons, enamoured or ill-disposed or infatuated or detached, we see a reciprocal connexion so that one thinks “She who is seen by you is seen by me also”’ (transl. Woods). While the Arabic text speaks of different sentiments on the part of one man towards his wife, the Sanskrit text refers to the sentiment which several men entertain towards one and the same woman. But this divergence does not seem to be of any importance as far as the idea which both texts are meant to convey is concerned.

101 Ritter suggests that(which occurs both in the MS and in Ritter's printed text) should be replaced byWe see no need for this emendation. Q68 (R, p. 196, 1. 17). Also cf. Vy. on YS, sūtra 4.22 (23): apare citta-mātram evedaṃ sarvam….‘Others (Vijñānavāda Buddhists) maintain that this whole universe is mind only…’

102 This corresponds to YS, sūtra 4.16:0 tad-uparāgāpekṣitvāc cittasya vastu jñātājñātam’‘An object is either known or not known according to whether it does or does not affect (lit.: tinge) the mind’.

103 Hereis rendered by us as ‘intellect’ rather than ‘intellection ’ (cf. e.g. R, p. 197,1. 7). Cf.n. 90 above.

104 The Arabic text bears some similarity to a statement of Vāc. on YS, sūtra 4.(16) according to which different things are cognized by different cognitions: yad dhi ghaṭa-grāhi cittaṃ tad yadā paṭdravya- vyagralayā na ghaṭe vartate ‘For the same mind which perceives (say) a pot, when distracted by (another) substance (such) as a piece of cloth, does no longer dwell on the pot’.

105 This term corresponds to Sanskrit sphaṭika-maṇi, which is a compound of sphaṭika, ‘crystal’, and maṇi, ‘jewell’. Cf. Vy. on YS, sūtra 4.22 (23). Also cf. the use of the simile of abhijātamaṇi, ‘precious gem’ in YS, sūtra 1.41, which Vy. adloc. glosses as sphaṭika (‘crystal’). In translating the latter sūtra al-Bīrūnī employs the Arabic(‘crystal’) to render abhijāta-maṇi (cf. BSOAS, ch. I, 323). For the use of the simile in the Arabic text cf. also Vij., Nagojibhatta's Vṛtti, Yogasudhākara and Maṇiprabhā on YS, sūtra 1.3. Also cf. Kapila's Sāṇkhyasūtra 6.28 with Vijñānabhikṣu's Sāṅkhyapravacanabhāṣya ad loc. The latter's explanation reads: yathā japāsphaṭikayor noparāgaḥ, kiṃ tu japā-pratibimba-vaśād uparāgābhimāna-mātraṃ raktaḥ sphaṭika iti, tathaiva buddhi-puruṣayor noparāgaḥ, kiṃ tu buddhi-pratibimba-vax015B;ād uparāgābhimāno ‘vivekavaśād ity arthaḥ ‘A crystal is not (really) affected by an (adjacent) hibiscus flower but there is merely a delusion to this effect (taking the form) “the crystal is red” due to reflexion of the hibiscus flower; similarly the puruṣa is not affected by the mind but there is a delusion to this effect due to reflexion of the mind, on account of the failure to discriminate (between the mind and the puruṣsa); this is the meaning.’ For further references and discussion of the significance of the simile (especially in Sarikhya-Yoga philosophy) cf. Erik af Edholm, ‘The crystal and the hibiscus flower’ in ed. Eivind, Kahrs, Kalyāṇa-mitrārāgaṇam: Essays in honour of Nils Simonsson, Oxford 1986, 5777.

106 The MS hasis an emendation proposed by Ritter and with some hesitation adopted by us.

107 and(‘colours and shapes’) is probably a rendering of the Sankrit rūpākāra; cf. Vy. on YS, sūtra 1.41: yathā sphaṭika upāśraya-bhedāt tat-tad-rūpoparakta upāśraya-rūpākāreṇa nirbhāsate ‘Just as a crystal tinged by the colour of the particular (object) placed near it appears as characterized by the colour (of that object)…’. The term ākāra means lit. ‘shape, form, aspect, appearance’ (cf. YS, sūtra 4.21 (22)).

108 Ritter adds a question mark, and prima facie it seems likely that this, in spite of the absence of an interrogative particle is a question. However, the phrase(translated by us: ‘your assertion is invalidated’) below (Ans. to Q 70) suggests that Q 70 may be an assertion rather than a question. This applies to Q 69 as well. If the Arabic text is read as a question it could be translated: ‘Is the intellect etc.’. Cf. Vy. introducing YS, sūtra 4.18 (19): syx0101;d āśaṅkā cittam eva svābhāsam…bhaviṣyati ‘Supposing (the following) query (lit. doubt) is raised (ace. Vāc. ad loc, by the Vaināśikas–a term applied to Mahāyāna Buddhists–or by the Cittātmavādīs, ‘those who maintain that the self is nothing but the mind itself): “The mind may be self-illumining…(so that there need be no puruṣa)”.’

For the simile of the ‘lamp’ () here cf. Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda on Vy. loc.cit.: svasaṃviditākārā eva hi vṛttayaḥ yathā pradīpāx1E25; prakāśayati ghaṭādīn ātmānaṃ ca ‘for the functions (of the mind) are characterized by self-awareness just as a lamp illumines itself as well as (objects) such as a pot etc’ Also cf. Vātsyāyana's Nyāyabhāsya on Gautama's Nyāyasūtra 5.1.10:…pradīpadarśanārhaṃ pradipopādx0101;naṃ nirarthakam ‘…In order to see a lamp it is pointless to fetch (another) lamp.’ Cf. also Nāgārjuna's Vigrahavyāvartanī, ed. Johnston, E. H. and Arnold/Kunst, , in Kamaleswar Bhattacharya, transl. The dialectical method of Nāgārjuna, Delhi, 1978, 32 (text), 26 (transl.). (For further references see Jacob, G. A., A handful of popular maxims, repr., Delhi, 1983, 36).

For the phrase(‘does not require something other than itself) cf. Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda on Vy., loc cit.: prakāśānlaraṃ nāgnir apekṣata iti ‘Fire does not require another light (for its illumination)’. For a general discussion of the concept of sva-saṃvedana in Indian epistemology see Matilal, B. K., ‘Sva-samvedana: self-awareness’ in ed. Lipner, Julius J., A net cast wide: Investigations into Indian thought in memory of David Friedman, Newcastle upon Tyne, 1986, 74–9; id. Perception: An essay on classical Indian theories of knowledge, Oxford, 1986, 141 seq.

109 This corresponds to YS, sūtra 4.18 (19): na tat svābhāsaṃ dṛśyatvāt ‘It (tat, i.e. citta mentioned in sūtra 4.16 (17)) does not illumine itself since it is an object of sight (i.e. cognition).’ The fact that tat refers to citta in sūtra 4.16 (17) may mean that sūtra 4.17 (18) which comes between sūtras 4.16(17) and 4.18 (19) is an interpolation. This supposition is in keeping with the absence of any reference to it in al-Bīrūnī's text.

110 Ritter adds a question mark. Prima facie this seems likely. However, see our n. 108 above.

111 As Ritter has pointed out the Arabic MS hasRitter proposes the emendationadopted by us.

112 Probably a word (may be) is missing in the Arabic text.

113 i.e. by the purusa.

114 For the purusa.

115 This is probably a reference to the purusa.

116 i.e. in apprehension by the mind.

117 In the preceding sentencehas been translated by us as ‘occur’, whereas in this sentence it is translated as ‘is realized’.

118 Q70 appears to reflect the position of the school designated in the commentaries as kṣaṇikavādīs (lit.: the school of momentariness, i.e. the doctrine that all existents are momentary), according to Vy. on YS sūtra 4.19(20). In this passage the partisans of this school are said to assert the identity of kāraka, the agent, and kriyā, his act. The Ans. to Q 70 appears to some extent to be a combination of sūtra 4.19(20), of passages in commentaries on sūtra 4.21(22) and of sūtra 4.23(24).

Sūtra 4.19(20) reads: eka-samaye cobhayānavadhāraṇam ‘(It, i.e. citta, the mind, mentioned in sūtra 4.16(17) and referred to in sūtra 4.18(19) cannot be affirmed to be both (subject and object) at the same time.’ (This seems to be Deussen's interpretation). Woods's translation should also be mentioned. It reads as follows: ‘And there cannot be a cognition of both (thinking-substance and thing) at the same time.’ The Arabicin Ans. to Q 70 appears to correspond to this sūtra.

Sūtra 4.23(24) reads: tad-asaṅkhyeya-vāsanābhiś citram api parārthaṃ saṃhatya-kāritvāt ‘Despite its being diversified by countless subliminal traces it (tad, i.e. citta, the mind) (exists) for the sake of another because of its functioning as an aggregate.’ A plausible interpretation of this sūtra is suggested by Vāc. ad loc: yady api asaṅkhyeyāḥ karma-vāsanāḥ kleśa-vāsanāś ca cittam evādhiśerate na tu puruṣam, tathā ca vāsanx0101;dhinā vipākāś cittāśrayatayā cittasya bhoktṛtām āvahanti, bhoktur arthe ca bhogyam iti sarvaṃ cittārthaṃ prāptaṃ tathāpi tac cittam asaṅkhyeya-vāsanā-vicitram api parārtham; kasmāt saṃhatya-kāritvād iti ‘Although countless subliminal traces of karma and subliminal traces of afflictions remain attached to the mind only, but not to the self,—and although, accordingly, the fruitions which depend upon subconscious impressions, insofar as they are contained in the mind, would lead one to suppose that mind is the experiencer—and although, because all objects-of-experience are for the experiencer, everything would be supposed to be for the mind—still the mind diversified as it is by countless subconscious impressions must be supposed to exist for the sake of another. Why? Because it acts as a combination’ (Woods's translation with alterations). Also cf. Bhoja ad loc.: sattva-rajas tamāṃsi ca citta-lakṣaṇa-pariṇāma-bhāñji saṃhatyakārīṇi ca; ataḥ parārthāni; yaḥ paraḥ sa puruṣaḥ ‘The three guṇas function jointly in the modification characterized by the mind and are aggregated factors; hence they have another for their goal. The other is the puruḥa.’ Also cf. SK, kārikā 17: saṅghāta-parārarthatvāt…puruṣo 'sti ‘Since combined (existents) serve a goal other than themselves…puruṣa exists…’.

