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Inherence is an aspect of psychological essentialism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2014

Tara C. Dennehy
Tara C. Dennehy*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01002. tdennehy@psych.umass.eduhttp://people.umass.edu/tdennehy
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Abstract

Inherence is not a distinct construct from psychological essentialism; it is one of several underlying beliefs. I propose that inherence is only one entry point to the perception of an essence and posit that context may influence which aspects of essentialist reasoning precede inferring an essence. I also discuss how psychological essentialism can uniquely account for violations of category-based expectancies.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 37 , Issue 5 , October 2014 , pp. 486 - 487
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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