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Explaining consciousness: From correlations to foundations

  • Wolfgang Prinz (a1)

Abstract

What does it take to explain the roles of consciousness for action and action for consciousness? This commentary claims that efficient functional explanations must meet two epistemological requirements: independent description of explanandum and explanans, and foundational explanation of their mutual relationship. It is argued that Morsella et al.'s target articledoes not fully meet these requirements.

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References

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Graziano, M. S. A. (2013) Consciousness and the social brain. Oxford University Press.
Prinz, W. (1984) Modes of linkage between perception and action. In: Cognition and motor processes, ed. Prinz, W. & Sanders, A. F., pp. 185–93. Springer.
Prinz, W. (2003a) Emerging selves: Representational foundations of subjectivity. Consciousness and Cognition 12:515–28.
Prinz, W. (2012) Open minds: The social making of agency and intentionality. MIT Press.

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