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Implicit metacognition, explicit uncertainty, and the monitoring/control distinction in animal metacognition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2004

Lisa K. Son*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Barnard College, New York, NY10025
Bennett L. Schwartz*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Florida International University, Miami, FL33199http://www.fiu.edu/~schwartb
Nate Kornell*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Columbia University, New York, NY10027http://www.columbia.edu/~nk267

Abstract:

Smith et al. demonstrate the viability of animal metacognition research. We commend their effort and suggest three avenues of research. The first concerns whether animals are explicitly aware of their metacognitive processes. The second asks whether animals have metaknowledge of their own uncertain responses. The third issue concerns the monitoring/control distinction. We suggest some ways in which these issues elucidate metacognitive processes in nonhuman animals.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2003

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