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Theories or fragments?

  • Nick Chater (a1) and Mike Oaksford (a2)


Lake et al. argue persuasively that modelling human-like intelligence requires flexible, compositional representations in order to embody world knowledge. But human knowledge is too sparse and self-contradictory to be embedded in “intuitive theories.” We argue, instead, that knowledge is grounded in exemplar-based learning and generalization, combined with high flexible generalization, a viewpoint compatible both with non-parametric Bayesian modelling and with sub-symbolic methods such as neural networks.



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Theories or fragments?

  • Nick Chater (a1) and Mike Oaksford (a2)


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