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Firestone & Scholl conflate two distinct issues

  • Ryan Ogilvie (a1) and Peter Carruthers (a1)

Abstract

Firestone & Scholl (F&S) seem to believe that the viability of a distinction between perception and cognition depends on perception being encapsulated from top-down information. We criticize this assumption and argue that top-down effects can leave the distinction between perception and cognition fully intact. Individuating the visual system is one thing; the question of encapsulation is quite another.

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References

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Barrett, H. & Kurzban, R. (2006) Modularity in cognition. Psychological Review 113:628–47.
Carruthers, P. (2006) The architecture of the mind: Massive modularity and the flexibility of thought. Oxford University Press.
Fodor, J. A. (1983) Modularity of mind: An essay on faculty psychology. MIT Press.
Kok, P., Brouwer, G., van Gerven, M. & de Lange, F. (2013) Prior expectations bias sensory representations in visual cortex. Journal of Neuroscience 33:16275–84.
Ogilvie, R. & Carruthers, P. (2016) Opening up vision: The case against encapsulation. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7:122 [ePub ahead of print]. doi:10.1007/s13164-015-0294-8.

Firestone & Scholl conflate two distinct issues

  • Ryan Ogilvie (a1) and Peter Carruthers (a1)

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