119 The MS, followed by Ritter has(‘the hidden knowledge’). However, the reading(‘the true knowledge’) seems preferable. Cf. in the Ans. to Q 72:(see below). The expressionrecurs in R, p. 189, 1.2 (Ans. to Q47) and p. 192,1.9 (Q 53). Also cf. India, Hyd., p. 56,1.4:

‘Pain and pleasure do not have an effect on the possessor of true knowledge just as the continuous flow of the streams to the ocean have no effect on its water’. This is erroneously translated by Sachau (i, 74): ‘Pain and pleasure have no effect on the real world…’. Cf. Bhagavadg012B;tā 2.38; 15.5; 2.70; and cf. R, p. 191, 11.2–3 (cf. BSOAS, ch. III, 264). Also cf. India, Hyd., 53:…‘…the liberating knowledge which they call “mokṣa”…’.

The passage from(R, p. 197,1. 13) to the end of Q 71 is repeated in the MS. In the repeated version(in line 14) is replaced byandwhich occurs in the repeated version is omitted in the first one.

Q71 bears some resemblance to Bhoja on YS, sūtra 4.24(25): idānīṃ śāstra-phalaṃ kaivalyaṃ nirnetuṃ daśabhix1E25; sūlrair upakramate ‘He (Patañjali) now proceeds to set forth in ten sūtras the fruit of the teaching, namely kaivalya’. The Arabiccorresponds to phala (‘fruit’); the Arabic‘(The oneness of the One, the Real One, is recognized as true’; in Ans. to Q 72 below) corresponds to kaivalya (lit. ‘wholeness’, i.e. oneness).

120 The MS haswhich does not make sense. Ritter's emendationhas been adopted by us.

The Answer to Q 71 may correspond to Maṇiprabhā on YS, sūtra 4.24(25): icchāyāḥ sva-viṣaya- Iābha-nivartyatvāt ‘Because the cessation of desire must come about when its object has been attained’. Possibly the text used by al-Bīrūnī read: icchā-sva-viṣaya-lābha-nivartyatvāt(‘Because desire and the achievement of its object must cease’).

121 Ritter has herebut in n. 7 on R, 197 he observes that the wordcannot be clearly read in the MS. In fact the MS has)and a scrawl after it.does not make sense. We propose the emendation

122 The MS and Ritter's printed text haveWe propose to readIn YS, sūtra 3.54 viveka appears to be rendered by(see R, p. 192,1. 1–Ans. to Q 55). Elsewhere al-Bīrūnī seems to render vivekin of YS, sūtra 2.15 by(Ans. to Q31–R, p. 180, 1. 10; see also BSOAS, ch. II, p. 538, n. 78).

123 The Arabic haswhich is a well-known Ṡūfī designation of God. However, it is not clear whetherhas here this meaning.

124 Ritter reads herewhich we translated as the equivalent of

The Ans. to Q 72 corresponds to YS, sūtra 4.25(26): tadā viveka-nimnaṃ kaivalya-prāgbhāraṃ cittam ‘Then the mind flowing down the declivity of discriminatory knowledge is borne on towards kaivalya.’ The Arabic(‘the oneness’) here corresponds to kaivalya, lit. ‘wholeness, oneness’. For this correlation between ‘knowledge’ and ‘discrimination’ cf. YS, sx016B;tra 2.28: yogāṅgānuṣṭhanād aśuddhi-kṣaye jñāna-dīptir ā viveka-khyāteḥ ‘When, following the practice of the aids to yoga, impurity has dwindled away, enlightenment arises culminating in the knowledge of discrimination (between puruṣa and prakṛti, i.e. between self and non-self).’ The two notions of ‘knowledge’ and‘discrimination’ are correlated in a different way by Vy. on YS, sūtra 4.25(26):…viveka-jaṃ jñānam (‘knowledge produced by discrimination’). The latter correlation is also attested in the sūrras (see YS, sūtras 3.52 and 54).

125 The MS haswhich Ritter emends toFrom the graphical point of viewmay be closer to what is written in the MS. But see below, R, p. 198,1. 8; and above R, p. 177,1. 3 and 1. 5; p. 191,1. 12.

