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Another rescue mission: Does it make sense?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2018

Piotr M. Patrzyk
Piotr M. Patrzyk*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne, Quartier UNIL-Dorigny, Internef, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland.piotr.patrzyk@unil.ch
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Abstract

Two misguided ideas dominate philosophical thinking on moral responsibility: (1) the idea that it obviously exists, and (2) the idea that even if it does not, it is nevertheless needed for the society to function properly. In his book, Doris (2015b) discusses the first illusion, while uncritically accepting the second. In this commentary, I question the utility of such endeavors.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 41 , 2018 , e56
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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