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Relative Truth Definability of Axiomatic Truth Theories

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 January 2014

Kentaro Fujimoto
Kentaro Fujimoto*
Affiliation:
Merton College, Oxford OX1 4JD, UK, E-mail: kentaro.fujimoto@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
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Abstract

The present paper suggests relative truth definability as a tool for comparing conceptual aspects of axiomatic theories of truth and gives an overviewof recent developments of axiomatic theories of truth in the light of it. We also show several new proof-theoretic results via relative truth definability including a complete answer to the conjecture raised by Feferman in [13].

Type
Research Article
Information
Bulletin of Symbolic Logic , Volume 16 , Issue 3 , September 2010 , pp. 305 - 344
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2010

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