126 There is a possibility that renders avidyādi (' ignorance etc.') and thus refers to all five afflictions (kleśas) of which avidyā is the basis (cf. YS, sūtra 2.4). Cf. Bhoja on YS, sūtra 4,30(31): dvarandni klesah la eva malah ' The (obstructing) coverings are the afflictions which constitute the defilements'. (Also cf. Vy. on YS, sūtras 2.11 and 52.) The Arabic phrase:. corresponds to viśuddhir malānām (‘ expurgation of defilements’) in Vy. on YS, sūtra 2.52. Cf. Corrado Pensa,’ On the purification concept in Indian tradition with special regard to Yoga’, East and West (New Series), xix, 1969.

127 The general idea underlying Q and Ans. 73 roughly correspond to the purport of YS, sūtra 4.26(27) as explained in the available commentaries. However, al-Bīrūnīs way of expressing this idea is different in various important particulars. Possibly he follows, as in many other cases, a commentary which as far as we know is lost. YS, sūtra 4.26(27) reads: tac-chidresu pratyayāntarāni samskārebhyah ‘ During the interruptions herein (in the flow of the mind referred to in YS, sūtra 4.25(26)) other thoughts due to subliminal impressions (arise)’.

128 For the use of the word (‘ smelting’) in this context cf. Manusmrti 6.71 quoted by Vij. under YS, sūtra 2.52:

dahyante dhmāyamānānām dhātūnām hi yathā malāh/ tathendriyānām dahyante dosāh prānasya nigrahāt//

‘ Just as dross is expurgated when ores are melted by blowing, so are the “ defects ” pertaining to the faculties (expurgated) by breath control.’ (For the meaning of dosa here cf. Kullūkabhatta ad loc: manaso rāgādayaś caksur-ddes ca visaya-pravanatvādayao dosdh ‘ the defects consisting in desire (aversion and delusion) of the mind and in attachment of the senses to their objects’; cf. klesa, ‘affliction’, YS, sūtra 2.3). For the use of metallurgical similes cf. also Vij. on YS sūtra 1.4, Gheranda-Samhitā, verse 4.9.

129 The first part of Ans. to Q 74 seems to be a recapitulation of some passages in the sūtras as is indicated by the which seem to correspond to YS, sūtra 4.27(28). The latter reads: hdnam klesavad uktam. Three translations of this sutra are possible, the third of which is only slightly different from the second: (a) ‘ Their removal (i.e. the removal of other thoughts due to subliminal impressions; cf. YS, sūtra 4.26(27)) as well as that of the afflictions has (already) been described;’ (b) ‘ It has already been said that their removal is like that of the afflictions’; (c)‘ Their removal has been described in the same manner as that of the afflictions’.

As Rajendralala Mitra and Deussen point out this sūtra seems to refer to YS, sūtra 2.10–11. However, it would appear that al-Bīrunl, possibly influenced by the commentary available to him, is referring here to YS, sūtra 1.12 of which he gave earlier (Ans. to Q6, R, p. 171, 11. 15 seq.; cf. BSOAS, ch. I, 312–3) a translation and an explanation, rendering abhyāsa by(see BSOAS, ch. I, 316–7).

130 . This expression is reminiscent of the phrasewhich is current among Arabic philosophers who have taken it over from the Greeks. Cf. also R, p. 171,1. 19 (Ans. to Q6; pertaining to YS, sūtras 1.13 and 14 which are concerned with abhyāsa, ‘ repeated practice’) above:(‘ the faculty in question will indubitably acquire this habit in a permanent fashion, and will be diverted from the tendencies it had when it lacked this habit’ (cf. BSOAS, I. p. 317). Also cf. R, p. 195,1. 8 (Q 65):(‘ this “ action ” becomes in the various moulds nature to him’); cf. India, Hyd., 56:(‘ habituating the self to it to the point of its becoming (a second) nature’).

131 As Ritter observes, the MS has. We adopt Ritter's emendation

132 See above n. 125.

133 The MS has. We adopt Ritter‘s reading APU,. Cf. below R, p. 198, 1. 10.

134 This corresponds to YS, sūtra 4.29(30): tatah klesa-karma-nivrttih‘ Thereupon the cessation of the afflictions and of works (karma) (comes about).’ The Arabic expressionmay reflect the Sanskrit kuśalākusalāh…karmāśayāh, ‘ the residua (or, subtrata) of works, both good nd evil’. The latter expression occurs in Vy. ad loc.

135 in the plural. the singular above R, p. 198,1. 2 (Q 73). Also cf. R, p. 174, I. 8:Also cf. R, p. 192,1. 19.

136 Cf. the phrase sthirībhute samādhau (‘ when his concentration has become steadfast’) in Bhoja on YS, sūtra 4.28. The wordhas been translated above, R, 1. 21, by ‘ is steadfastly fixed.’

