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Is everyone Bayes? On the testable implications of Bayesian Fundamentalism

  • Maarten Speekenbrink (a1) and David R. Shanks (a1)
  • Please note a correction has been issued for this article.

Abstract

A central claim of Jones & Love's (J&L's) article is that Bayesian Fundamentalism is empirically unconstrained. Unless constraints are placed on prior beliefs, likelihood, and utility functions, all behaviour – it is proposed – is consistent with Bayesian rationality. Although such claims are commonplace, their basis is rarely justified. We fill this gap by sketching a proof, and we discuss possible solutions that would make Bayesian approaches empirically interesting.

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References

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Savage, L. J. (1954) The foundations of statistics. John Wiley/Dover.
Wallsten, T. S. (1971) Subjectively expected utility theory and subjects' probability estimates: Use of measurement-free techniques. Journal of Experimental Psychology 88:3140.
Zambrano, E. (2005) Testable implications of subjective expected utility theory. Games and Economic Behavior 53:262–68.

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A correction has been issued for this article: