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Counterfactuals in science and engineering

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2008

Sanjay Chandrasekharan  and
Nancy J. Nersessian
Sanjay Chandrasekharan
Affiliation:
School of Interactive Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA 30332-0280. sanjayan@cc.gatech.edunancyn@cc.gatech.eduhttp://www-static.cc.gatech.edu/~sanjayan/http://www.cc.gatech.edu/~nersessian/
Nancy J. Nersessian
Affiliation:
School of Interactive Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA 30332-0280. sanjayan@cc.gatech.edunancyn@cc.gatech.eduhttp://www-static.cc.gatech.edu/~sanjayan/http://www.cc.gatech.edu/~nersessian/
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Abstract

The notion of mutation is applicable to the generation of novel designs and solutions in engineering and science. This suggests that engineers and scientists have to work against the biases identified in counterfactual thinking. Therefore, imagination appears a lot less rational than claimed in the target article.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 30 , Issue 5-6 , December 2007 , pp. 454 - 455
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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