137 This refers to the cognized objects.

138 This corresponds to YS, sūtra 4.30(31): tadā sarvāvarana-malāpetasya jhdnasydnantydj jneyam alpam ‘ Then, because of the infinity of the knowledge from which all (obstructing) coverings and defilements have been removed, what is yet to be known amounts to little’. Forin the Arabic text cf. the expression kva cid eva (‘ in some cases only, rarely’) occurring in Vy. ad loc. The Arabic wordswhich seem to imply the idea of motion may reflect an expression similar to that occurring in Vy. ad loc: privartitam udghatitam ‘ set in motion, opened up ’. The latter word is glossed by Vāc. as pradeśād apanītam ‘ removed from (its) place’.

139 In the Arabic phrasethe wordsmay represent Sanskrit grahanādi, which may have occurred in the commentary used by al-Bīrūnī, and signified the triad grahītr, grahana and grāhya (the subject, act and object of cognition). Cf. the term grahana in Vy. ad loc. The triadand the expressionreferring to it occur also elsewhere in al-Bīrūnīs translation of the YS. Cf. R, 197 (Ans. to Q 70); R, p. 176, II. 11–12 (cf. BSOAS1, ch. I, p. 307 and p. 324, n. 223); R, p. 177, 1. 2 (transl. BSOAS, ch. I, p. 324, 1. 5). Also cf. India, Hyd., 53 (quoted by R, p. 176, n. 3, transl. Sachau, I. 69–70; cf. BSOAS, ch. I, p. 324, n. 224); India, Hyd., 51–2 (transl. Sachau, I, 68). Also cf. BSOAS, ch. I, 308. Also see below n. 154.

140 lit.‘ at that time’.

141 YS, sūtra 4.31(32) appears to be an answer to Q 75. The answer given in al-Bīrūnīs translation refers to the relation between the ‘ happy, fortunate (or, earnest) one’ and the gunas. YS, sūtra 4.31(32) reads: tatah krlārthānām parināma-krama-samāptir gunānām ‘ Thereupon, when the gunas have fulfilled their purpose the end of the sequence of mutations (is reached).’

142 The connexion between time and the sequence of mutations of the gunas which is referred to in al-Bīrūnīs translation seems to be presupposed in YS, sūtra 4.32(33). This sūtra reads: ksanapratiyogī parindmāparānta-nirgrāhyah kramah ‘ Sequence is the correlate to the moment (and) is recognized as such at the end of the mutation.’ The following phrase of Vāc. under YS, sūtra 3.52 bears on the relation between moment and sequence: kramasyāvalambanam ‘ (The moment) is the basis of the sequence’. The connexion between time and the sequence of mutations of the gunas is also dealt with in YS, sūtra 3.15. The latter sutra is not reflected in al-Bīrūnīs text. See BSOAS, ch. III, 259. Also see our excursus above.

143 The use ofandmay be due to the fact that in philosophical Arabic these are terms referring to a state of the intellect which has transcended the obstacles posed by matter and psychic faculties, such as imagination, dependent upon matter. Cf. also R, 173,1. 11; R, p. 193, 1. 7; R, p. 177, 1.14; India, Hyd., p. 21, 1. 16, BSOAS, ch. II, p. 546, n. 145; and see our preface, above.

144 In Arabicmeans ‘ good fortune’ and‘seriousness, earnestness’. The wordhere may be due to an attempt to render the Sanskrit kuśala which can mean either ‘ fortunate ’ or ‘ skilful, earnest’. Cf. Vy. on YS, sūtra 4.32(33): kuśalasyāsti samsārakrama-parisamāptih ‘ There is certainly an end for the earnest man to the sequence of samsdra (ofrebirths or, empirical existence)’. To this corresponds the latter part of Ans. to Q 75:

145 The MS haswhich, as Ritter correctly notes, (R, p. 198, n. 4) is not clear. Ritter proposes to readwhich does not seem to make sense. We have adopted in the text the reading‘escapes’. For the idea of transcending time cf. Vy. on YS, sūtra 4.32(33): ku(astha-nityatāpurusasya parināmi-nityatd gunānām ‘ The permanence of the purusa is absolutely changeless, whereas the permanence of the gunas is in mutation.’ Also cf. Vāc. adloc.: baddhānārn cittāvyatirekābhimānāt tat-parināmena parināmādhyāsah, muktānām cāsti-kriyām upādāyāvāstavo ‘pi parināmo moha-kalpitah, śabdasya purahsaratayā tat-prstho vikalpo ’sti-kriyām upādatta iti ‘ Persons who are in bondage, because they assume that they are not over and above mind-stuff, have the mutations of this (mind-stuff) attributed to them. And in the case of the liberated a mutation based upon the (mere) act of existence and having no material existence is wrongly predicated. Since it is a word only (if we say that the liberated exists), which comes first, the predicate-relation which follows is based on the act of existence’ (transl. Woods). Also cf. Śarikara Bhagavatpāda ad loc: paramārthatah purusesv aparināmitvān nāsti krama ity arthah ‘ That is to say, in the last analysis there is no sequence in purusas since they are immutable.’

146 For the termsandcf. R, p. 194,1. 17 (Ans. to Q 63) and see n. 52 above.

147 Ritter’s text conforms to the MS which has. This is clearly a scribe’s attempt to reproduce al-Bīrūnīs transcription of ksana (‘ instant’). Cf. India, Hyd., p. 283, 11. 3–4:

‘Others among them (i.e. among the Hindus) insert between minute and second a third measure, called ksana, which is equal to one fourth of a minute (i.e. = fifteen seconds).’

148 Ritter’s text has. The MS has. There is no difference between the two expressions as far as meaning is concerned. The definition of ksana in the answer to Q 76 corresponds to that given in Vij. under YS, sūtra 2.50: caksur-nimesvacchinnasya kālasya caturtha bhāgah ksanah ‘ A ksana is one quarter of the time required for (lit.: delimited by) the twinkling of an eye.’ Also cf. Vac. ad loc. (The word ksana itself probably derived from īksana,‘ glance’; hence its meaning as pertaining to the time of a glance.)

149 Vy. on YS, sūtra 4.32(33) proposes a different example to illustrate the assertion that without a time-sequence no change can come about: na hy ananubhūta-krama-ksanā navasya purānatā vastrasyānte bhavati ‘ For without a sequence of moments being perceived a new garment cannot reach at the end the state of becoming old.’ In Ans. to Q 66 above (R, p. 196,11.4–5) the example of the white (object) becoming yellow and then black is used in order to illustrate the thesis that such a process does not bring about an absolute destruction of the qualities in question: they exist in potentia after having existed in actu.

In the Kālasamuddeśa (v. 13) of Bhartrhari’s Vākyapadīya the relation of time to observed change is formulated as follows:

mūrtīnām tena bhinnānām dcayāpacayāh prthak/ laksyante parināmena sarvāsām bheda-yoginā//

‘Growth and decay of all corporeal forms separated by that (i.e. time) which brings about separations are perceived, each apart, through mutation (caused by time).’ Cf. Peri Sarveswara Sharma, The Kālasamuddeśa of Bhartrhari’s Vākyaapadīya (together with Helārāja’s commentary translated from the Sanskrit for the first time), Delhi, 1972, 49. Our interpretation of the Sanskrit verse is somewhat different from that offered in the latter.

150 —lit. ‘how’.

151 As Ritter observes, in a parallel passage in India (see the following note) the word Ois used instead of. There is no difference between the two terms as far as meaning is concerned

152 The expression ‘ endowed with knowledge‘ is a translation ofwhich is rightly inserted by Ritter into the text from the parallel passage in India, Hyd., p. 61, 11. 17 seq.

153 This corresponds to YS, sūtra 4.33(34): purusārtha-śūnyānām gunānam pratiprasavah kaivalyam svarūpa-pralisthā vā citi-śakter iti. We adopt the reading citi-śakter, rather than citiśaktir. The latter occurs in most printed texts, but Vyāsa's interpretation seems to presuppose the reading śakter: tasyāh sadā tathaivāvasthānam ‘ the permanence of its abiding in that state.’ Cf. YS, sūtra 1.3: tadā drastuh svarupe ’vasthdnam. (Also cf. Vij. on YS, sūtra 2.25.) This points to Vyāsa’s having regarded śvarupa-pratisthā as a noun rather than an adjective. The following passage in Bhavadeva ad loc. also appears to support the reading śakter: svasmin svarūpasya pratisthāsambhavena buddhy-anabhisambandha eva svapratisthatvam citer bodhyam ‘ The subsistence of pure consciousness is to be thought of as the absence of connexion (of the purusa) with the mind (buddht) because the subsistence (of the purusa’s) nature in itself has come about.’ The sūtra may accordingly be translated: ‘ (The state of) kaivalya (‘ wholeness’ i.e. independence, liberation) consists in the resorption (into prakrti, ‘ primordial Nature ’) of the gunas no longer motivated by (lit. ‘ empty of the goal of ’ ) the purusa (‘ self’); or alternatively (it may be defined as) the state in which the faculty of pure consciousness subsists.’ For the meaning of the term śakti here cf. YS, sūtras 3.23; 2.2; 2.23; and the gloss yogyatā (‘ ability’) by Vāc and Maniprabhā under YS, sūtra 2.6 and by Vij. under sutra 2.23. For an understanding of the term as meaning ‘ potentiality’ cf. Vij. under YS, sūtra 2.6. (Also cf. the use of the term in Vy. on YS, sūtra 2.4: kā prasuptih cetasi śakti-mātra-pratislhanam bīja-bhāvopagamah ‘ What is the dormant state (of the afflictions)? It is their subsistence in the mind as a mere potentiality, reduced to (the condition) of a seed’.)

The first part of the sūtra under consideration corresponds to SK, kārikā 68:

prāpte śaīra-bhede caritārthatvāt pradhāna-vinivrttau/ ekāntikam ātyantikam ubhayam kaivalyam apnoti/

‘ When, upon separation from the body, primordial Nature ceases to function by reason of the purpose having been achieved, one attains the state of kaivalya which is absolute as well as final (cf. kārikā 1).’ The definition of kaivalya in YS, sūtra 3.55 is similar though not identical (cf. BSOAS, ch. III, p. 304, n. 284).

In a passage in India (Hyd., 61) al-Bīrūnī sets forth, as he says, the views of the Hindus on liberation. Some of the opinions which he expounds seem to be derived from the YS. At the end of the passage there is a quotation from the conclusion of ‘ the book of Patafijali’. The passage reads:

The passage may be translated as follows:

‘ With regard to liberation they (the Hindus) came (to hold the doctrine of) union. For God (according to them) can dispense with hoping for recompense or fearing opposition, exempt from (the object of) thoughts, beyond all antagonists which could be abhorrent and equals which could be beloved, knowing himself with a knowing that does not supervene and does not have (as its object) something that was not known to Him at some stage (lit., state). This, according to them, is also the attribute of the liberated one. Hence the latter cannot be distinguished from Him in this respect except in the matter (of) the beginning; for he did not exist in the eternity a pane ante in the manner in which he exists (after having been liberated), since he was before (achieving this state) in a stage of entanglement (becoming) a knower through the known. His knowledge is like unto a fantasy which is acquired by means of effort, and that which is known to him is the sphere of hiddenness ().

In the stage of liberation, on the other hand, the veils are lifted, the coverings removed, and the impediments eliminated; the essence is cognizant and not desirous of acquiring knowledge of hidden () things, separated from the sensibilia that become obsolescent, united with the intelligibilia that are permanent. For this reason the questioner put at the end of the Book of Patafijali a question regarding the how of liberation. The answerer said: “If you wish, you may say: It is the annulment of the three forces (i.e. the three gunas) and the return of the latter to the same source from which they came forth; and if you wish, you may say: It (i.e. liberation) is the return of the soul, endowed with knowledge, to its (own) nature”.’

Cf. R, 181 (Ans. to Q 37). Alsocf. R, 173 (Ans. to Q 12) and India, Hyd., p. 20,11. 10 seq. with regard to the statement that in the past there was a time when the liberated one had not yet achieved the state of liberation whereas God has from all eternity been in that state. Cf. R, 174 (Ans. to Q 13; see our translation, BSOAS, ch. I, 320; we believe that the word which is blurred in the MS should be read— ‘like someone, or something, created in time ’; see R, p. 174,1. 2; BSOAS, ch. I, p. 320,1. 5).

154 The termis applied in al-Bīrūnīs translation to the union of intellection, he who intellects and that which is intellected. Cf. India, Hyd., p. 102, 1. 1 seq.:

‘They (the Hindus) have books…such as (the book of) Patanjali on the quest for liberation and (for) the union of the soul with its intellectum.’ Also cf. India, Hyd., p. 61, 1. 8; R, p. 197, 1. 20; BSOAS, ch. I, 305. Also cf. India, Hyd., p. 55, 1. 19:(‘ seeking liberation and addressing himself singlemindedly to (the achievement of) absolute unity’).

155 This is a literal translation. There is a possibility that al-Bīrūnī had written. This transcription is used by him for the Sanskrit śloka (with regard to the Mahābhārata; cf. India, Hyd., p. 102,1. 17) which means both ‘ verse’ and ‘ a group of 32 syllables’. In this context, however, al-Bīrūnrs statement that he has abridged the original text (cf. R, p. 168, 1. 2; BSOAS, ch. I, 310) should be also taken into account.

156 We readwhereas Ritter reads.

157 The MS hasWe adopt Ritter's reading.

158 The MS has. Ritter notes that the MS seems to havewhich he emends to . This emendation does not appear to be necessary.

159 The MS has. We adopt Ritter's reading.

160 The MS hasWe adopt Ritter's reading.

161 As Ritter notes the MS has . We adopt Ritter's reading.

162 Possiblyshould be emended. Cf. above R, 199, 1.1:. Also cf. India Hyd. p. 55:BSOAS, i, p. 309, n. 59).has been rendered above (R, p. 199, ii; cf. n. 153) by ‘ union’.

163 The MS hasWe adopt Ritter's reading.

164 The MS has. We adopt Ritter's reading

165 The MS followed by Ritter haswhich does not appear to make sense in this context. The emendation which we adopt is not certain.

166 The MS has. We adopt Ritter's reading

167 The MS hasWe adopt Ritter's reading

168 The MS hasWe adopt Ritter's reading

169 The MS has. Ritter, who notes this, does not propose any reading. Our reading (in spite of a grammatical difficulty) is.

170 The MS has. Ritter adds a question mark. This word is rendered by us as‘ (well) known ’.

171 The MS and Ritter's text havewhich does not make sense. Ritter adds a question mark. Our translation is based on the supposition that al-Bīrūnīs text had a derivative from the root(but notwhich would not make sense in the context).

172 The MS has. We adopted Ritter's emendation.

173 it. ‘share’.

174 may also mean ‘ shell’. Ritter notes that this word is not clearly legible. The MS hasCf. the parallel passage in India, Hyd., p. 19, 11. 7 seqPossiblyin our text has been substituted for(which occurs in the parallel passage in India). Sachau's rendering ofby ‘ sour dates’ (Sachau, i, 25) is erroneous.

175 We readinstead ofwhich occurs in Ritter's text.

176 The Arabiccorresponds to the Sanskrit śramana. The termis used regularly in India to denote ’the followers of the Buddha‘. Cf. Hyd., p. 30, 1. 17; p. 93, 1. 13; p. 479, 1. 16. Admittedly, in the Pali scriptures the term is used to denote various heterodox (non-brāhmanical) groups of mendicants, including the Buddhists, but the members of the Buddha's order (sahgha) are referred to by the non-Buddhists as the śramanas. (Cf. Padmanabh S. Jaini, ‘ Śramanas: their conflict with brāhmanical society ’, in ed. Elder, Joseph W., Chapters in Indian civilization, Univ. of Wisconsin, 1967, I, 42; also cf. Ruegg, D. Seyfort: The study of Indian and Tibetan thought: some problems and perspectives (Inaugural lecture), Leiden, 1967, 23–5.

177 Apparently one or more words are missing here, though the MS has no lacuna.

178 We propose to read. Ritter has

179 Our rendering of this word is suggested by al-Bīrūnīs phraseIndia, Hyd., p. 5, 1. 14.

180 We adopt Ritter's reading. The MS has.

181 In this context the term dravya apparently does not mean ‘ substance’ as in the Nyāyā-Vaiśesika doctrine, in which it is used to refer to any one of the nine categories of ‘ substances’ (prthivī, ap, tejas, vāyu. ākāśa, kāla, diś, ātman, manas—namely the five elements: earth, water, fire, air, physical space, time, space-direction, self and mind). As used by Vy. the term may mean ‘ matter’(?). Cf. Bhāsvatī ad loc: rŪpādi-dravyam ‘ objects such as colour ’. Also cf. Vy. on YS, sūtra 3.47:…samūho dravyam indriyam ‘ a sense-faculty is a composite thing…’. Cf. Vy. on YS, sūtras 2.30, 33; 3.13,44,52; 4.12.

182 On the division of time in Indian sources see Hermann Jacobi, ’ Einteilung des Tages und Zeitmessung im alten Indien’, ZDMG, 74, 1920, 247–63.

183 The avalambī of the printed text has been amended by us into avalambo. Woods's translation ’ and rests upon the sequence ’ (p. 282, 1. 12) follows the reading avalambī. Our emendation is supported by Vāc's reading as well as his interpretation of the text: kramasyāvalambanam avalambah. (The reading avalaksī occurring in Vij. does not appear to make sense.)

184 In this context it may be pointed out that according to the doctrine of the Vaibhāsikas—this is a designation of an early Buddhist school of thought—while the dharmas, i.e. the smallest units of phenomena, have always subsisted their actual existence is limited to one instant. In spite of the obvious differences the doctrine of the Vaibhāsikas and that of Vy. and Vij. (see below) have in common the view that things considered as eternal have two modes of subsistence: actuality and non-actuality. In contradistinction another early Buddhist school, the Sautrāntikas reject the opinion that dharmas are eternal; they maintain that the existence (or subsistence) of the dharmas is momentary.

185 Apparently the atom itself.

186 Apparently the activity of the atom.

187 ksana-rūpa is an emendation. The printed text has ksanākhya, which means ‘ called instant’.

188 The printed text has atiriktam. We read atiriktah.

189 We read vyavahāra-hetutva instead of vyavaharāhetutva of the printed text.

190 The term parārdha can inter alia mean (a) a very high number, such as 100,000,000,000,000,000—cf. Annambhatta's Tarkasahgraha Foucher, (A., Le compendium des Topiques, Paris, 1949, 66–7) or (b) an infinite number. (Cf. Apte's Practical Sanskrit Diet.)

191 This renders pracaya which occurs in one of the MSS. Another MS (followed by G. Jha's printed text) has avayava which does not make sense. However, an emendation avayavin (‘ whole ’) would give approximately the same sense as pracaya.

Al-Bīrūnī's Arabic version of Patañjali's Yogasūtra: a translation of the fourth chapter and a comparison with related texts

  • Shlomo Pines and Tuvia Gelblum


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